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1 Unity, plurality and explanation: The questions, 
the premises, the contributions 
 
They may seem to be different sorts of things. Some of the theories 
may address different phenomena or different realms of phenomena. 
Some are genuinely competing, others can be reconciled with one 
another, while still others pass one another by, answering different 
questions. They fit together only in a very complicated and 
overlapping geometry (Garfinkel 1981: 1) 
 
1.1 Questions 
 
Spatial issues have been somewhat neglected in the history 
of the economics discipline (cf. Blaug 1996). Yet economic 
activity clearly does not take place in the proverbial head of a 
pin: space and distance do affect economic activity in a non-
trivial way. Aimed at ending the long silence of the economics 
discipline on the “spatial economy”, a new approach to spatial 
issues was developed at the beginning of the 1990s. Almost by 
accident, Paul Krugman, at that time already well known for 
his contribution to new trade theory, noticed that a small 
modification to his new-trade-theory models would allow the 
endogenous derivation of spatial agglomeration: the New 
Economic Geography was set off. Krugman (1991a) employs a 
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general equilibrium model characterised by the presence of 
increasing returns, imperfect competition and transportation 
costs to derive a core-periphery pattern, that is, a situation 
where economic activity is fully concentrated in a core region. 
Later, partly in reaction to the complaints of “economic 
geographers proper” (cf. Martin 1999), the New Economic 
Geography became known as “Geographical Economics” (GE 
henceforth).  
By now, GE is an established field in economics. The 
appearance of four monographic expositions confirms its 
present standing (Fujita et al. 1999; Fujita and Thisse 2000; 
Brakman et al. 2001; Baldwin et al. 2003). The same basic 
approach that was first developed in Krugman (1991a) has been 
refined, extended and suitably modified to be applied to a host 
of spatial phenomena such as the analysis of the emergence of 
cities and systems of cities, growth and development, 
international trade and the behaviour of multinationals. 
There are many features of this intellectual episode that 
trigger the interest of a philosopher of economics. Although 
much of mainstream economics did neglect spatial issues, 
regional and urban economics are well-established fields of 
economics whose domains of inquiry overlap with that of GE. 
The emergence of GE also coincided with a renewed interest in 
spatial agglomeration and clustering1 in neighbouring fields, 
such as economic geography, economic sociology and business 
studies.  
Scholars from these different disciplines have criticised 
GE on a number of grounds. One of the main points of 
contention concerns the GE models and their unrealisticness. 
Debates over the unrealisticness of theoretical models, 
                                                          
1 Clusters are geographical concentrations of firms operating in the same 
industry or related industries potentially connected through production 
or service-related ties. 
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especially (though not exclusively) those grounded in the neo-
classical tradition, abound in economics. The dispute between 
economic geographers and GE provides a nice case study into 
the old but yet unresolved issue of unrealisticness [1]. In 
particular, it provokes us to ask the following questions. 
 
[1a] What roles do different unrealistic elements play in 
the GE models? 
 
[1b] If these elements play different roles, do proponents 
and opponents of the GE models correctly distinguish 
between these roles? 
 
[1c] And more generally, what is the explanatory worth of 
unrealistic models? 
 
Second, GE pursues explanatory unification [2]. The same 
basic approach is applied to explain a variety of phenomena 
that were previously attended to by separate theories. Among 
the questions posed by the pursuit of explanatory unification by 
GE are:  
 
[2a] Is GE a genuine instance of explanatory unification? 
 
[2b] If it is, what features does it display? 
 
[2c] Do existing philosophical accounts mainly wired to 
the natural sciences shed light on this (alleged) social 
science instance of explanatory unification? 
 
Third, at present we witness a plurality of approaches to spatial 
agglomeration, a plurality that apparently stands in sharp 
contrast with the unificationist ambitions of GE. Undoubtedly, 
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this is fertile terrain for an analysis of inter-disciplinary and inter-
theoretic relations [3]. It requires us to address the following 
issues. 
 
[3a] Are the approaches on offer incompatible and how 
should we go about finding this out? 
 
[3b] Are they rivals or complementary and how should 
we go about finding this out? 
 
Fourth, the presence of a plurality of alternative theories 
seeking to account for the same phenomenon leads to issues of 
theoretical pluralism [4]: 
 
[4a] Should a unified approach be pursued and if 
obtained, should it replace the existing plurality? 
 
[4b] What grounds are there for either accepting or 
rejecting the existing plurality?  
 
From a philosophy of economics perspective, this host of 
questions offers enough stimulus and substance to motivate a 
philosophical and methodological study of the case of GE and 
its neighbours.  
This thesis is a collection of essays that address the above 
issues using sophisticated tools developed in the philosophy of 
science. Two essays, Chapters 3 and 5, are primarily meant as 
contributions to the particular field constituting my object of 
study. They clarify features of GE and relate them to theories 
developed within neighbouring fields. In these two articles, the 
philosophical content has been kept to a minimum as their 
intended audience is that of practicing theorists, mainly 
(though not exclusively) interested in spatial agglomeration 
The questions, the premises, the contributions 
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issues. Chapters 2 and 4 intend to contribute in a more direct 
way to discussions carried out within the philosophy of 
economics and of the social sciences in general. In these, GE and 
its neighbours are analysed as a case study meant either to 
serve as a check on the fit between the chosen philosophical 
accounts and actual scientific practice or as an illustration for 
proposed refinements to available approaches. 
These four essays share a common set of philosophical 
premises in terms of which some kind of overarching 
philosophical framework can be outlined. This introductory 
essay serves to clarify those premises and their relations. Thus, 
after a brief introduction to the case of GE and its neighbours, I 
outline the philosophical premises that informed this thesis. In 
particular, in Section 1.2, I discuss realism and the partial and 
approximate nature of theories. I take on the view that though 
there is only one world, phenomena are complex and 
multifaceted, and hence, our theories are only capable to 
capture aspects of those phenomena. One of the main epistemic 
tasks of theories is that of providing explanation of phenomena. 
In Section 1.3, I consider the view of explanation that permeates 
this thesis. I make extensive use of the contrastive approach to 
explanation, which makes it possible to precisely formulate 
what aspect of the phenomenon an explanation, and the theory 
that provides it, can actually explain. Finally, in Section 1.4, I 
discuss kinds of inter-theoretic relations and provide 
ontological, epistemological and pragmatic grounds for 
accepting a plurality of interrelated theories and explanations of 
the same phenomenon. What emerges is a realist-grounded 
pluralism. After having outlined the philosophical framework, I 
summarise the contributions of this thesis in Section 1.5.  
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1.2 Geographical economics and its neighbours 
 
GE aims to explain the uneven distribution of economic 
activity in space, in particular, the phenomenon of spatial 
agglomeration at different spatial scales. The concept of 
agglomeration refers to phenomena such as the existence of 
industry clusters, the emergence of core-periphery patterns, the 
existence of cities and systems of cities, the pattern of 
international trade and specialization, the causes of economic 
growth and development.  
Geographical economists hold that these apparently distinct 
phenomena might be (at least partly) brought about by the 
same kind of economic mechanisms. Motivated by this 
conviction, GE proposes a unified approach for the study of 
those phenomena.  
The presence of increasing returns at the firm level and 
transportation/trade costs2 are the building blocks of the GE 
framework. At the aggregate level, increasing returns and 
transportation costs give rise to pecuniary externalities. 
Pecuniary externalities3 are transmitted through the market via 
price effects. Roughly, the presence of pecuniary externalities 
implies that the more firms and workers there are in a locality, 
the more the locality becomes attractive as a location for further 
firms and workers. This triggers a cumulative process whose 
end result might be that all economic activity turns out to be 
concentrated in one locality. 
                                                          
2 Increasing returns to scale are defined as a decrease in the average costs 
per unit of output for the individual firm as the level of output increases. 
Transportation/trade costs are generally assumed to be of the “iceberg 
form” meaning that part of the good “melts” in transit, and hence, only a 
fraction of it arrives at destination.  
3 Externalities are defined as a decrease in average costs as a result of an 
increase at the level of output of the whole industry. 
The questions, the premises, the contributions 
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Pecuniary externalities are centripetal or agglomerating 
forces, that is, they push towards the concentration of economic 
activity. In the GE framework, these centripetal forces are 
counteracted by centrifugal forces, (such as the presence of 
immobile factors, of congestion and the like) which push 
towards dispersion. The GE models are characterized by the 
presence of multiple equilibria: whether or not, and where, 
agglomeration occurs depends on the relative strength of those 
forces and on initial conditions, that is, on previous locational 
decisions.  
As I have already said, GE is not the only approach seeking 
to account for agglomeration phenomena. Fields such as urban 
and regional economics, economic geography and strategic 
management are also busy with investigating agglomeration 
and its effects on economic activity. Each of these disciplines 
and approaches has reacted differently to the emergence of GE. 
It seems fair to say that the fiercest critics of the GE approach 
have thus far come from within the field of economic 
geography.  
At the basis of the rather hostile reaction of many economic 
geographers is a historically-rooted resistance against 
‘neoclassical economics’ and its ‘methodology’. Around the 
1970s, many economic geographers abandoned the emphasis on 
mathematical formalism and the search for general laws and 
regularities that had characterised the field since the 1950s and 
began to look for alternative ways of theorising. One such 
influential alternative is provided by the version of Bhaskarian 
transcendental realism (Bhaskar, 1975) proposed by Andrew 
Sayer (1984) (cf. Mäki and Oinas 2004; Sayer 2004). At present, 
economic geography is a much-diversified field in terms of both 
philosophical and methodological commitments. As economic 
geographer Allen Scott (2004) put it, “[a] cursory count reveals” 
that, in recent years, the discipline has been variously 
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undergoing “an empirical turn (Smith 1987), an interpretative 
turn (Imrie et al. 1996), a normative turn (Sayer and Storper 
1997), a cultural turn (Crang 1997), a policy turn (Martin 2001), 
and a relational turn (Boggs and Rantisi 2003), among others” 
(Ibid: 483).  
The relation between GE and economic geography 
constitutes the subject of two of the subsequent chapters: 
Chapter 3 examines in some detail the ongoing dispute, and 
Chapter 5 discusses some of the economic geographers’ 
criticisms against GE as an illustrative case, the analysis of 
which may contribute to the literature on unrealistic models. 
In this thesis I do not discuss all fields and approaches 
whose domain of inquiry in one way or another overlaps with 
that of GE4. In Chapter 4, GE is compared to three theoretical 
approaches to clustering proposed within different fields, 
namely economic geography, strategic management and 
regional planning.  
 
1.3 Realism and the partial and approximate nature of 
theories 
 
The first philosophical premise that informs this thesis is a 
commitment to the view that there exists an objective world 
(metaphysical realism) and that theories can correctly capture 
its working (scientific realism) (cf. Psillos 1999).  
The theories and approaches analysed in this thesis lend 
themselves to a realist interpretation, and their proponents 
seem to interpret them along these lines. This holds for GE as 
                                                          
4 There is a host of other interesting approaches to clusters and 
agglomerations that I have not mentioned in this work (for example, 
Arthur 1994; Beccattini 1990; Bellandi 1996; Camagni 1995; Henderson 
1977; Jacobs 1961; Piore and Sabel 1984; Putnam 1993). 
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well, contrary to the economic geographers’ ascriptions of 
‘instrumentalism’ and ‘positivism’ to it. In Chapter 3, I argue 
that these labels are misplaced: geographical economists appear 
to hold a realist attitude towards their theories5. The source of 
confusion very much rests on a conflation, noticed some years 
ago by Mäki (1992 a, b) between two different notions: those of 
realism and realisticness. Keeping these two notions distinct 
helps to see how the GE models may contain a host of 
unrealistic elements and yet be interpreted realistically. (A 
more extensive exposition of Mäki’s view is given in Chapter 3). 
Though theories can correctly capture the working of an 
objective world, they can only do so in a partial and 
approximate way. Since (i) most real-world phenomena are 
infinitely complex, (ii) our cognitive capacities are limited, (iii) 
theories are representations, and (iv) hence cannot be faithful to 
the represented object on every aspect with perfect precision, 
(v) our theories are by their very nature both partial and 
approximate. 
In particular, it is in the nature of theories to be partial (in 
Mäki’s (1992a) terminology this constitutes one sense of 
unrealisticness) for they do leave out many aspects of the 
phenomenon they investigate. Theories are also approximate, 
that is, they are similar to the objects they represent only to 
certain degrees (See Giere 1988; Teller 2004; Mäki 2001a) 6. Very 
often, focusing on one or a few aspects not only requires 
neglecting others, but also introducing flatly false elements. In 
Mäki’s terminology, we say that in order to isolate theoretically 
                                                          
5 Recognising this, however, does not imply anything about the veracity 
of the GE theory, nor of any other for that matter. The point is simply that 
theories interpreted realistically can turn out to be either true or false and, 
whether they are true or false depends on objective states of affairs. 
6 Although many philosophers agree that it is in the nature of theories to 
be partial and idealized, the specific terminology employed and the 
implications they draw vary. 
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some aspects of the object under study, theories often employ 
idealizations, that is, plainly false assumptions made for the 
purposes of neutralizing, theoretically, the effects of “disturbing 
factors”. (Following Mäki (1992a), this constitutes a second 
sense in which theories and models are said to be unrealistic). It 
is generally agreed that this does not constitute a grave problem 
as far as those idealizations concern features which are 
irrelevant or secondary to the aspects which are meant to be 
truly described. 
All this means that theories differ with respect to what 
aspects they include and to the degree to which they are “true” 
of those included aspects. Comparisons between theories, 
models and the explanations they provide can be carried out by 
looking at what, and how, they isolate as being in need of 
explanation and as doing the explaining. Questions by 
proponents of rival approaches about what is isolated as in 
need of explanation and as doing the explaining gives rise to 
what Mäki (2004b) terms the dynamics of dispute. Here “dispute” 
refers to the process of questioning the boundaries of those 
isolations by proponents of rival approaches, and “dynamic” 
refers to the role of these appraisals in driving theoretical 
change.  
The dynamics of dispute creates the potential for erotetic 
progress. Erotetic progress amounts to asking better questions 
(potentially) leading to better explanations (Mäki, 2004b; cf. 
Kitcher, 1993). Erotetic progress is, in this way, parasitic on 
explanatory progress. Mäki (2004b) distinguishes between two 
notions of explanatory progress stemming from two 
conceptions of explanation. One sees explanation as unification: 
to explain is to unify a number of apparently diverse 
phenomena (cf. Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981, 1989). The other 
sees explanation as a matter of representing the causal nexus 
within which the explanandum is embedded: to explain a 
The questions, the premises, the contributions 
 11
 
phenomenon is to cite the nexus of causes that brings it about 
(cf. Salmon 1984, 1998). Translating these into notions of 
explanatory progress, we obtain the two notions of progress as 
scope expansion and progress as improved causal articulation or 
penetration. The former occurs “when the domain of kinds of 
phenomena explained by a theory expands” (Mäki 2004b: 326). 
I call this explanatory scope: progress as scope expansion occurs 
when a widening of explanatory scope takes place. The second 
“is a matter of an improving grasp of the relevant details of the 
causal processes and mechanisms behind the phenomena to be 
explained” (Mäki 2004b: 326). I call this explanatory depth: 
progress as improved causal articulation occurs as explanatory 
depth increases. 
 
1.4 Causal explanation and contrastive questions 
 
Rather than theory or model I take explanation as the unit of 
analysis. Obviously explanation is only one among the goals a 
theory and its models are used for, but it is certainly one, if not 
the most, significant epistemic task. The strategy I employ is to 
reconstruct a given theoretical approach as giving an 
explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. In many 
cases, this means stripping the approach to its bare essentials, 
but when needed, other features of the theoretical approach are 
carefully considered.  
The philosophical literature on explanation is vast (cf. 
Salmon 1989; Psillos 2002). It ranges from theories that 
investigate the nature of explanation to analyses of specific 
kinds and modes of explanation. A review of this exciting field 
is far beyond the scope of this work. Here I will discuss the 
most influential ideas about explanation that inform this work 
and how these fit with the rest of it. 
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An explanation is composed of three elements: the explanans 
(what does the explaining), the explanandum (what is to be 
explained) and the relation between them. Theories of 
explanation not only differ as to what the proper relation 
between explanans and explanandum is in order for an 
explanation to count as such, but also as to what the relata 
themselves are.  
For purposes of generality, I take explanans and 
explanandum to refer to all sorts of things, such as laws, 
processes, mechanisms, phenomena, events, patterns, states of 
affairs, and so on. I am concerned with both singular 
explanations, that is, explanations of particular occurrences, 
and theoretical explanations, that is, explanations of laws, 
regularities, patterns and the like. In regard to the relation 
between explanans and explanandum, I take them as causally 
related. Roughly, I take it that explanation is a matter of citing 
causes, or better, of locating the explanandum in a causal 
nexus7. This view is thin enough to fit with a variety of 
substantive theories of causal explanation.  
In addition to subscribing to the idea that explaining is (at 
least in the majority of cases) to cite causes8, I make extensive 
use of contrastive analysis (see Chapters 4 and 5). The 
contrastive approach to explanation (see for instance Barnes 
1994; Garfinkel 1981; Lipton 1990; 1991; Woodward 2003; 
                                                          
7 In the previous section, I have discussed two views of explanation: the 
causal and the unification view. The unification view takes it that to 
explain is to unify. In contrast, I here adopt the view that to explain a 
phenomenon is to cite its cause, and hence, that unification is parasitic on 
causation. Explanatory scope is a matter of explaining different classes of 
phenomena as brought about by same or similar causes. 
8 In Chapter 4 we encounter a case of functional explanation. Functional 
explanations are not at odds with the idea that explanation is a matter of 
citing the causes of a phenomenon. See for instance Kincaid (1996) for an 
exposition of the view that functional explanations are causal 
explanations. 
The questions, the premises, the contributions 
 13
 
Ylikoski 2001) takes an explanation to be, either explicitly or 
implicitly, an answer to a composite question of the following 
form: why f rather than c? where f is an aspect of a phenomenon 
to be explained (for instance, leaves turning yellow in autumn) 
and c is an alternative to it (for instance, leaves turning blue in 
autumn or turning yellow in spring). Formulating an 
explanation-seeking question in contrastive terms allows us to 
make sense of a given selection of factors among the many that 
lie behind the occurrence of a phenomenon (see Chapter 4 for a 
more extensive discussion of the contrastive approach). 
Although I do think that the contrastive approach to 
explanation points to a constitutive element of what explaining 
amounts to, the main insights of this thesis can be retained even 
if contrastivity is seen as merely a useful instrument to precisely 
formulate what a given explanation can actually explain.  
The contrastive approach proves to be of help when 
assessing the explanatory potential of theoretical models and 
when investigating inter-theoretic relations (in terms of the set 
of questions posed at the beginning of this essay, the areas in 
which the contrastive approach is of help are [1] and [3], 
respectively).  
First, as I argue in Chapter 5, contrastivity proves to be an 
aid in the solution of debates over unrealistic models in 
economics, namely, issue [1]. The point is that the degree to 
which a model is unrealistic is to be judged by paying attention 
to the contrast the phenomenon to be explained is compared to. 
If we take explanatory questions to be contrastive, then 
theoretical isolations and idealisations are, at least partly, 
dependent on the contrasts. Or to put it the other way around, 
isolations and idealisations determine the range of contrastive 
questions about a given phenomenon a theoretical model can 
actually explain (in Chapter 5, I call this “explanatory variety”). 
The contrastive approach serves well also in a dynamic context: 
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it helps to assess whether and how the explanatory potential of 
a given theoretical approach changes over time, and hence, it 
might assist when making judgements regarding explanatory 
progress.  
Second, regarding inter-theoretic and inter-disciplinary 
relations, namely issue [3], as others have already observed 
(Garfinkel 1981; Ylikoski 2001; Day 2002), what might at first 
appear to be rival explanations, on closer examination display 
an intricate web of relations of complementarity and rivalry. 
Not only are theorists often not very specific about what they 
are explaining, they might even offer misleading hints 
regarding the actual explanandum. The intended explanandum, 
what a theorist intends to explain, and what we might call 
actual explanandum, that is, what the theory is actually able to 
explain, might diverge. The contrastive approach to explanation 
offers the resources to compare theories and their explanations 
in terms of their actual explananda, and it allows us to do so at 
a very fine grain level. Thereby, it permits to appreciate 
differences and similarities that a less fine-grained analysis 
would not. Chapter 4 confirms the usefulness of the contrastive 
approach in the analysis of inter-theoretic relations by applying 
it to (a selection of) explanations of spatial clusters. 
 
1.5 Pluralism and inter-theoretic relations 
 
Theoretical pluralism refers to a stance that favours the co-
existence of a plurality of theories of the same phenomenon (cf. 
Mäki, 1997). Once we acknowledge that theories are both 
partial and approximate, ground is prepared for the co-
existence of a plurality of theories about the same phenomenon, 
each interested in one or another of its various aspects. 
Addressing questions regarding the conditions under which a 
The questions, the premises, the contributions 
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plurality of theories is acceptable and even welcome, namely 
issue [4], is important in this respect. There is a variety of forms 
of pluralism and a variety of grounds on which pluralism can 
be advocated. Before assessing whether a given plurality of 
theories should be accepted or rejected and on what grounds, 
however, we are first required to deal with the question as to 
how those theories precisely relate to each other. Borrowing 
Garfinkel’s words quoted at the beginning of the chapter, we 
are required to ascertain the overlapping geometry of their 
relations. 
 
1.5.1 On inter-theoretic relations  
 
Focusing on what has really been explained, that is, the 
actual explanandum, is crucial to a sophisticated analysis of 
inter-theoretic relations (issue [3]) and the contrastive approach 
allows us to do precisely such a fine-grained analysis. After 
having individuated the actual explananda of the theories 
under investigation, we are required to ascertain whether the 
explanations in question are compatible or not.  
Given that I take explanations to (possibly) capture objective 
causal relations, then two sources of incompatibility can arise: 
a) incompatibility of the explananda b) incompatibility of the 
explanantia9. Incompatibility can arise because of factual 
disagreements, conceptual incompatibility, or because an 
explanation disputes the relevance of the explanans of the rival 
explanation (Day 2004). 
When a plurality of explanations has the same explananda, 
we are confronted with the following possibilities. First, they 
                                                          
9 I do not consider compatibility and incompatibility among explanatory 
relations as a distinct case. I take explanations to be possibly capturing 
causal relations and the explanantia to comprise the way in which a cause 
brings about the effect. 
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can be incompatible because of some form of incompatibility 
among the explanantia. Thus, at most one of them is correct. 
Second, the explanations are compatible. In this case, the 
explanations are either incomplete or dependent on each other 
and the factors they refer to can be causally or otherwise related 
to each other (Kim 1988, 1989; Day 2004). (Table 4.1 outlines 
some of these relations and Chapter 4 applies them to the 
plurality of explanations of spatial clustering) 
In Chapters 3 and 4, compatible theories are said to be 
complementary and incompatible theories are said to be rivals. 
However, this represents a terminological simplification. 
Indeed, theories providing compatible explanations are not 
thereby complementary, and they might even be rivals. Let me 
explain. First, there is a distinction to be made between 
incompatible explanations and rival explanations. Incompatible 
explanations are those that cannot be true at the same time 
because of the way the world is. Rivalry might refer to 
incompatible explanations in the way defined above, but it 
needs not do so. Theories can be rival for instance when they 
compete in the pursuit of financial resources, dominance, 
prestige, that is, one or another scarce resource (it could be 
thought that incompatible theories compete in the pursuit of 
truth). The implication of making this distinction is that 
compatible explanations may still be rivals on these other 
dimensions. Some of the explanations and theories discussed in 
this thesis appear to be compatible from an ontological point of 
view, and yet they are perceived to be rivals on other 
dimensions. 
Second, compatible theories and explanations are not ipso 
facto complementary. This might often be the case, but it needs 
not be so. Complementarity involves more than compatibility. 
Think for example of the case where the two explanations cite, 
employing different terminologies, identical causal factors. In 
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this case, the two explanations, though compatible, can hardly 
be said to complement each other. What then makes two 
compatible explanations complementary?  
First, the two explanations should be about the same or 
closely-related aspects of a phenomenon: there is not much 
sense in attributing complementarity to two compatible 
explanations, one that explains why my pen just fell on the floor 
and the other why dinosaurs got extinct. Second, for 
explanations to be genuinely complementary, they have to 
provide distinct (kinds of) information: If one of the explanations 
contains all the explanatory information of the other, then the 
latter is redundant and should not be said to be 
complementary. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse alternative theories 
of spatial agglomeration and clustering and their various 
aspects. They suggest that some of these theories do provide 
different kinds of information, and hence are complementary, 
while others are compatible, but do not appear to complement 
each other in any interesting sense. 
Compatible explanations could, at least in principle, be 
unified. Since unification is generally regarded as a scientific 
ideal (cf. Mäki 1990, 2001a), it might even be argued that the 
integration of the two explanations into one should be pursued. 
In this thesis I am dealing with explanations that are typically 
embedded in scientific theories; hence, the integration of 
explanations is usually achieved through the unification of 
theories. Unification of scientific theories generally takes place 
through the development of a more fundamental theory that 
shows that the objects of the unified theories are manifestations 
of the objects of the unifying theory (Mäki 1997; 2001b). There 
are a number of epistemological and pragmatic reasons that 
make theoretical unification in many cases difficult or even 
impossible to achieve.  
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For the sake of the argument, however, suppose that those 
difficulties are overcome and unification succeeds. Do all 
unifications entail the replacement of the original theories? The 
answer is negative because theoretical unification usually 
requires modifications of the original theories (Mäki 1997: 45). 
The unifying theory will also be partial and approximate, but it 
will be so in a way different from the original theories. 
Explanatory unification is typically achieved by way of 
developing a more abstract law or principle (Morrison 2000). 
This indicates that in most cases the unifying theory, by being 
more abstract, and partial and approximate in a different way, 
will not provide the same kind of explanatory information 
offered by the original theories.  
Chapter 2 discusses unification in GE, namely issue [2], and 
shows that unification has been achieved by way of developing 
a more abstract and idealised framework. We do not 
extensively discuss the unified theories10, but GE theorists 
themselves regard their theory to be a complement, rather than 
a substitute, to the original theories.  The main reason for this 
seems to be that the kind of mechanisms that accomplishes the 
unification is taken to bring about the phenomena the theory 
unifies, but it is not believed to be the only responsible 
mechanism. Other, different kinds of mechanisms, which 
constitute the objects of the unified theories, do operate as well 
in the production of those phenomena. Hence, the GE case 
appears to support the point that in most cases, the 
development of a unifying theory does not entail the 
replacement of the unified ones.  
The larger implication of this is that either because of the 
impossibility of theoretical unification or because the theory 
                                                          
10 These are theories in urban and regional economics, trade theory, 
growth and development theory (cf. Mäki and Marchionni 2005b for a 
discussion of this aspect of the GE unification). 
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that unifies does not fully replace the original theories, a certain 
degree of plurality generally remains. But are there grounds for 
accepting and even welcoming such a plurality? 
 
1.5.2 What grounds for pluralism? 
 
After having identified the philosophical premises that 
inform this thesis, I take a small step forward and show that 
those premises lead naturally to the endorsement of some form 
of pluralism. Thus, I address issue [4]. This has implications for 
GE and its neighbours where a plurality of theories and 
approaches prevails. What justifications might we have for 
accepting and perhaps welcoming this state of affairs? 
The realist thesis that there is only one world, and hence 
only one way in which things in the world really are, is 
consistent with the idea that phenomena are multifaceted, and 
that different theories and explanations can capture only one or 
a few aspects of them. However, from the ontological 
viewpoint, a multiplicity of theories and explanations is 
acceptable only insofar as the theories and explanations in 
question are compatible.  
Yet there are epistemological and pragmatic grounds on 
which even a multiplicity of incompatible theories can be 
accepted. These same grounds also provide further reasons for 
welcoming a plurality of compatible theories. The well-known 
problems of underdetermination and theory-ladenness which 
point to the difficulty (or even impossibility) of unambiguously 
proving which, if any, of the theories in question is the correct 
one provide strong reasons for accepting and in most cases 
welcoming a plurality of theories (whether they be compatible 
or not). Social epistemologists (for example, Kitcher 1994, 2001; 
Longino 1990, 1991; Solomon 1994, 2001) have discussed these 
problems at length. In general, they believe that an 
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environment favouring a variety of theories, methods and 
points of view, some of which might be incompatible, is more 
conducive to scientific progress, thereby endorsing some form 
of epistemological pluralism (cf. Feyerabend 1963). Erotetic 
progress, discussed in section 1.3 above, hinges on the 
dynamics of dispute, and hence is itself facilitated by the 
presence of a plurality of different theoretical approaches and 
viewpoints. 
A plurality of compatible theories can also be retained for 
pragmatic reasons: some theories may serve certain purposes 
better than others. This means that theories and explanations of 
the same phenomenon may focus on different explanantia 
because of different pragmatic interests11, and that we could 
wish to retain them all because each meets a particular 
interest.12.  
The overall picture that emerges from this discussion is a 
realist pluralism of sorts, that is, a pluralistic view that 
nonetheless accords with realist tenets. There are strong reasons 
for accepting and even welcoming a plurality of compatible 
theories. These are ontological (the world is one, but the 
phenomena that make it up are complex and multifaceted), 
epistemological (theories are partial and approximate, and 
epistemic uncertainty prevails), and pragmatic (different 
theories meet different pragmatic interests). There are even 
epistemological and pragmatic grounds for welcoming a 
plurality of incompatible theories. This implies that though 
                                                          
11 Pragmatic interests partly determine the selection of the contrast. Once 
the contrast is selected, pragmatic interests might also affect the isolation 
of certain factors among the ones that explain the contrastive 
explanandum.  
12 Notice, however, that accepting this does not imply that what 
counts as explanatory wholly depends on epistemic interests Cf. for 
instance van Bouwel and Weber (2002) and Weber and van Bouwel 
(2002) for a pluralist stance mostly based on pragmatic considerations. 
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disputes among proponents of alternative theories of the same 
phenomenon are likely to lead to theoretical progress, progress 
ought not to be interpreted as a tendency towards reducing 
theoretical variety and plurality. The development of the true 
and complete theory of a phenomenon is unlikely, if not 
impossible. On the other hand, acknowledging this does not 
amount to denying the virtues of theoretical and explanatory 
unification, especially if these are ontologically grounded (Mäki 
2001a). The view I advocate here suggests that the way to 
theoretical progress is likely to be characterised by the 
coexistence of tendencies towards both unity and plurality. 
The implication of this for GE and its neighbours should be 
clear. Spatial agglomeration research is characterised by a 
plurality of theories and approaches committed to different 
epistemological and methodological principles. Some of these 
theories might actually be compatible (see Chapters 3 and 4) 
and focus on different aspects; others, by contrast, might 
actually be incompatible. Yet, for the reasons just discussed, this 
variety of approaches should be accepted and even welcomed. 
Attempts to unify such as the GE’s one should not necessarily 
be looked at with suspicion, at least as far as a certain degree of 
plurality and variety is preserved. 
 
1.6 Summary of the contributions 
 
Having outlined the philosophical framework, it is now time 
to look in more detail at how it has been variously employed in 
the four essays to come, and hence, to summarise the 
contributions of this thesis. Notice that the order of the 
subsequent chapters does not entirely comply with the way in 
which I presented the issues in this introductory essay: the 
essay concerning unrealisticness, that is, issue [1], is the last 
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chapter in the thesis (Chapter 5). In addition, pluralism (issue 
[4]) is not explicitly discussed in any of the subsequent 
chapters.  
Chapter 2 shows that GE represents an instance of 
explanatory unification [2a] and identifies its characteristic 
features [2b]. Unification in GE has been a matter of applying 
the same pattern of derivation to different kinds of 
explanandum phenomena. At the same time, GE aimed to show 
that these phenomena are really produced by the same kind of 
mechanisms. Although unification in GE has been achieved 
thanks to the application of an abstract mathematical structure, 
this does not imply that GE lacks explanatory power. Since it 
aims to explain stylized facts, its abstract mechanisms are 
possibly explanatory. Explaining particular occurrences, 
however, requires including not only details about the specific 
situation, but also mechanisms that are not included in the GE 
framework. We also ask whether the philosophical accounts we 
considered are able to shed light on this social science instance 
of unification [2c]. The analysis shows that although none of 
them is capable of fully capturing the distinctive features of the 
GE’s unification, they contribute to illuminate its different 
aspects. We take this to suggest that unification in science is not 
uniform, but rather adopts different forms and strategies 
depending on disciplinary (and other) contingencies.  
Chapter 3 discusses the dispute between economic 
geographers and geographical economists. It seeks to clarify 
this dispute by way of removing possible misunderstandings. 
In particular, this essay addresses the issue of inter-disciplinary 
and inter-theoretic relations [3]. It investigates whether the 
approaches of economists and geographers are incompatible 
[3a] and, if they are not, whether, and how, they complement 
each other [3b]. Once misunderstandings are removed, I show 
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that the two approaches might complement each other on both 
methodological and substantial grounds.  
Chapter 4 analyses a selection of explanations of spatial 
clustering. We consider GE and theories proposed in economic 
geography, management studies and regional planning. This 
chapter, therefore, contributes to the issue of inter-disciplinary 
and inter-theoretic relations [3]. It answers questions 
concerning the way in which the theories in question relate to 
each other, whether they are compatible, complementary or 
rival, that is, questions [3a] and [3b] above. The formulation of 
the explanandum in contrastive terms helps to see as 
compatible explanations that would otherwise seem 
incompatible. We obtain an intricate web of relations: some 
explanations are partially incompatible, others are merely 
compatible, and still others appear to complement each other.  
Chapter 5 also adopts the contrastive approach to 
explanation. It goes some way towards addressing the issue of 
the explanatory worth of theoretical models [1c]. In particular, I 
demonstrate that contrastivity pinpoints a distinctive role for 
some of the unrealistic elements in theoretical models, that is, 
the role of fixing the causal background shared by the fact and 
its foil. By identifying some of the roles unrealistic elements 
play in the GE models, [1a], I show that some of the unrealistic 
elements of the GE models can be interpreted as fixing the 
causal background. I investigate whether opponents of GE have 
correctly distinguished those roles [1b] and suggest that, once 
its explanandum has been precisely delimited, some of the 
criticisms of unrealisticness raised by economic geographers 
appear to be misguided.  
*** 
The contributions of this thesis can be divided into two 
categories: those which concern the specific social science case, 
that is, GE and its neighbours, and those whose relevance 
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concerns the philosophy of economics and of the social sciences 
more generally. In what follows I discuss the general 
conclusions, concerning both types of contributions, which can 
be drawn from the more detailed analyses. 
 
1.6.1 
 
A number of general conclusions that primarily concern GE 
and its neighbours emerge from this thesis. I summarise them 
as follows. 
 
(i) Explanations of spatial agglomeration and clustering have 
an implicit contrastive form. They compare agglomeration with 
alternative spatial arrangements such as dispersal. The contrast 
partly accounts for the type of agglomeration economies they 
isolate as explanantia. This holds for GE as well. 
(ii) The GE models contain a host of unrealistic elements 
playing different roles. Some can be read as fixing the causal 
background between the fact (agglomeration) and the foil 
(dispersion). These unrealistic elements of the GE models 
restrict the GE explanandum which turns out to be: “Why is 
economic activity agglomerated, rather than dispersed, in cities, 
clusters, certain countries and groups of countries?” 
(iii) Delimiting the GE explanandum in this way shows two 
things. First, the explanatory potential of the GE models, in 
terms of the range of questions it has the resources to explain, is 
very limited. Second, some misunderstandings affect the 
dispute with economic geographers, whose criticisms, in some 
cases, turn out to be misplaced. It appears that economic 
geographers and geographical economists are interested in 
different questions, and hence, in different aspects of 
agglomeration.  
For eographical conomics and its neighbours g e
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(iv) The above considerations open up possibilities for 
complementarity. The explanations of spatial clustering here 
examined are largely compatible, and in some cases, they 
complement each other.  
(v) Recognising complementarity does not amount to a 
denial of the methodological differences among the approaches 
here analysed. However, the presence of different 
epistemologies and methodologies should be seen as a 
favourable ingredient for theoretical progress to take place. 
 
1.6.2  For philosophy of economics 
 
The general conclusions regarding the philosophy of 
economics and of social science more generally are the 
following. 
(i) The contrastive approach proves useful in the discussion 
over the unrealisticness of theoretical models. Some of the 
unrealistic assumptions of theoretical models can be seen as 
serving the function of fixing the causal background between 
the fact and the foil. Those unrealistic elements do not endanger 
the truth of the explanation.  
(ii) The contrastive approach shows that the difference 
between explanations given by theoretical models and 
explanations given by other means is not a matter of kind, but 
of degree. Theoretical models, typically built in order to isolate 
a given process or mechanism, have the resources to explain a 
fairly limited number of contrastive questions about the 
phenomenon they investigate. 
(iii) None of the accounts of explanatory unification 
developed by philosophers of science here considered can alone 
fully capture the characteristic features of explanatory 
unification in GE. Together, they are able to illuminate its 
different aspects. This suggests that the philosophical accounts 
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are partial and/or that the structure of unification in science is 
not uniform, but rather takes on different forms and strategies 
depending on disciplinary (and other) contingencies.  
(iv) It is a recurrent theme of this thesis that imprecision about 
what is being explained leads to misguided judgments on the 
explanatory value of theories and on how they relate to 
alternative theories. In practice, very often theories and the 
explanations they provide are expected to explain more than 
what they actually can, and critics often take this failure to 
imply that the theories in question cannot explain anything at 
all. In some cases, vagueness about what is being explained 
leads to considering alternative theories as rivals when in fact 
they are complementary.  
(v) The contrastive approach to explanation helps to achieve 
clarity and precision on what is explained and by what. Because 
of this, its usefulness for inter-theoretic comparisons is 
confirmed.  
(vi) Since theories are both partial and approximate, 
different theories of the same complex phenomenon typically 
account for different aspects of it. This provides grounds for 
accepting and even welcoming a plurality of theories. Further 
epistemological and pragmatic reasons reinforce those grounds. 
On the realist pluralism I advocate here, the way to theoretical 
progress is characterised by tendencies towards both unity and 
plurality.  
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2 On the structure of explanatory unification: The 
case of geographical economics∗ 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 Amongst practising scientists, unification is widely 
perceived as a methodological virtue that should be pursued, 
and eventual achievements of unification are to be celebrated. 
Philosophers of science have long recognized this feature of 
scientific practice and have sought to develop accounts of it. 
They are accounts of what it is to “explain much by little” and 
of how to assess such explanatory unifications. 
Most of the illustrations and case studies provided by 
philosophers come from the natural sciences, mainly physics 
and biology (for example, Kitcher 1989; Morrison 2000). Few 
philosophical studies have been recently concerned with 
unification in the social sciences (see, however, Kincaid 1997; 
Mäki 1990, 2001). This is a shortcoming, as unification is no less 
of a pressing issue in the social sciences. The urge to unify has 
shaped much of social scientific theory formation, and the 
dream of a unified social science has given rise to a long history 
of research and debate that is very much alive today.  
                                                          
∗ This essay is co-authored by Uskali Mäki 
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In this paper, we offer a detailed examination of a 
contemporary episode of explanatory unification in the social 
sciences. Thus, we follow the tradition of looking at the actual 
practice of science to gain insights into the phenomenon of 
explanatory unification. Our case is a newly emerged field 
within economics, known as geographical economics (or new 
economic geography; GE henceforth). GE was recently 
developed to deal with the economic role of space, an issue 
largely neglected by earlier mainstream economic inquiry. 
Unification is a prominent theme that has motivated and 
shaped research within GE.  This new field claims to have 
provided a unified approach to the study of phenomena of 
agglomeration at different spatial scales (local, regional, 
national and, international) by showing how these phenomena 
can be traced back to the same basic economic mechanisms. 
We analyze our case to cast light not only on GE itself, but 
also on some of the philosophical accounts of explanatory 
unification. We ask what exactly is going on in GE when the 
practitioners say what they do is unification; and we use our 
empirical discoveries to assess key elements in some of the 
major contemporary philosophical accounts of unification. Or, 
perhaps more accurately, we use some of the issues in the 
philosophical accounts to guide our discoveries, and then use 
those discoveries to assess the philosophical accounts for their 
fit. In particular, we will discuss the role of premises and of 
argument patterns in unifying derivations; the role of 
ontological convictions and mathematical structures in shaping 
unifications; the question of how explanation and unification 
relate to one another; and the related issues of multiple 
mechanisms and degrees of unification.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a first 
glimpse on unification in GE: the celebrated achievements of 
unification, the major phenomena and theories that are claimed 
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to be unified, and the building blocks of the unifying 
framework. Section 2.3 briefly lists some key issues in recent 
studies of explanatory unification in the philosophy of science 
which will guide the subsequent discussion. The main feast is 
served in Section 2.4. It discusses the issues identified in the 
previous section and gradually develops an account of the kind 
of explanatory unification that characterizes GE. Section 2.5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2.2 The explanatory framework of geographical economics 
 
GE is a theoretical approach to spatial issues developed 
within economics in the beginning of the 1990s. It seeks to 
explain the uneven distribution of economic activity in space, 
and more precisely, the phenomenon of spatial agglomeration 
taking place at different spatial scales. The concept of 
agglomeration refers to seemingly very distinct empirical 
phenomena such as the existence of industry clusters, the 
emergence of core-periphery patterns, the existence of cities and 
systems of cities, the pattern of international trade and 
specialization, the causes of economic growth and 
development. The question is whether these phenomena of 
agglomeration do have something in common. 
The uneven spatial distribution of economic activity shows a 
fractal dimension, that is, it repeats itself at different levels of 
spatial aggregation. To geographical economists this suggests 
that these apparently distinct classes of phenomena might be (at 
least partly) brought about by the same kind of economic 
mechanisms, viz. "economic mechanisms yielding 
agglomeration by relying on the trade-off between various 
forms of increasing returns and different types of mobility 
costs" (Fujita and Thisse 1991: 1).  
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 […] GE is able to show that the same mechanisms are at 
work at different levels of spatial aggregation. The idea 
that at least to some extent the same underlying 
economic forces are relevant for explaining the spatial 
organization of cities, the interaction between regions 
within a nation, as well as the uneven distribution of 
GDP across countries is very important. In order to lay 
the foundations for a unified approach … (Brakman et al. 
2001: 323) 
 
Instead of investigating each of those classes of phenomena 
separately, using a different theory for each, GE proposes a 
framework that unifies previously separate fields of inquiry – 
such as international, regional, and urban economics - by 
showing how what previously seemed to be disparate 
phenomena can be traced back to the same basic economic 
mechanisms.  
 
The empirical phenomena […] have been studied 
thoroughly from many different angles, based on 
different theoretical frameworks, for a long time. From 
what is primarily a location perspective there are urban 
economics, economic geography, regional economics, 
and regional science. The interaction between economic 
centers is addressed by international economics, 
development economics, and industrial organization. 
One way to proceed would be to investigate each 
empirical phenomenon separately, using the insights of 
those of the above fields, inside or outside economics, 
which are thought to be relevant for the issue at hand. 
(Brakman et al. 2001: 17-18) 
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Unification is regarded as a major virtue of GE, a virtue that it 
shares with theories in more mature fields such as physics. 
 
Since the 1970s the top item on the agenda of theoretical 
physics has been to unify general relativity and quantum 
mechanics into a theory of quantum gravity. […] A main 
purpose of this book [viz. Fujita, Krugman and Venables’ 
“The Spatial Economy”] is to demonstrate that many of 
the stylized facts of urban and regional economics […] 
can be derived from a set of common assumptions […] In 
any case, there is a need to unify fields in economics just 
like in physics,  and the book has contributed to this 
discourse (Urban 2001: 151). 
 
It is thus evident that explanatory unification has served as a 
guiding ideal for the development of GE. This can be 
highlighted by considering a pressing objection to GE, namely 
that it lacks novelty: the kinds of mechanisms it postulates have 
been known since long by both geographers and economists (cf. 
Martin 1999; Berry 1999). Geographical economists respond by 
granting the point and arguing that there are at least two ways 
in which it contributes to advancing the literature on spatial 
agglomeration (Brakman et al. 2001: 323). First, it is argued, 
many of the previous theoretical attempts to explain 
agglomeration typically lacked economic micro-foundations, 
i.e. agglomeration was not derived from the location decisions 
of optimizing agents. GE instead claims to be capable of 
providing the missing micro-foundations. The second alleged 
contribution is that it shows that the same basic economic 
mechanisms might in fact operate so as to shape the 
distribution of economic activity at different spatial scales, 
thereby unifying the theories that had previously been used for 
studying those phenomena separately. 
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The framework of GE within which these mechanisms are 
modelled has two building blocks: the presence of increasing 
returns at the firm level and transportation/trade costs13. 
Increasing returns at the firm level requires dropping the 
traditional assumption of perfect competition and replacing it 
with that of imperfect competition which is modelled according 
to the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model14. At the 
aggregate level, increasing returns at the firm level and 
transportation costs give rise to pecuniary externalities15. 
Pecuniary externalities are transmitted through the market via 
price effects and, simply put, their presence implies that the 
more firms and workers there are in a locality, the more the 
                                                          
13 Increasing returns to scale are defined as a decrease in the average costs 
per unit of output for the individual firm as the level of output increases 
(cf. (2.3) in the Appendix). The presence of space implies that the cost of 
exchanging goods and services across locations increases as (both 
physical and cultural) distance increases due to physical transport, tariffs, 
cultural barriers and so on. Transportation costs are generally assumed to 
be of the “iceberg form” meaning that only a fraction of the good arrives 
at destination (cf. Appendix). This assumption is made in order to avoid 
modelling a separate transportation sector.  
14 The Dixit-Stiglitz model provides a way to model imperfect 
competition. The Dixit-Stiglitz is a general equilibrium model where there 
is a large number of firms producing differentiated products under 
increasing returns to scale. Firms take the price-setting behaviour of other 
firms as given and do not take into account the effects of changing their 
own price onto the price index. The products are symmetric, which means 
that consumers do not prefer one variety to another. However, they prefer 
variety for its own sake, which means that they always prefer to consume 
a unit of a new variety than an additional unit of a product they have 
already consumed (both features are captured by the CES utility function, 
see Appendix). The Appendix provides the basic features of the core 
model of GE where the supply and demand side of the economy are 
indeed modelled a la Dixit-Stiglitz. 
15 Externalities are defined as a decrease in average costs as a result of an 
increase at the level of output of the whole industry. Pecuniary externalities 
are externalities that are transmitted through the market via price effects 
for each firm, which, as a consequence, may decide to change its output 
decisions. 
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locality becomes attractive as a location for further firms and 
workers. This creates a cumulative process whose end result 
might be that all economic activity turns out to be concentrated 
in one locality. While pecuniary externalities are forces that 
push towards the concentration of economic activity 
(agglomerating or centripetal forces), the presence of immobile 
factors, of congestion and the like push towards dispersion 
(dispersing or centrifugal forces). Let us call this the pecuniary 
externalities mechanism of agglomeration. 
The GE models are characterized by the presence of multiple 
equilibria: whether or not, and where, agglomeration arises 
depends on the relative strength of those forces and on initial 
conditions, that is, on previous locational decisions. The GE 
models represent the process as path-dependent: the 
cumulative nature of the process of agglomeration is such that a 
small advantage of one location due to locational chance events 
in the past can have snowball effects which turn that location 
into the centre of economic activity, even though this outcome 
might not be the optimal one. 
To explain empirical phenomena as diverse as systems of 
cities, core-periphery patterns, international specialization and 
so on, locations are interpreted either as cities, regions or 
countries, and the pool of dispersing and agglomerating forces 
is accordingly modified.  
 
2.3 Explanatory unification in philosophy of science 
 
Our strategy is to examine the claims to unification in GE 
from the point of view of a few core issues that have emerged in 
recent philosophical work on explanatory unification. This 
section lists those issues and outlines the key concepts for 
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dealing with them, while the next applies them to the case of 
GE.   
Many explanatory unifications seem to involve inference, or 
derivation of large numbers of explanandum sentences from a 
small number of some other items. Our first issue has to do 
with the character of these other items. In his quest for what 
explaining and understanding amount to, Michael Friedman 
(1974) suggests that understanding of a phenomenon is 
achieved by reducing the total number of independent 
phenomena we have to accept as ultimate. Unification is 
achieved by minimizing the number of premises and 
maximizing the number of conclusions in explanatory 
arguments. Philip Kitcher (1981, 1989) revises Friedman’s 
account, arguing that the unifying unit is rather a pattern or 
scheme of derivation: "Science advances our understanding of 
nature by showing us how to derive descriptions of many 
phenomena, using the same patterns of derivation again and 
again, and, in demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce 
the number of types of facts we have to accept as ultimate (or 
brute)" (Kitcher 1989: 432).  
Both Kitcher’s and Friedman’s views imply that unification 
(and explanation) is a matter of inference and derivation. But 
does this capture the key feature of unification? This gives rise 
to our second issue. If it does, the view would be that 
unification is achieved merely by way of deriving large 
numbers of explanandum sentences from a small set of 
premises or patterns of derivation. If it does not, one may argue 
that explanatory unification essentially involves revealing a 
shared ontology underlying the diverse phenomena that are 
explained. This suggests a distinction between two variants of 
unification, derivational and ontological (Mäki 1990, 2001). 
While derivational unification is a matter of deriving large 
classes of explanandum sentences from a parsimonious set of 
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premises, theoretical structures or inferential patterns, 
ontological unification is a matter of redescribing a large 
number of apparently independent phenomena as forms or 
manifestations of a common system of entities or causes, thus 
revealing an underlying ontic unity between apparently diverse 
phenomena. 
Another angle from which to consider the role of ontology 
is suggested by the observation that unifications often come 
about facilitated and shaped by mathematical structures. 
Drawing from a few cases of unification in physics and biology, 
Morrison (2000) notices that in most of them the unifying 
theory embodies a mathematical structure that plays a 
prominent role in the process of unification, sometimes at the 
expense of ontology. Does the prominent role of mathematics in 
enhancing unifications rule out ontological unification, or are 
they compatible? This is our third issue. We seek to identify the 
respective roles of mathematics and ontology in driving 
unification.  
Our fourth issue concerns how unification relates to other 
epistemic notions such as explanation and confirmation. 
Kitcher’s view is that explanation is unification: to explain is to 
unify (Kitcher 1981, 1989). Many others take issue with this and 
instead argue that unification and explanation are logically and 
conceptually separate – even though a good explanation may 
turn out to be capable of unification as well. The view is that the 
unifying power of a theory does not contribute to its 
explanatory power, but it may contribute to its confirmation 
(Whewell 1847; Mäki 2001). Since we have been unable to find 
evidence in the GE literature concerning a connection between 
unification and confirmation, we will not pursue this idea 
further. We will instead examine Morrison’s (2000) view of how 
explanation and unification relate. She holds that not only does 
unification not imply explanation, but there is a trade-off 
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between them. In her view, unification does not typically 
translate into an increase in explanatory power because it 
typically occurs via a process of abstraction. More abstract and 
general laws may unify, but they have less explanatory power 
because they neglect details specific to the phenomenon to 
which they are applied.  
Finally, our last issue deals with the twin ideas of degree 
of explanatory unification and of ontic unity by considering the 
questions of whether the unifying mechanism is always the 
only mechanism in operation, whether it is always the main 
mechanism, and whether it is in operation in all instances of the 
classes of phenomena it unifies.  
 
In what follows we examine how the case of GE relates to 
the four issues discussed above. The analysis will help us to 
outline an account of what is going on in GE when the 
practitioners claim they seek and manage to unify. We show 
that none of the presently available philosophical accounts of 
explanatory unification fully captures the kind of unification 
that seems characteristic of GE. Rather than concluding from 
this that unification in this specific context is not a genuine 
instance of explanatory unification, we endorse the view that 
unification is a complex phenomenon taking on different 
features in different contexts.  
 
2.4.1 Premises and conclusions versus argument patterns 
 
On Friedman’s early account (Friedman 1974), unification is 
conceived in terms of the number of premises and conclusions 
in explanatory arguments. Explanations are arguments whose 
2.4 The structure of unification in eographical g
conomics  e
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premises are the explanantia and whose conclusions are the 
explananda. Unification is a matter of minimizing the number 
of premises and maximizing the number of conclusions 
(Kitcher 1989: 431). Kitcher extends and refines Friedman’s 
account. He suggests that explanatory unification is a matter of 
applying the same patterns of derivation over and over again to 
derive descriptions of different kinds of explanandum 
phenomena. 
 To Kitcher, argument patterns are composed of the 
following elements. First, schematic sentences are expressions 
in which most if not all non-logical expressions are replaced 
with dummy letters. Second, a set of filling instructions for a 
schematic sentence indicates how dummy letters are to be 
replaced in specific applications. A schematic argument is a 
sequence of schematic sentences. Third, a classification for a 
schematic argument provides the inferential characteristics of 
the argument. The triple composed of a schematic argument, a 
set of sets of filling instructions, and a classification for a 
schematic argument constitutes the argument pattern. 
Unification and hence progress is achieved by deriving 
descriptions of many types of phenomena using the same or 
similar patterns of derivation over and over again16.  
In line with the trend in economics more generally (cf. Mäki 
2001: 495), Kitcher’s account appears to be more suitable than 
Friedman’s for characterizing unification in GE. Here is an 
expression of the idea in terms of models that implement a 
theoretical pattern: 
 
                                                          
16 Similarity between argument patterns is defined in terms of stringency 
of a pattern. This in turn is determined by the conditions on the logical 
structure imposed by the classification and by the conditions on the 
substitution of expressions for dummy letters.  
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Across a variety of models that seem quite different on 
the surface, a suitable redefinition of variables leads to 
the same expressions for break point and sustain point. 
[…] In this sense we can claim to have developed a 
theory of spatial concentration that is broader than any 
particular model, and that helps us to see a number of 
different models as particular cases of a more general 
approach (Fujita et al. 1999: 10) 
 
The “more general approach” can be interpreted as the 
argument pattern which is used over and over again to derive 
agglomerations of different kinds with “a number of different 
models as particular cases”. The “suitable redefinition of 
variables” yields those particular cases; those variables can then 
be seen as the dummy letters in the schematic sentences. An 
instance of how variables are to be re-interpreted according to 
the specific application is given by the following quote.  
 
In a world of countries—which we think of as 
geographical units that can trade, but among which labor 
does not move—agglomeration in the sense of 
population concentration cannot occur. However, 
linkages among industrial sectors can still lead to a 
process of industrial concentration that is conceptually 
very similar to the stories about agglomeration we told in 
our regional and urban analyses. […] So far we have 
shown that a geographical approach to world trade can 
indeed be conducted using the same tools we have 
applied to cities and regions, and that the structure of 
this analysis is indeed at an abstract level almost exactly 
the same as what we have done before” (Fujita et al. 1999: 
259) 
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The same abstract structure of analysis is retained across 
applications. In each, the basic expressions are to be redefined 
so as to refer to cities, regions or countries. This requires 
redescribing a number of variables so as to fit them with the 
application to those distinct levels of aggregation.  
To exemplify, consider the core model of GE, namely 
Krugman (1991a)17 (The basics of the core model and of an 
extension are provided in the Appendix). This derives the 
conditions for the existence and sustainability of a core-
periphery pattern, that is, a situation in which the economic 
system is characterized by the presence of a core where the bulk 
of economic activity is concentrated. In this model, workers are 
mobile between locations and are assumed to move in response 
to differences in real wage18. This movement is at the basis of 
the forces that can bring about and sustain a core-periphery 
pattern. Consider now the establishment of patterns of 
international trade as the phenomenon to be derived. In this 
case, the assumption of labour mobility specific to the core 
model is dropped (as the extent of international mobility is 
much lower with respect to mobility across regions or cities), 
and hence locations are to be interpreted as countries. Labour 
mobility is replaced by the presence of inter-industry linkages 
                                                          
17 Krugman (1991a) is considered the first core model of GE. It is the core 
model in the sense that it provides the basic apparatus for subsequent 
models which are extensions and refinements to it. It is also generally 
regarded as the first core model because recently a second kind of core 
model has been introduced (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999; 
Krugman and Venables 1995, 1996; Puga 1999). By replacing inter-
regional labour mobility with inter-industry linkages (grounded on the 
presence of intermediate inputs) the second core model and its 
refinements solve a few problems which affect the first core model such 
as its bias towards deriving complete agglomeration and its failure to 
account for the empirical fact that concentration of manufacturing 
production exceeds concentration of manufacturing labour (Brackman et 
al. 2001; 2004) 
18 Cf. equation (2.6) in the Appendix 
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among firms that employ each other’s products as intermediate 
inputs in production, as a force pushing towards 
agglomeration19.  
The argument patterns that yield either agglomeration or 
dispersion are composed of expressions referring to 
characteristics of the supply and the demand side of the 
economy (according to the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition). Once the equilibrium solutions are obtained, 
expressions that represent the role of backward and forward 
linkages can be derived. These expressions provide the 
conditions (range of transportation costs) under which “an 
economy with agglomeration becomes possible” (the sustain 
point) and those under which “an economy without 
agglomeration becomes unstable” (the break point) (Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables 1999: 10). These expressions turn out to 
be very similar across a variety of different models. 20  
 
2.4.2 Derivational versus ontological unification 
 
On the interpretation just given, GE achieves unification by 
using similar patterns of derivation to derive descriptions of 
                                                          
19 In the Appendix, the basics of the core model and the extension to 
international trade are outlined. Notice the similarity between (2.17)-(2.20) 
of the international specialization models with (2.7)-(2.10). Their 
differences are essentially due to the presence of the intermediates for 
production in the international specialization model. Also the centrifugal 
force may change depending on the phenomenon to be derived. For 
instance, the immobile factor can either be land or the agricultural 
workers. In the core model, the latter are immobile, whereas when GE 
seeks to explain the existence of cities and systems of cities, the immobile 
factor is typically land. 
20 Appendix reports expressions (2.15) and (2.21) for the sustain points 
and (2.16) and (2.22) for the break points of the core model and the 
international specialization model respectively. Notice that they are 
basically identical expressions except for a change in parameter. 
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apparently diverse phenomena. The next question we consider 
is whether GE yields nothing but derivational unification, in 
contrast to ontological unification. Derivational unification is a 
matter of deriving large classes of explanandum sentences from 
a parsimonious set of premises, theoretical structures or 
inferential patterns. It is based on the derivational capacities of 
theories. Explanations are construed as arguments and theories 
are regarded as logical formulae, possibly devoid of truth-
value, serving the task of generating implications and saving 
the phenomena. Per se derivational unification does not imply 
anything about unity among the phenomena themselves.  
By contrast, ontological unification is based on the 
representational capacities of theories in depicting underlying 
systems. Explanations are construed as descriptions of the order 
of things in the world. Theories are regarded as purportedly 
true pictures of the simplest mechanisms and processes of the 
world's workings; phenomena are regarded as manifestations 
thereof. Ontological unification is a matter of redescribing 
apparently independent and diverse phenomena as 
manifestations (outcomes, phases, forms, aspects) of one and 
the same small number of entities, powers, mechanisms, 
processes.  (Aronson 1984; Mäki 1990, 2001)  
In GE, rather than excluding one another, derivational and 
ontological unification seem to be conjoined. Unification is not 
solely a matter of derivation. The aim is rather to establish a 
significant fact about the world: agglomeration at different 
spatial scales can in fact be caused by the same kind of 
mechanisms.  
Talk of “mechanisms” and “forces” is frequent in GE as the 
following quotations exemplify. 
 
The main reason for looking at these different levels of 
aggregation is that in explaining clustering, GE shows 
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that to a large extent the same basic forces apply at all 
levels of aggregation. (Brakman et al. 2001: 2; emphasis 
added) 
 
By using highly stylized models, which no doubt neglect 
a lot of specifics about urban/regional/international 
phenomena, GE is able to show that the same mechanisms 
are at work at different levels of spatial aggregation. 
(Brakman et al. 2001: 323; emphasis added) 
 
This talk about the “same mechanisms” and the “same 
forces” supports a view of unification that is consistent with the 
ontological variant. It also connects with the issue of the role of 
real mechanisms in explanation. In this respect, it seems to 
speak against Kitcher’s position and for views such as Salmon’s 
on which explaining a phenomenon is a matter of laying bare 
the mechanisms or causal processes that underlie the 
phenomena we observe and wish to explain (Salmon 1984, 
1998; see also Skipper 1999).  The mechanistic view of 
explanation is grounded on the realist thesis that the world has 
a causal structure independent of our explanatory efforts; 
Kitcher’s view of explanation instead leaves no room for 
independent metaphysical concepts such as that of 
mechanisms.  
Viewing GE from yet another epistemic angle suggests that 
it indeed does subscribe to common mechanisms that are 
independent of explanation and unification. This can be 
expressed as an implicit commitment to both realism (about the 
existence of common mechanisms) and fallibilism (about the 
possibility of one’s models not getting those mechanisms quite 
right). It also runs counter to the view that unity in the world is 
a function of a unifying theory.  
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The use of highly unrealistic assumptions made for reasons 
of mathematical tractability (“modelling tricks” as geographical 
economists call them) has prompted geographical economists to 
raise questions about how the models relate to the real world. 
While the employment of radically unrealistic assumptions is 
often fine for realism, or for the acquisition of significant truths 
about the world (see for example, Mäki 1994, 2004), 
geographical economists grant that some of their assumptions 
are motivated by mathematical tractability rather than ontology 
– and that the resulting models might therefore not be fully 
adequate. This is expressed in the following lengthy quote from 
a major representative. 
 
It has become apparent, however, that while new 
geography models do make it possible for the first time 
to put spatial considerations into models rigorous 
enough to become part of the analytical canon, those 
models are too simple, too stylized to reproduce the real 
economic geography of the world very well […] We 
might note in particular that the new economic 
geography […] suffers to some extent from the 
temptation to focus on what is easiest to model rather 
than on what is probably most important in practice […] 
Still, there are good reasons why mainstream economics 
does place a high value on being able to produce tightly 
specified models—if only to provide the backdrop for 
less tight, more empirically motivated study. (Krugman 
2000: 59) 
 
Rather than as such speaking against realism, this fallibilist 
attitude reveals a realist attitude: though there are pre-theoretic 
reasons to believe that there is unity among the phenomena 
studied, the theoretical constraints employed in order to 
capture that unity may in the end fail to do the job. The 
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statement recognizes the very possibility that the unifying 
theory might fail in describing a real unity or in picking out the 
correct mechanism or in depicting its precise working or 
relative relevance. As said, this runs counter to Kitcher’s 
position on which unity amongst phenomena is a function of a 
unifying theory.  
 
2.4.3  Mathematical structure versus ontological convictions  
 
The abstract mathematical framework employed by GE has 
been crucial in the process of unification. GE is said to be part of 
“the increasing returns revolution” in economics, which started 
unfolding with the appearance of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of 
monopolistic competition in the field of industrial organization. 
The Dixit-Stiglitz model offered a mathematical tool with which 
to deal with the presence of increasing returns at the firm level. 
New trade theory, new growth theory and GE itself all 
developed as applications of the Dixit-Stiglitz model to their 
specific fields of study. In particular, a sequence of successive 
extensions to models of new trade theory resulted in the 
appearance of the first core model of GE which only adds 
mobility of workers to its international trade antecedent. 21 
                                                          
21 Trade theory enjoys a special role in the dynamics of unification of GE. 
It was first proposed in order to account for the observation that much of 
trade between countries is of the intra-industry rather than of the inter-
industry kind as predicted by its neoclassical antecedent. Krugman (1979) 
seeks to explain intra-industry trade in terms of a framework of 
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition modelled a la Dixit-
Stiglitz. The presence of increasing returns explains intra-industry trade 
between countries thanks to the assumption that consumers have taste for 
variety. Given the assumption that each variety is produced at only one 
location, in presence of increasing returns to scale the taste for variety 
creates an incentive for both countries to trade those varieties of goods 
they produce thereby giving rise to intra-industry trade. To this model, 
Krugman (1980) adds the presence of transportation costs and later 
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 Geographical economists maintain that the reason why 
space had previously been neglected by the mainstream of the 
economics discipline was the lack of appropriate mathematical 
tools to deal with increasing returns at the firm level: it is these 
that are held to be crucial for an explanation of agglomeration. 
It was then thanks to the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition that economists could deal with spatial issues 
within a framework that they would find satisfactory.  
This is in line with Morrison’s observation that in many 
instances of unification the unifying theory embodies a 
mathematical structure that plays a prominent role in the 
process of unification, sometimes even at the expense of 
ontological considerations (Morrison, 2000). That the abstract 
mathematical framework has played a fundamental role in the 
unifying process is obvious. On the other hand, we just 
discovered that ontological convictions have also been relevant 
in the development of GE. How do the two relate? To realise 
this, consider the following passage. 
 
What we find remarkable and gratifying in all of this is 
the extent to which we are able to use the same modeling 
“architecture” to address so many issues in seemingly 
disparate fields. But then our point is precisely that these 
fields are not that disparate after all:  be it urban 
economics, location theory, or international trade, it’s all 
about where economic activity takes place - and why” 
(Fujita et al. 1999: 12) 
                                                                                                                             
Krugman and Venables (1990) adds uneven distribution of economic 
activity, thereby bringing new trade theory even closer to what would 
become the GE approach. The first core model of GE, Krugman (1991) 
only adds mobility of workers to Krugman and Venables (1990) (See 
Appendix where (2.6) gives the ad hoc dynamics of workers’ migration.). 
As a consequence of this assumption, the size of the market can be 
endogenously determined by the locational choices and hence 
agglomeration is explained rather than assumed. 
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What is here referred to as the “same modeling architecture” 
relates to the abstract mathematical structure that Morrison 
talks about and what Kitcher refers to as a pattern of derivation. 
However, at the same time, Fujita et al. (1999) seem to entertain 
the idea that unification achieved by applying the same 
modelling architecture to “seemingly disparate fields” is 
ontologically grounded: “the fields are not disparate after all” 
in the sense that they all describe the same generic aspects of 
how things are in the world, namely “where economic activity 
takes place - and why”. A similar point is made even more 
clearly in the following quote.  
 
The empirical phenomena touched upon above have 
been studied thoroughly from many different angles, 
based on different theoretical frameworks, for a long 
time.[…] We have already mentioned that the fractal 
nature of location phenomena […] suggests that similar 
forces might be relevant in explaining them. We therefore 
use throughout the book a common structural approach 
to help understand the phenomena […] (Brakman et al. 
2001: 17-18; emphases added) 
 
The unification of the phenomena studied separately by 
previous theories has been achieved with the aid of a “common 
structural approach” or the same pattern of derivation. Yet 
unification is grounded on the possibility that “similar forces 
might be relevant” in explaining the unified phenomena, a 
possibility suggested by the observation that location 
phenomena have a fractal dimension.  
We conclude that both ontological and mathematical 
considerations have played a role in the unification process of 
GE. It seems there need not be any conflict between them. We 
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might put their respective roles by saying that unification has 
been facilitated by mathematics and motivated by ontology (even 
though we admit there is no sharp dichotomy between 
facilitation and motivation)22.  
Even though the GE unification has been motivated by 
ontology, does this allow us to draw conclusions about ontic 
unity? Morrison (2000) makes a distinction between reductive 
and synthetic unity. Reductive unity is established when two 
phenomena are identified as being of the same kind (for 
example, electromagnetic and optical processes; Ibid: 5). 
Synthetic unity involves the integration of two separate 
processes or phenomena under one theory (for example, the 
unification of electromagnetism and weak force; Ibid: 5). 
Whereas synthetic unity does not have implications for claims 
about ontic unity, the ontological implications of reductive 
unity depend on whether the unification has been merely the 
product of applying an abstract mathematical structure or 
whether there are good reasons for believing that the unified 
processes are really one and the same. What we have said 
above suggests that the GE unification appears to be of a 
reductive kind. But are there good independent factual reasons 
for believing in such a unity as Morrison requires in order to 
draw justified conclusions about unity amongst the 
phenomena? Although there seems to be a consensus on the 
existence of the mechanisms described by GE and on how they 
work by and large, doubts remain (cf. Martin 1999; Sjöberg and 
Sjöholm 2002) as to whether they operate in the way depicted 
by GE and whether, and to what extent, they bear explanatory 
role in respect to all classes of phenomena purportedly unified 
                                                          
22 Notice that while geographical economists hold ontological convictions 
about the unity of the phenomena they investigate, they envisage the 
possibility that the constraints posed by the mathematical structure may 
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by GE. In this sense, though GE might be seen to pursue 
reductive unity, a cautious attitude should be adopted when 
considering whether those phenomena are in fact united 
precisely in the way depicted. Empirical investigation, which is 
still at an infant stage in GE (cf. Fujita et al. 1999 and Brakman 
et al. 2001), should be helpful in settling this issue. 
 
2.4.4 Explanation versus unification 
 
The relationship between unification and explanation is one 
of the thorny issues in the literature on unification. By 
considering this issue we will get a better picture of some 
aspects of unification in GE. In particular, this will help us see 
the nature of the relevant explanantia and explananda. While 
Kitcher believes that to explain is to (derivationally) unify, one 
rival view takes explanation to be a matter of identifying causal 
mechanisms, whether singular or general (Salmon 1984; Barnes 
1992; Skipper 1999; Morrison 2000). On this account, unification 
may come as an extra bonus. We have seen above that the GE’s 
case seems to support the latter view. Geographical economists 
believe that explaining phenomena requires invoking 
unification-independent mechanisms. This suggests that in GE 
explanation is not the same as unification.  
Morrison claims that not only are explanation and 
unification separate, but there is often a trade-off between the 
two: “the very project of unifying two theories is, for the most 
part, at odds with the procedures necessary for obtaining 
detailed explanatory knowledge.” (Morrison 2000: 192). Indeed, 
she argues, 
 
                                                                                                                             
not be conducive to the correct identification of the unifying mechanisms 
and of their precise workings. 
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The more general the hypothesis one begins with, the 
more instances or particulars it can, in principle, account 
for, thereby “unifying” the phenomena under one single 
law or concept. However, the more general the concept 
or law, the fewer the details that one can infer about the 
phenomena. Hence, the less likely it will be able to 
explain why particular phenomena behave as they do. If 
even part of the practice of giving explanation involves 
describing how and why particular processes occur—
something that frequently requires that we know specific 
details about phenomena in question—then the case for 
separating unification and explanation becomes not just 
desirable but imperative. (Morrison 2000: 20) 
 
The “how” element of the explanation involves the description 
of the process that has brought about the phenomenon, and in 
this sense, the grounds for separating unification and 
explanation are similar to those suggested by the advocates of 
mechanical conceptions of explanation. We will next focus on 
Morrison’s additional idea that unification usually requires the 
development of a more general concept or law. By virtue of its 
abstract character, this concept or law includes fewer details 
about the phenomenon, and therefore has limited explanatory 
power.  
No doubt unification in GE has been achieved at the expense 
of neglecting details specific to the phenomena under 
investigation as geographical economists themselves 
acknowledge: 
 
By using highly stylized models, which no doubt 
neglects a lot of specifics about 
urban/regional/international phenomena, GE is able to 
show that the same mechanisms are at work at different 
levels of spatial aggregation. […] In order to lay the 
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foundations for a unified approach, there is a price to be 
paid in terms of a neglect of institutional and 
geographical details. (Brakman et al. 2001: 323) 
 
This supports Morrison’s view about the way in which 
unification functions. But does abstraction from specific details 
entail that there is a trade-off between unification and 
explanation, and that a higher degree of unification is 
responsible for a decrease in explanatory power? As reviewers 
have also noted (Ladyman 2003; Muller 2001), Morrison’s lack 
of a precise notion of explanation makes her argument about 
the dissociation between explanation and unification a bit 
vague. However, two ideas seem to motivate her claim that 
there is a trade-off between explanation and unification. First, 
when making the claim she seems to have in mind explanation 
of particular phenomena. Second, she seems to subscribe to the 
view that increased understanding is achieved by describing 
how particular processes occur and that such a description 
(often) requires knowing specific details about the phenomenon 
to be explained. We propose both ideas need qualification. 
First, insisting on detailed descriptions of processes is too 
strong. Explaining always implies selection among the many 
details of the causal history of the phenomenon to be explained. 
It follows that description of processes can be given at various 
levels of abstraction and resolution, depending on the kind of 
explanatory information we are looking for. As many have 
already pointed out (for example, Garfinkel 1981; Lewis 1986; 
Jackson and Pettit 1992), one kind of valuable explanatory 
information concerns what is common across instances of a 
phenomenon. This requires selecting common details and 
factors rather than instance-specific ones. As argued elsewhere 
(Chapter 3 of this thesis), GE can be interpreted as searching for 
those economic mechanisms that are possibly in operation 
The case of geographical economics 
 51
across instances of agglomeration independently of spatial and 
temporal particularities and specificities.  
Morrison’s second ground for her claim of a trade-off 
between unification and explanation seems to be associated 
with explanation of particular phenomena. That is, she says, 
“the more general the concept or law, the fewer the details one 
can infer about the phenomena. Hence, the less likely it will be 
able to explain why particular phenomena behave as they do” 
(Ibid.: 20). It is not clear whether she holds the view that 
explanatory power is ultimately to be judged against 
explanation of particular occurrences. Be that as it may, we 
submit that if explanation of generic kinds, phenomena and 
regularities is considered, then a decrease of explanatory power 
is likely not to occur since these “theoretical” explanations 
typically require information about what is common across 
instances of the generic phenomenon.  
This is an important point to make, as the characteristic 
thrust of social science theorizing is to provide theoretical 
explanations rather than singular ones. In economics—and GE 
is no exception—theories typically aim to account for what 
economists refer to as “stylized facts”. (A few examples of the 
stylized facts GE is concerned with are the following: “At the 
global level, there is a strong correlation between the degree of 
urbanization and per capita income” (Brakman et al. 2001: 6); 
“Trade is large between similar countries and dominated by 
intra-industry trade” (Brakman et al. 2001: 245); “There are 
frequent changes in economic ranking, known as leap-
frogging” (Brakman et al. 2001: p. 186); “In nearly all countries, 
cities largely specialized in a few activities coexist with much 
more diversified cities” (Duranton and Puga 1999: 2).  
In general, stylized facts are abstractions and modifications 
of more particular bodies of information: they are generic 
patterns rather than particular occurrences. To theoretically 
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explain stylized facts is different from explaining particular 
bodies of data, as the latter requires more information about the 
details of the particular case. Therefore, failure to explain 
particular occurrences does not imply failure to explain generic 
patterns. While abstract mechanisms, laws and processes might 
have great explanatory power when explaining stylized facts, 
the same mechanisms, laws and processes are not sufficient for 
explaining particular occurrences.  
This implies that while it may well be true that in many 
instances, unification is achieved at the expense of explanatory 
power with respect to singular occurrences, this is not 
necessarily so when explanatory power is judged in terms of 
stylized facts, patterns, regularities and the like. The abstract 
framework of GE is to be supplemented with a host of specific 
details when employed to explain particular events such as “the 
establishment of a hierarchical system [of cities] in the US by 
the 1870” (Fujita, Krugman and Mori 1999) or the existence of 
particular industry clusters, such as Silicon Valley. The 
abstraction from these specific details may very well limit the 
explanatory power of GE with respect to those particular 
occurrences; and their introduction might require major 
modifications of the theoretical framework, or they might even 
resist integration within the straightjacket of the GE framework. 
Yet, GE might still be capable of explaining the kinds of stylized 
facts mentioned above. 
 
2.4.5 Multiple mechanisms and degrees of explanatory 
unification and of ontic unity 
 
We have seen that unification in GE proceeds by way of 
isolating the pecuniary externalities mechanism that is believed 
to be common to cases of agglomeration at different scales, and 
thus to constitute the unity among these cases. Given the 
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concession of the possibility of multiple effective mechanisms, 
including those not modelled by GE, we can now develop the 
twin ideas of degrees of explanatory unification and degrees of ontic 
unity. We can identify the following possibilities. 
 
 The unifying mechanism is always the only mechanism 
in operation. 
 
 The unifying mechanism is not always the only 
mechanism in operation, but it is always the main 
mechanism in operation. 
 
 The unifying mechanism is not always the only 
mechanism in operation, and is not always the main 
mechanism, but is always in operation. 
 
 The unifying mechanism is not always the only 
mechanism in operation, is not always the main 
mechanism, and it is not always in operation in all 
instances of the classes of phenomena it unifies. 
 
As we descend from the top to the bottom of this simple 
taxonomy, two things happen. On the one hand, the unifying 
power of the mechanism (or the theory depicting it) will 
increase in the sense that an increasing number of kinds of 
phenomena is likely to be governed by it. On the other hand, 
the strength of ontic unity amongst the phenomena will 
decrease in the intuitive sense that the firmness of the hold with 
which the mechanism governs them gets weaker.  
In GE, the unifying mechanism, namely the pecuniary 
externalities mechanism of agglomeration, might, at least in 
principle, be sufficient to bring about and sustain 
agglomeration even in the absence of other agglomerating 
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factors. However, in reality, pecuniary externalities rarely (if 
ever) act in isolation. Moreover, the GE mechanism may not 
even be the main mechanism at work in every case since, as 
geographical economists themselves point out, in certain cases, 
for instance cities, technological externalities are likely to be 
more relevant. This covers the first three cases in the above 
taxonomy. In regard to each of them, we are prepared to say 
that unification (of varying degrees) takes place.  
It is the fourth case that is problematic. Pecuniary 
externalities might indeed not be necessary for agglomeration, 
because, in principle, agglomeration may be a chance 
occurrence or perhaps the outcome of the design of a dictatorial 
planning agency. Naturally, we may be hesitant to say that in 
the fourth case unification happens at all: the mechanism 
simply fails to unify those phenomena with respect to which it 
plays no causal role. In other words, if it fails to govern 
particular members of a class of phenomena, then it fails to 
unify that class with other classes. On the other hand, we might 
try to accommodate this case by extending the idea of degrees 
of unification. We may just say that the higher the proportion of 
members of a class of phenomena that are governed by the 
mechanism, the higher the degree of unification, and of unity 
between this class and others. We should add that there is 
nothing very dramatic about this situation, given that in 
economics, and the social sciences more widely, general claims 
characteristically admit of exceptions.  What this suggests is 
that the kind of unification pursued and achieved by GE unifies 
large classes of phenomena while permitting relatively weak 
ties of ontic unity among them.  
If phenomena of agglomeration are governed by multiple 
mechanisms, then their explanation will require multiple 
theories supplementing GE. The set of such supplementary 
theories is likely to include also the unificandum theories: those 
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whose domains GE has sought to unify. The various inter-
theoretic relations that emerge are bound to be somewhat 
complex: a subject for another study.   
2.5 Conclusion  
 
We have shown that explanatory unification has played an 
important role in the development of GE. With the aid of 
existing accounts of unification in the philosophy of science we 
have attempted to provide a picture of the structure of 
unification in this specific context.  
In particular, we discovered that unification in GE has been a 
matter of applying similar patterns of derivation to different 
kinds of explanandum phenomena, rather than a matter of 
minimizing the number of premises and maximizing the 
number of conclusions. The GE pattern of derivation is the 
abstract mathematical structure that enabled the process of 
unification. As such, unification in GE is closer to Kicther’s 
account than to Friedman’s one. On the other hand, two 
features of the GE unification cannot be captured by Kitcher’s 
view of unification. First, unification in GE has proceeded by 
showing how the same mechanisms and forces, being at work 
at different spatial scales, can produce different kinds of 
phenomena. Second, geographical economists are prepared for 
the possibility that the mathematical structure has imposed 
excessively severe constraints on unification such that the 
outcome might not adequately capture the real unity in the 
world. This gives us a picture of unification in GE that is in 
terms of mechanisms that exist independently of explanation 
and unification.  
Both mathematical and ontological considerations have 
played a role in driving unification in GE. In particular, 
unification has been motivated by ontology and facilitated by 
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mathematics. Our case study thus lends support to Morrison’s 
claim that unification in science often proceeds with the aid of 
an abstract mathematical structure. Yet, no such support is 
found regarding her claim that unification often proceeds at the 
expense of explanatory power. Since GE aims primarily at 
explaining stylized facts, the abstract mechanisms captured by 
the GE mathematical structure might well be explanatory.  
On the other hand, GE’s capability of explaining particular 
occurrences might be very limited. Explaining particular 
occurrences not only typically requires the inclusion of a host of 
details about the specific situation, but also that of other 
mechanisms not encompassed by the unifying theory. This 
appears to be the case in GE where the unifying mechanism is 
not always the only mechanism in operation and in some cases 
it is not even the main one, implying a high degree of 
explanatory unification, but a low degree of ontic unity.  
With some conceptual adjustments, we have been able to 
identify and describe a special kind of unification in one recent 
branch of social science. From our analysis it follows that 
although none of the philosophical accounts we drew upon 
fully captures the kind of unification characteristic of GE, each 
of them has enabled us to highlight some of its aspects. This 
provides further confirmation to the view that unification in 
science is not uniform but rather adopts different forms and 
strategies depending on disciplinary contingencies and on the 
peculiarities of the unified domain (cf. Morrison 2000). 
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3 Geographical economics versus economic 
geography: towards a clarification of the 
dispute∗ 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Geographical economics is an attempt to incorporate the role 
of space into conventional economics, initiated by Paul 
Krugman at the beginning of the 1990s under the label of ‘new 
economic geography’ (see for example, Fujita and Thisse 1996; 
Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman 1991a, 1991b, 1996; Krugman and 
Venables 1996; Puga and Venables 1997; Venables 1996a, 
1996b). Economic geographers who have traditionally been 
concerned with similar issues, rather than welcoming this ‘new’ 
interest by economists in spatial issues, strongly criticise 
geographical economics on a number of grounds (for example, 
Dymski 1996; Martin 1999; Martin and Sunley 1996; Sheppard 
2001; Sunley 2001).  
I will put such criticisms under scrutiny taking Ron Martin’s 
1999 contribution as representative. His critical review of the 
‘new geographical turn in economics’ has had a remarkable 
impact on geographers partly because it reflects their common 
view on geographical economics and on neo-classical 
economics more generally. Martin claims that GE “represents a 
                                                          
∗ This paper has been published in Environment and Planning A 
(Marchionni 2004) 
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case of mistaken identity: it is not that new, and it most 
certainly is not geography” (1999: 67).23 This claim is 
accompanied by three fundamental objections to GE: its 
‘myopic view of theory’, to which I refer as the methodological 
criticism, its ‘commitment to mainstream mathematical 
economics’ and ‘its neglect of geography’, which I lump 
together as the isolation criticism. Examining these objections in 
some detail involves touching upon key issues such as those of 
realism, realisticness24, concepts of theory and model and the 
method of isolation. One purpose of this exercise is to elicit 
certain features of GE and by so doing to partly contribute to 
the clarification of the ongoing dispute between geographical 
economists and economic geographers.  
To do this, I first introduce the dispute between GE and 
economic geography (Section 3.2). Then I examine Martin’s 
methodological criticism and argue that it rests on a narrow 
conception of realism which prevents an appreciation of how 
realism can be compatible with the use of unrealistic 
assumptions (Section 3.3). On a more abstract notion of realism 
attuned to the wider philosophical discussion, GE turns out to 
be compatible with realism. I show this in section 3.4. Once it 
has been established that both economic geography and GE are 
compatible with realism, the dispute emerges as one between 
                                                          
23 I take Martin as representing the stance of the economic geographers 
towards GE. In the SSCI (May 2004), Martin’s 1999 paper is cited in fifty-
four articles. It is also discussed by The Economist (1999) and, as I will 
show in section 3.2.2, similar points are made by other economic 
geographers. Though Martin’s criticisms are levelled against GE and new 
growth theory, my discussion is on GE alone. Within the latter, Krugman 
plays a prominent role primarily because of his commentaries upon 
methodological aspects of GE.  
24 For a detailed discussion of (un)realisticness see Mäki (for example, 
1992a, b, 1998c). As will be seen later, 'realisticness' refers to "a set of 
properties of theories and their constituent parts" (Mäki 1998c: 409) and is 
to be distinguished from realism which refers to a collection of 
philosophical doctrines. 
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distinct theoretical isolations. In fact, the other two sets of 
objections Martin levels at GE are directed at what factors GE 
isolates as explaining spatial agglomeration. Martin's point is 
that GE does not take into account factors that economic 
geographers deem important for understanding spatial 
agglomeration. I show in section 3.5 that the main thrust of the 
dispute revolves around the concepts of horizontal and vertical 
isolation. I notice that the theoretical isolations of GE depend on 
and in turn determine what aspect of spatial agglomeration it 
can possibly explain. I hence suggest a way to formulate the 
explanandum of GE which helps to make sense of its theoretical 
isolations (section 3.6). The precise delimitation of the GE 
explanandum suggests that Martin's criticisms fail to hit the 
target, but more importantly, it allows us to look at the 
relationship between economic geography and GE in a new 
light. Taking this as a point of departure, in section 3.7, I ask 
whether beyond the methodological divide there are grounds 
for complementarity between the two approaches.  
3.2 The dispute 
 
In this section I summarise the intended contribution of GE, 
the critical reactions of economic geographers and a response 
from the GE perspective. 
 
3.2.1 An overview of geographical economics 
 
The location of economic activity in space had been a subject 
somewhat neglected by (mainstream) economists (cf. Blaug 
1996). According to Paul Krugman, the reason is that 
economists had been unable to handle imperfect competition, a 
feature of markets where increasing returns to scale at the level 
of the individual firm are present. Yet increasing returns to 
scale are precisely what enforce concentration of some activities 
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in space. This is why GE "may be regarded as the fourth […] 
wave of the increasing returns-imperfect competition 
revolution" in economics (Krugman 1999a: 93) that began in the 
1970s in the field of industrial organisation. The same analytical 
tools (namely, models of imperfect competition in presence of 
increasing returns), had been applied first to international trade 
and then to technological change and economic growth and 
finally to the development of GE (Ibid. 93). Hence it has been 
the availability of certain modelling techniques that cleared the 
way for the final recognition of economic geography by the 
economics discipline. 
In  Krugman’s characterisation, GE is a 
 
“genre” or a style of economic analysis which tries to 
explain the spatial structure of the economy using certain 
technical tricks to produce models in which there are 
increasing returns and markets characterised by 
imperfect competition (Krugman 1999a: 93).  
 
The explanandum of GE is the spatial structure of the economy, 
more precisely, the "concentrations of population and of 
economic activity: the distinction between manufacturing belt 
and farm belt, the existence of cities, the role of industry 
clusters" (Fujita et al, 1999: 4). The modelling tricks that 
characterise GE are the use of the Dixit-Stiglitz model of 
monopolistic competition, the modelling of transport costs as 
the fraction of a good shipped that melts away in transit 
(Samuelson’s iceberg costs), the employment of ad hoc 
dynamics and the use of computer simulations to supplement 
analytical results. Modelling tricks are understood as 
“assumptions that reflect not so much a realistic view of how 
the world works as a judgement about what will make the 
analysis of geographic issues manageable without doing too 
much damage to the relevance of that analysis” (Fujita et al. 
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1999). GE thus faces a trade-off between tractability and 
realisticness seemingly solved in favour of the former. Because 
this is one of the charges economic geographers level at GE I 
will have more to say about this later. For now let us look at 
how the models of GE explain the spatial structure of the 
economy. 
The spatial structure of the economy is analysed as the result 
of the interaction between agglomerating and dispersing forces. 
Table 3.1 lists (some of) these forces: the left-hand column 
represents the sources of external economies, the centripetal 
forces responsible for the agglomeration of economic activity 
(the Marshallian local external economies); the right-hand 
column lists the forces that act against the local external 
economies, that is the centrifugal forces that push for the 
dispersion of economic activity. 
 
Table 3.1. Centripetal and centrifugal forces 
Centrifugal forces Centripetal forces 
Market size effects (linkages) Immobile factors 
Thick labor market Land rents 
Pure external economies Pure external diseconomies 
Source: Krugman (1999b: 91); Fujita et al. (1999a: 346) 
 
Though “in the real world not only agglomeration in general, as 
well as any example of it, typically reflects all items on the 
menu” (Krugman 1999b: 91), GE typically focuses only on the 
interaction between market-size effects as the centripetal force 
and the presence of immobile factors as the centrifugal force 
(first line of table 3.1).  
Market-size effects are held possibly to give rise to 
cumulative processes of agglomeration when increasing returns 
and transportation costs are both important. The basic idea is 
that firms typically want to locate close to their customers and 
Geographical economics versus economic geography 
 
 
62
suppliers (or to the suppliers of goods required by their 
workers). If for some reason a certain place already has a 
concentration of producers, then it will offer a larger market 
because of the demand of the producers and workers 
(backward linkages) and a good supply of inputs and consumer 
goods (forward linkages) (Fujita et al. 1999: 7). Even abstracting 
from advantages inherent to particular localities (that could be 
identified at the local, regional or national scale), a slight 
difference in the size of the market in one locality, through the 
operation of forward and backward linkages25, could trigger 
and sustain cumulative and self-reinforcing processes of 
agglomeration and thus ‘lock in’ a certain pattern of evolution 
in that locality. The systems are usually characterised by the 
existence of multiple equilibria; hence whether and where 
concentration will take place depends on the relative strength 
of the two counteracting forces and on initial conditions. 
This basic framework depicting the tension between market-
size effects and immobile factors, is employed, with little 
variations, for providing insights into apparently diverse 
empirical phenomena such as the distinction between 
manufacturing belt and farm belt, the existence of cities, the role 
of industry cluster, the dynamics of the product cycle in 
international trade.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 The concepts of backward and forward linkages and their role in 
producing processes of cumulative causation have been proposed by 
Hirshman (1958). See also Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor (1978) for the 
concept of cumulative causation, especially in the context of regional 
development. Krugman offers an interesting interpretation of how these 
insights, though important, were neglected by the discipline of economics 
because they were not mathematically formalised (and not even 
formalisable at the time) (See Krugman 1995). 
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3.2.2 The reaction of economic geographers 
 
Many economic geographers hold a negative attitude 
towards neo-classical economics. In a recent intervention Amin 
and Thrift (2000) warn economic geographers of the dangers of 
a rapprochement with economics for economic geography 
would most likely become its "prey". It is perhaps not 
surprising that, though GE aims at bringing space and 
geography onto the research agenda of economists, economic 
geographers are generally not persuaded. GE is blamed for its 
imperialistic tendencies (Johnston 1992); for being founded on 
an inadequate rationalist justification (Barnes 2003); and for 
inspiring the feeling of déja vu (Berry 1999; Hoare 1992; Martin 
1999). On methodological grounds, GE is often criticised 
because it employs formal mathematical models based on neo-
classical economics that do not allow the complexity of real-
world phenomena to be captured (Clark 1998; Dymski 1992; 
Martin 1999). For Clark “there is a suspicion that analytical 
elegance and tractability drive the focus of analysis rather than 
empirical problems” (Clark 1998: 75; see also Martin 1999). On 
more substantial grounds, economic geographers have 
identified a series of issues that are poorly treated or even 
omitted altogether in the models of GE and that geographers 
believe are important. For instance, GE is held to downplay the 
key role of technological and knowledge spillovers in 
explaining agglomeration (cf. Olsen 2002) and the importance 
of “macro-structural factors” in determining the location 
decisions of firms (Dymski 1992). It is also charged with paying 
too little attention to the issue of “spatial contingency” which 
results in a failure to acknowledge “spatial interdependence” 
(Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002). And finally, economic geographers 
noted that GE deals poorly with the problem of aggregation in 
the sense that it overlooks the possibility that different 
mechanisms may be at work at different spatial scales (Martin 
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1999; Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002). Though certainly not 
exhaustive, this overview should hint at the kind of criticisms 
economic geographers have directed at GE. 
 
3.2.3 The response of geographical economists 
 
Geographical economists have virtually ignored the 
criticisms coming from the economic geographers' camp. An 
interesting exception is Brakman, Garretsen and van Marrewijk 
(2001) who explicitly address Martin’s 1999 criticisms. They 
concede that geography and its sociological, psychological and 
institutional components do play an important role in 
explaining agglomeration. They also recognise that some of the 
theoretical and empirical insights of GE are in fact not new. Yet 
they argue that the novelty of the approach lies in the way in 
which it deals with economics and geography rather than in its 
research topic. To them, the contribution of GE is twofold. First, 
GE has been capable of showing that the same mechanisms are 
at work at different spatial scales, an achievement reached at 
the cost of neglecting “institutional and geographical details”. 
And second, it is “the only field of economics which provides a 
micro-economic foundation in a consistent general equilibrium 
framework for the spatial distribution of economic activity” 
(Ibid.: 323).  
 
3.3 The methodological criticism 
 
Martin (1999) observes that the works of geographical 
economists and economic geographers are “quite distinct 
methodological and epistemological genres” (Martin 1999: 81; 
see also Amin and Thrift 2000; Clark 1998, Dymski 1992). From 
the methodological standpoint, he criticises GE for its 
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employment of “positivistic accounts” unlike geographers who 
have abandoned them “in favour of realist approaches”.  
A realist approach is held to be one in which “explanations 
are built  ‘from below’, often relying upon close dialogue with 
individual agents and organisations, and linking this ‘local’ 
knowledge with wider, larger stylised facts and conceptual 
frameworks” (Ibid. 81). This is opposed to the “positivistic 
accounts” of GE characterised by “deductivist, mathematical 
demonstration” in which “mathematical tractability drives the 
focus rather than the apparent diversity of economic systems” 
and “the complexity of the economic landscape is one of 
mathematical solvability, rather than empirical messiness and 
particularity” (Ibid.: 81; Clark 1998).  
Although there is no doubt that the methodological 
commitments of economic geography and GE set them apart, I 
argue that Martin’s characterisation of the former as realist and 
the latter as positivist is based on a rather narrow conceptions 
of both philosophical positions26. Relevant for the subsequent 
discussion is the notion of realism. As it is generally understood 
in philosophy, realism refers to a collection of theses about 
what exists (and how) and about what relationship holds 
between our representations and the world and not to a method 
whereby theories are formulated (see Mäki and Oinas 2004). 
Accordingly, confusion can be avoided by saying that certain 
methods of theory formation are compatible with realism while 
others are not, rather than talking of “realist methods”. And 
more importantly, despite emphasis on formalism and 
                                                          
26 Martin’s usage of the terms is influenced by the way in which 
positivism and realism are perceived in human geography. Johnston 
(1985) and Sayer (1985) give a historical account of the reception of 
positivism and realism in economic geography. Mäki and Oinas (2004) 
examine the "narrow" notion of realism of economic geographers and 
how that differs from the one discussed by philosophers of science.  
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tractability, models in GE might be compatible with this view of 
realism.  
Martin’s argument proceeds by noticing that these two 
methods lead to different notions of theory. GE endorses a 
“myopic view of theory” apparently meaning that theory “is 
assumed to be synonymous with formal, mathematical model 
building” (Ibid.: 81). In economic geography, instead, “the 
dominant mode of theorising is one of discursive persuasion” 
that “permits the construction of much richer maps or 
representations of reality” (Ibid.: 82). In Martin and Sunley 
(1996: 268), the contrast is posed in terms of the “aim at being 
realistic” of economic geographers and the “unrealistic 
assumptions” of GE. 
Although it may well be correct that the GE models are 
unrealistic in a variety of senses, their representations of the 
core of real-world phenomena might nonetheless be true (or 
approximately true). And, if GE employs unrealistic 
assumptions to get at the core of real-world problems, then it is 
quite compatible with realism as a philosophical doctrine about 
theories. In order to understand whether GE' philosophy and 
method are actually incompatible with realism, as suggested in 
Martin (1999) and Martin and Sunley (1996), we need to 
distinguish between the concepts of realism and realisticness. 
The implications of this distinction go well beyond 
terminological clarity for this sheds a new light on GE and 
perhaps reduces its distance from economic geography, 
without, however, downplaying the methodological divide 
between the two approaches.  
3.4 Unrealistic assumptions and realist philosophy 
 
On several occasions Uskali Mäki (1992a, 1992b, 1998a, 
1998b, 1998c, 2003) has insisted on the need to distinguish 
between realism and realisticness, two concepts that though 
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partly related are in fact quite distinct. The distinction proves 
useful because it serves to show that realism and unrealisticness 
are compatible in a way that Martin may have failed to 
recognise. 
The notion of realism we are interested in here is realism as a 
philosophical theory about scientific theories. Roughly, it holds 
that scientific theories can refer to real-world entities, that they 
can represent those entities by attributing properties to them, 
and that they can be held to be true or false representations of 
those entities on the basis of how they relate to the way the 
world works (for example, Mäki 1992a).  
The concept of realisticness instead refers to “a property or 
a set of properties of theories and their constituent parts" (such 
as observability, truth, plausibility and partiality) (Mäki 1998c: 
409). Unrealistic theories or assumptions can be compatible 
with the above notion of realism. In order to appreciate the 
senses of unrealisticness relevant to our discussion, a further 
distinction is to be employed, that between the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth (Mäki 1992a, 1992b, 1998a, 2004a). First, 
scientific theories are bound to be unrealistic in the sense of 
being partial representations: they isolate one part of reality 
from the influence of the rest of reality. As such they do not tell 
the whole truth. Second, one way to theoretically bring about 
theoretical isolations is by way of assumptions that are 
unrealistic in the sense of being false about what they refer to; 
therefore failing to convey nothing but the truth. Idealisations, 
(when a certain variable is falsely represented as having value 0 
or |∞|), exaggerations and simplifications are unrealistic in this 
latter sense (Mäki 1992a, 1992b).  
As Mäki's framework clarifies, the systematic violation of 
the whole-truth and nothing-but-the-truth criteria can be 
compatible with realism when falsehood is about inessential or 
irrelevant features of the phenomenon under investigation, or 
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about features only temporarily isolated, and hence when it 
serves the pursuit of truth about essential or relevant features. 
(Mäki 1998a; for the framework in action as applied to von 
Thünen's theory see Mäki 2004a) 
 
3.4.1 Realism in geographical economics 
 
Krugman is “at once theoretician, prescriptive methodologist 
and historian of the theory he produces” (Meardon 2002: 233). 
His writings ‘as a methodologist’ show that despite emphasis 
on formalism and tractability he endorses realism as a theory 
about theories27.  
For Krugman every science needs to find a way to deal with 
complexity. The fact that the only fully correct model of a 
system is the system itself leads to the necessity of “leaving out 
many aspects of reality” (Krugman 1995: 69), that is, to violate 
the whole truth. The decision of what to put into a model is 
constrained by 1) modelling techniques and 2) other resources 
(such as money and patience). These two constrains delimit a 
wide variety of possible models and the one that is actually 
built “depends on educated guessing”. We will see that this 
educated guessing may be said to be about the 
                                                          
27 The focus here on Krugman's writings is motivated by the fact that he 
has provided quite extensive and sophisticated commentaries on these 
issues. His views are nonetheless taken as representative of geographical 
economists. There are good reasons to suppose that most geographical 
economists (and perhaps many economists in general) hold similar views. 
Allegations such as, "the economic geography approach […] is by no 
means the only tools for understanding the shaping of the space-economy. 
It is our contention, however, that the qualitative results presented […] 
are fairly robust and are representative of general tendencies at work in 
contemporary economies" (Fujita and Thisse 2003: 40, emphasis added), are 
fairly common and suggest that geographical economists aim at 
understanding real-world phenomena by way of models thought to be 
capable of isolating real tendencies. This reveals a realist understanding 
of the activity of theorizing. 
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relevant/essential/primary forces that bring about the 
phenomenon to be explained and as such it provides reasons 
for ascribing to Krugman a realist attitude towards models and 
theories28. 
To begin, consider the following passage. 
 
[E]volutionary theorists find what is sometimes 
derisively called ‘bean-bag genetics’ a tremendously 
useful fiction: literally untrue though it may be, it is a 
powerful intellectual tool, offering a way to cut through 
the essence of complex higher-level phenomena in a way 
that a ‘realistic’ appreciation of the genetic mechanisms 
never could. The same is true of neoclassical economic 
analysis (Krugman 1996: 135-136) 
 
Krugman argues that neoclassical economic analysis, to which 
he fully subscribes, is a useful fiction, or rather it employs useful 
fictions, and in that regard it is literally untrue, in the sense that 
it violates the nothing-but-the-truth criterion. Yet it is precisely 
thanks to those falsehoods that economics is capable of getting 
at the essence of complex phenomena.  
 
Try to understand why countries specialize and trade in 
terms of realistic descriptions of human psychology, and 
without abstracting from the disequilibrium that 
characterizes global markets most of the time, and you 
will end up with mush—or with something that you 
imagine is a sophisticated analysis but is really a crude 
set of misconceptions hidden beneath literary 
pretensions. (Krugman 1996: 136) 
 
                                                          
28 Models are to be distinguished from theories. For simplicity, we can 
think of the GE theory as a collection of models where each model is a 
more specific and more isolative version of the theory (cf. Mäki, 2004b). 
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The point is that for Krugman “there is no alternative to 
models. We all think in simplified models, all the time. The 
sophisticated thing to do is not to pretend to stop, but to be self-
conscious—to be aware that your models are maps rather than 
reality” (Krugman 1995: 79). Though, for Krugman, models and 
their assumptions are useful fictions, he does not endorse the 
view that untrue models and assumptions are useful in the 
sense instrumentalists would have it—as the geographer Eric 
Sheppard (2001) seems to suggest in ascribing a Friedmanian-
like methodology to GE. While instrumentalists would be 
happy to retain untrue assumptions and models if they were 
good instruments for, say prediction, to Krugman they are to be 
used primarily insofar as they enhance understanding. When 
an untrue assumption fails to serve the purpose of 
understanding, then it ought not to be retained at all costs. The 
following passage is suggestive in this respect. 
 
[…] it would be better if economists were more self-
aware—if they understood that their use of 
maximization-and-equilibrium […] is an useful fiction 
rather than a principle to be defended at all costs. If we 
were more modest about what we think our modelling 
strategy is doing, we might free ourselves to 
accommodate more of the world in our analysis. (1999b: 
27) 
Krugman’s methodological writings thus reveal reasons for 
ascribing him a realist stance. He believes that the very act of 
understanding real-world phenomena implies the need for 
isolation, that is the violation of the whole truth; and, moreover, 
he maintains that employment of false assumptions, violating 
nothing but the truth, is a means by which truth about the 
relevant aspects of the phenomenon can be attained. On the 
other hand, realists may feel uncomfortable with Krugman’s 
strategy: recall that for Krugman the decision of what to include 
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in the model (the isolated features) seems to depend in the first 
place on modelling techniques and available resources. Only 
within these constraints do ontological considerations of 
relevant versus irrelevant features determine the choice of the 
isolated terms. Such a view may conflict with a realist stance. 
Though on a realist view both tractability and ontological 
considerations may drive the use of false assumptions, the latter 
should predominate over the former (Mäki 1998a: 310). And in 
Krugman’s case, it may well be that, if the relevant forces 
operating in the real world were intractable or if turning them 
tractable was overly costly, then they would be isolated away in 
the first place. This should prompt questions about his realism. 
To qualify as realist, however, Krugman does not have to 
believe that each and every model actually isolates the relevant 
forces operating in the real world insofar as he holds that it is 
the goal of scientific inquiry to pursue truth about relevant 
aspects within the constraints imposed by pragmatic 
considerations. This means that an individual model may well 
fail to isolate the relevant forces, but that the progress of the 
scientific inquiry along with a widening of the available 
modelling techniques should aim at the identification of the 
essential elements of real-world phenomena. 
 
3.4.2 Realism and the choice of the isolated forces 
 
GE typically focuses on the interaction between only two of 
the forces held responsible for shaping the spatial structure of 
the economy (see Table 3.1 above), namely market-size effects 
and immobile factors. If those forces are isolated because they 
are regarded as the relevant causal factors, then we can safely 
conclude that the GE strategy of theorising is compatible with a 
realist position.  
 Geographical economists admit that “[i]n the real world not 
only agglomeration in general, but any particular example of 
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agglomeration, typically reflects all items in table 1” (Krugman 
1999a: 4, emphasis in the original). The choice of the forces to 
model however is dictated "less by empirical judgement than 
by […] strategic modelling considerations” (Krugman 1999a: 5). 
This last consideration lends support to the economic 
geographers' point: given that tractability considerations 
predominate over ontological ones, GE’ strategy of theory 
construction and model building appears not to be compatible 
with a realist stance. Yet consider the following passage: 
 
Still, we believe that it would be useful to carry out a 
more systematic exploration of the implications of our 
menu, to inquire into the behavior of models in which 
multiple centripetal and centrifugal forces are operating, 
to ask how the predictions of those models depend on 
the relative importance of those forces. Only by carrying 
out such an exploration will we be in a position to 
interpret the results of the obvious next step: empirical 
research (Fujita et al. 1999: 346) 
 
It appears quite clearly that though the exigencies of modelling 
has led to the analysis of only two forces actually operating in 
the real world, it is important, especially for interpreting 
empirical results, to take the omitted forces into account. Such a 
position may not contrast with a realist philosophy after all if 
the omission of the other forces is regarded as an early-step 
assumption29 required for exploring the real working of the 
isolated forces, but to be relaxed at later stages of the theoretical 
endeavour30. The other forces will be introduced later for 
assessing their respective relevance in accounting for 
                                                          
29 On the employment of this terminology, see Mäki (2000). 
30 Recent developments indeed take into account the operation of other 
centripetal or centripetal forces such as for instance knowledge spillovers 
(Baldwin and Forslid 2000) or congestion (Brakman et al. 1996) 
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agglomeration. The three sets of forces are, at least for the time 
being, all regarded as relevant for explaining agglomeration. 
It thus appears that, though employing different methods, 
both geographers and economists aim at explaining real-world 
phenomena. If this is so, then one important point of 
disagreement would be about the factors deemed relevant for 
explaining the phenomenon under study. This is in fact the 
issue to which the other two sets of Martin’s criticisms refer and 
to which I now turn. 
3.5 The isolation criticism  
 
Martin objects to GE on two further grounds: it is strongly 
committed to mathematical mainstream economics and neglects 
real places. Though Martin keeps the discussion of the two 
objections separate, I will discuss them together as the isolation 
criticism. Both sets of criticisms in fact refer to factors that 
economic geographers find relevant for understanding the 
phenomenon of agglomeration but are generally ignored in GE. 
In brief, economic geographers suspect that GE has isolated too 
few explanatory factors.  
Martin maintains that because of the commitment to 
mathematical mainstream economics, the “‘messy’ social, 
cultural and institutional factors […] are assumed to be of 
secondary importance” (Ibid. 75, see also Amin and Thrift 2001 
for a similar point in regard to economics more generally). But, 
he argues, “it is precisely the social, institutional and political 
embeddedness that can play a key role in determining the 
possibilities for or constraints in development, and thus why 
spatial agglomeration of economic activity occurs in particular 
places and not others” (Ibid. 75). The heavy dependence on 
modelling has also led to “serious misrepresentations of 
processes that are deemed to be important” by GE, viz. history 
and path-dependence. In Martin’s view GE has neglected the 
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“real and context-specific periods of time over which actual 
spatial agglomeration have evolved” and “the locally-
embedded and emergent socio-historical process of 
technological, institutional and social evolution” (Ibid. 75-76). 
Moreover, “structural change and hence dynamic, qualitative 
aspects of spatial development” (Ibid. 76-77), which are alleged 
to be key to today’s economic landscape do not find place in the 
GE models because of its commitment to mainstream 
economics. And finally, what lacks in the GE models is 
geography, intended as “real communities in real historical, 
social and cultural settings with real people, going about the 
‘ordinary business of life” (Ibid. 78). 
Such criticisms, however, may fail to hit the target once we 
delimit precisely the explanandum of GE. This is not to argue 
that those factors are actually not important for understanding 
agglomeration. The point is instead that their omission is 
determined and in turn determines what aspect of spatial 
agglomeration GE can possibly explain. To show this I employ 
a further distinction in the framework of theoretical isolation, 
that between horizontal and vertical isolation (Mäki 2004a).  
Horizontal isolation is an isolation that occurs at a given level 
of abstraction and refers to the fact that a theory focuses on a 
limited set of objects or properties. Vertical isolation, by contrast, 
is isolation that involves a change in the level of abstraction. In 
vertical isolation, a universal or quasi-universal is isolated from 
all its particularities and specifities in time-space. An example 
may help clarifying the distinction. Horizontal isolation is 
involved for instance when one or a few industries are isolated 
from all the other industries making up the economy as a 
whole. Vertical isolation implies the isolation of an abstract 
industry from the particularities of concrete industries in time 
and space (cf. Mäki 2004a).  
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In this terminology, GE has isolated “agglomeration” from 
contextual and local specificities and particularities in order to 
focus on those features that have a chance to be common across 
instances of the phenomenon. Martin’s criticisms instead ask for 
the opposite operation, that is, vertical de-isolation: to Martin 
what geographical economists should include in their models 
are (historical and spatial) specificities of concrete cases of 
agglomeration. Nonetheless to do this would require a decrease 
of the level of abstraction and generality of the GE explanation.  
Again, this is not to deny that the omission of historical and 
context specific factors can in fact mean that GE is “unable to 
tell us where it [industrial localisation and specialisation] 
actually occurs, or why in particular places and not in others” 
(Ibid.: 78), as Martin claims. But then one should ask whether 
these are the only questions worth posing.  
Consider the following reflections of Fujita et al. (Ibid: 1) on 
St. Martin’s Court, a street where sellers and second-hand 
books and prints are clustered:  
 
Why, then, have the shop’s owners chosen to be there? 
To be near each other. No doubt there is some interesting 
story about how that cluster (…) originally became 
established, but what sustains it now is a sort of circular 
logic.  
 
Two distinct questions can thus be asked about a cluster: how it 
originally became established and what is it that sustains it 
now. According to geographical economists, although the 
answer to the former question tells a story about that particular 
cluster (‘real history and real place’), the second involves 
abstracting from that story and focusing on the mechanism 
supposed to be common to many, if not all, instances of 
agglomeration.  
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Suggestive in this respect are Sayer’s considerations (1992) 
on how the rise of Silicon Valley could be explained: 
 
A narrative would take us through a series of events, 
leading in quasi-teleological fashion to its conclusion: the 
chance location of Stanford University, with its strong 
electrical engineering interests and the presence of 
Frederick Terman […] On the other hand, analysis would 
abstract from the historical accidents and apply concepts 
like ‘agglomeration economies’ and ‘vertical 
disintegration’ which purport to be applicable to a whole 
range of cases of industrial development (Sayer 1992: 
259).  
 
Both narrative and analysis explain the rise of Silicon Valley, 
but they serve different purposes31. I suppose Sayer would 
agree that questions such as “where agglomeration occurs and 
while in particular places and not in others” cannot be fully 
addressed by analysis. The reason is that an answer to these 
questions is likely to depend not solely on generic mechanisms 
but on local and historical specifities as well. 
3.6 Towards a clarification of the dispute 
 
When addressing the methodological criticism I argued that, 
though Martin is right in observing the methodological 
differences between geographers and economists, these need 
not be put in terms of different philosophical doctrines. 
Geographical economists could adopt a realist attitude towards 
                                                          
31 "The economizing view of theory [analysis] is more appropriate to 
abstraction of objects (relations, mechanisms, concepts) which are stable 
and pervasive, while thick description [narrative] is more appropriate for 
accounts of concrete situations in which there is considerable historical 
specificity and change" (Ibid. 262). 
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theories while employing highly unrealistic assumptions in 
formal mathematical models. Once this was acknowledged, the 
dispute was interpreted in terms of competing isolations of 
what are regarded as the relevant features of the phenomenon 
under study.  
A fundamental point needs to be made in this respect. The 
role of isolations in one’s theory is strictly related with one’s 
method of theory formation and with one’s conception of 
theory. If economic geographers and geographical economists 
do entertain different conceptions of how theory is to be 
constructed this has consequences for their respective isolative 
strategies and styles. The GE models are very isolative and 
therefore unrealistic (violating both the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth) partly in virtue of the role tractability 
plays in them. It may well be that an analysis conducted 
through formal mathematical models (necessarily involving a 
greater degree of idealisation) is less suited for understanding 
the role of certain relevant causal factors (perhaps those of a 
context-specific kind) because of the stronger need to isolate 
and idealise. 
The last remark is in fact one of the fundamental objections 
levelled by economic geographers: it is precisely because of the 
commitment to mathematical mainstream economics that GE 
neglects relevant aspects of real-world phenomena. Interpreted 
in terms of rival theoretical isolations determined by different 
beliefs on how the world works (and not solely by tractability 
considerations), the problem for geographers is twofold: (a) 
certain factors cannot be ignored if the working of real-world 
phenomena is to be understood; (b) mathematical formal 
modelling does not allow us to capture the working of those 
very factors.  
In principle space-time specificities can be incorporated in an 
abstract model without a decrease in the level of abstraction. 
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For instance, as GE actually does, history could be incorporated 
by letting it determine the initial parameters of the model. Yet 
this is not what geographers seem to have in mind when they 
urge geographical economists to take into account contextual 
and local specificities and particularities. Recall Martin’s 
dissatisfaction with the way in which history and path-
dependency are dealt with in the models of GE. Martin’s 
criticism therefore calls for a decrease in the level of abstraction 
and hence in the generality of the GE models.  
Yet, as suggested in the previous section, this kind of 
criticism may fail to hit its target if the GE explanandum is 
looked at in light of its vertical and horizontal isolations. Hence: 
• GE aims to investigate the influence on agglomeration and 
thus on the shaping of the spatial structure of the economy of a 
certain mechanism, namely, the interplay of market-size effects 
and immobile factors. In order to do so, the mechanism has 
been horizontally isolated from the operation of other causal 
factors, in particular the other centrifugal and centripetal forces. 
• GE aims to investigate how that mechanism could be taken 
to operate across instances of agglomeration independently 
from particularities and specifities of concrete cases. In order to 
do so, the explanation is given at a high level of abstraction by 
way of vertically isolating the general mechanism from those 
specifities and particularities that in fact may affect the actual 
outcomes of its operation.  
And it has been precisely thanks to these horizontal and 
vertical isolations that GE can claim to be capable of (a) 
explaining why and how agglomeration could emerge and then 
persist only as a result of the tension between market-size 
effects and immobile factors and (b) suggesting that a variety of 
different kinds of phenomena (such as the distinction between 
manufacturing belt and farm belt, the existence of cities and the 
role of industry cluster) may be explained as the result of the 
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same set of causal factors, thus resulting in explanatory 
unification32.  
These observations seem to be in line with the geographical 
economists’ own conception about the explanatory purposes of 
their theories. Brakman et al. (2001) describe what they regard 
as the contributions of their field. The passage is worth being 
quoted here at length. 
 
By using highly stylized models, which no doubt neglect 
a lot of specifics about urban/regional/international 
phenomena, geographical economics is able to show that 
the same mechanisms are at work at different levels of 
spatial agglomeration […] In order to lay the foundations 
for a unified approach, there is a price to be paid in terms 
of a neglect of institutional and geographical details, as 
the aforementioned criticisms make clear. But this is a 
price worth paying initially, certainly in view of our 
optimism that a number of these voids will be filled as 
geographical economics keeps developing in the future. 
(Brakman et al. 2001: 323) 
 
 
 
                                                          
32 Martin (1999) does not seem to value such an attempt because for 
geographers “scale matters” (see also Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002). In 
response, geographical economists argue that "a few general principles 
seem to govern the formation of distinct agglomeration even though the 
content and intensity of the forces at work may vary with place and time" 
(Fujita and Thisse 2002: 3). Whether the general principles postulated by 
GE are actually in operation needs to be decided by means of empirical 
investigation. To realists, theoretical unification of apparently diverse 
phenomena increases the explanatory power of a theory only so far as the 
unified phenomena are in reality the result of the same forces (see Mäki 
2001a).  
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GE seems to be willing to expand the explanatory scope of its 
models in the future, thus conveying the impression that even 
the omission of context-specific factors could be regarded as an 
early-step assumption. For now, however, this seems no more 
than a promissory note and doubts remain on whether this will 
be done in a way that economic geographers would find 
satisfactory. 
3.7 Grounds for complementarity 
 
GE and economic geography appear to be committed to 
irreconcilable methodologies. These extreme characterisations, 
however, look more like caricatures than accurate 
representations of the two approaches. Many geographers, for 
instance, though critical of the specific assumptions on which 
models in mainstream economics are built have raised their 
voices against banning mathematical modelling from the 
discipline altogether (for example, Plummer 2003; Plummer 
and Sheppard 2001; Sheppard 2001); others have been critical of 
the consequences that the methodological tendencies in 
economic geography can generate in the extreme (for example, 
Markusen 1999, Martin and Sunley 2001, Rodríguez-Pose 2001). 
On the other side of the divide, Krugman’s critical attitude 
towards discursive theorising at times seems too arrogant to be 
representative of all geographical economists33. Once such 
extreme positions have been tempered, we might be optimistic 
about the possibility for the two approaches to peacefully co-
exist, learn from each other, and perhaps even complement 
each other, as some commentators have, more or less forcefully, 
                                                          
33 The difficulty for the two approaches to coexist peacefully is often 
imputed to Krugman’s attitude towards methods and modes of theorising 
other than those expressed in mathematical formal models. Moreover, 
geographical economists seldom comment on geographers' work. This 
attitude clearly does not favour a constructive debate. 
Towards a clarification of the dispute 
 
 81
already acknowledged (cf. Brakman and Garretsen 2003; 
Dymski 1996; Martin and Sunley 1996; Sjöberg and Sjöholm 
2002).  
Whether economic geography and GE are rival or 
complementary endeavours is still an open question. To reach 
an answer we would need to single out the assertions of one 
among the variety of theoretical approaches to issues of 
agglomeration in economic geography (for example,  Malmberg 
and Maskell 2002; Martin and Sunley 2003; Scott 2000) and 
compare them with the relevant GE models, something which 
cannot be done here. Yet I hope that what follows will indicate 
what kinds of issues require special attention when such 
comparisons are carried out.  
As I have said, GE seeks to show how the (abstract) 
phenomenon of agglomeration may come about and be 
sustained through the operation of scale-independent economic 
mechanisms. These scale-independent economic mechanisms 
can hardly be thought of as being capable of accounting for all 
aspects of spatial agglomeration. A complete explanation of all 
aspects of spatial agglomeration—if possible at all—is likely to 
call for a wider set of explanantia than that of GE. Geographical 
economists themselves admit that contingent and locally 
specific factors of a social, historical, and institutional kind do 
play a role in explaining agglomeration. At the same time, 
economic geographers, while emphasising the role of local 
specifics and historical contingencies, concede that “the 
explanation of local agglomerations, of spatial economic 
differentiation necessarily involves close explication of locally 
specific and contingent factors as well as deeper, more general 
processes” (Martin ibid.: 80).  
Table 3.2 reiterates the main differences between GE and 
economic geography in terms which have framed our 
discussion so far. It should prove useful as a guide for the 
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following reflections upon the relation between the two 
approaches which proceeds by looking at their respective 
explanantia. 
 
Table 3.2. Geographical economics versus economic 
geography 
 Geographical economics 
Economic geography 
(Martin) 
Realisticness 
Use of unrealistic 
assumptions (partial 
and false) to build 
mathematical formal 
models 
Comprehensive (closer to 
satisfying the whole truth) 
and realistic (satisfying 
nothing but the truth) 
discursive descriptions 
Realism  
Compatible with an 
abstract version of 
realism  
Grounded on a narrow 
version of realism  
Explanandum 
How agglomeration 
can come about and be 
sustained  
Where agglomeration 
occurs; why in particular 
places and not in others  
Level of 
description 
 
High degree of 
abstraction Low degree of abstraction  
Explanantia 
General and abstract 
economic mechanisms 
operating at different 
spatial scales 
Locally specific and 
contingent factors and 
deeper general processes  
 
The general economic mechanisms GE investigates might be 
seen as (a subset of) the "deeper, more general processes" 
Martin refers to (1999: 80). It is clear that by focusing only on 
this set of factors, the GE models are necessarily partial34. What 
kind of relationship holds between economic geography and 
GE, that is to say, whether they are rivals or complementary, 
                                                          
34 Whether the theories of economic geographers do include both locally 
specific and contingent factors and general processes is not investigated 
here. Notice also that the distinction between specific and general does by 
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will then depend on the range of the respective set of 
explanatory factors and on their overlapping.  
If (a) economic geography offers a comprehensive theory of 
spatial agglomeration that includes the whole set of relevant 
locally specific and contingent factors as well as of deeper 
general processes and if (b) their claims about deep general 
processes are incompatible, then (c) economic geography and 
GE are rivals.35 
Instead (as it seems more plausible) if (a) neither economic 
geography nor GE offers such a comprehensive theory and if 
(b) they focus on different explanatory factors, regardless of 
whether this difference is in terms of the general versus specific 
divide, then (c) economic geography and GE are 
complementary36. Yet note that their complementarity is subject 
to the constraint that the different mechanisms and processes 
they postulate are compatible with each other, that is, they can 
be thought to operate in the same reality. 
If we accept that economic geography and GE are 
complementary, then further issues need to be explored: Should 
one theory supplement the other? Or should an encompassing 
theory be developed which integrates the two? Or alternatively, 
should they simply co-exist side-by-side and perhaps be used 
separately for addressing different sorts of questions?37 
                                                                                                                             
no means imply that investigating the former does not serve to gain 
insights into the workings of the latter and vice versa. 
35 If their claims on general processes are compatible, then economic 
geography would replace GE by virtue of the fact that its set of 
explanatory factors includes the other. The same would hold for GE in the 
event its set of explanatory factors include the economic geographers' one.  
36 A similar conclusion is reached by Phelps and Ozawa (2003: 600): "if 
important historical continuities and discontinuities are to be recognised", 
then the two perspectives (GE being concerned with "invariable principles 
of agglomeration", economic geography with "historical patterns of 
restructuring") need to be reconciled.  
37 Mäki (1997) formulates three strategies (vector addition, unification, 
and division of labour) that parallel the three questions above. 
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Supplementing one theory with the insights of the other 
presupposes not only the compatibility of the sets of forces and 
mechanisms each identifies, but also that their separate effects 
can be added up. Following John Stuart Mill (1843), we should 
distinguish between mechanical and chemical composition. When 
different mechanisms combine mechanically, it is possible to 
study each of them in isolation and then add up their separate 
effects. But when mechanisms combine chemically, their joint 
effect is different from the sum of each of them separately. An 
analogous idea is captured by the concept of emergent powers, 
that is, “powers or liabilities which cannot be reduced to those 
of their constituent parts” (Sayer 1992: 119). This means that we 
cannot for instance explain “the power of water to extinguish 
fire by deriving it from the power of its constituents, for oxygen 
and hydrogen are highly inflammable” (Ibid.: 119). 
If the forces affecting the spatial structure of the economy 
combine chemically, then GE (economic geography) cannot be 
simply supplemented by incorporating the insights of economic 
geography (GE). In such a case supplementation ceases to be a 
possibility. Integration into a unifying, more fundamental, 
theory would be a worthwhile pursuit but also overly difficult 
(if feasible at all). In face of all this, it seems that the best 
strategy is for the two approaches to co-exist side-by-side and 
be used for addressing different aspects of the phenomenon of 
agglomeration.  
3.8 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper has been to elucidate certain features 
of GE and by doing so to contribute to the clarification of the 
                                                                                                                             
Groenewegen and Vromen (1996) distinguish between supplementary 
theories, complementary theories that apply under different conditions 
and complementary theories that address different aspects of the same 
phenomenon. 
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ongoing dispute between GE and economic geography. Despite 
the heavy dependence of its models on unrealistic assumptions, 
GE can be compatible with realism insofar as unrealistic 
assumptions are subservient to the pursuit of truth about 
relevant aspects of spatial agglomeration. Once this has been 
acknowledged, the dispute between GE and economic 
geography is to be read in terms of what are regarded as 
relevant features of spatial agglomeration. While geographical 
economists seek to analyse mechanisms that might be common 
across a diverse set of instances of agglomeration, economic 
geographers are also concerned with the effects of contingent 
and locally specific factors. Yet this is not sufficient to make 
them rivals once the boundaries of the GE explanandum are 
correctly identified. This suggests that many of the criticisms of 
economic geographers are to some extent misplaced.  
This conclusion does not intend to score a point in favour of 
GE. Rather my argument is intended to be neutral. Removing 
possible misunderstandings in the dispute should favour both 
parties in that criticisms and responses can become far more 
incisive. The work of clarification attempted here can benefit 
geographical economists as well for it may be helpful in 
precisely identifying the explanatory potential of their models.  
Finally, I suggested that without downplaying obvious 
methodological differences, complementarity might be a 
possibility provided that the two sets of explanatory factors are 
compatible. If none of the available theories include all the 
relevant factors affecting agglomeration, then the selection of a 
certain subset of those explanatory factors as explanantia will 
determine what aspect of agglomeration they can possibly be 
explained.  
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4 The many explanations of spatial clustering: 
rival or complementary? ∗ 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Spatial clusters are geographical concentrations of firms 
operating in the same or related industries, potentially 
connected through production or service related ties. Alfred 
Marshall (1890) already drew attention to the phenomenon, but 
with the rise of the large corporate organisation the interest in 
spatial agglomeration withered in economics and related 
disciplines. Along with the study of “postfordism”, and the 
“new” or “knowledge-based” economy, since the 1980s, interest 
in spatial clustering re-emerged in a range of disciplines such as 
economic geography (Malmberg and Maskell 2002; Cooke 2002; 
Storper 1995, 1997), geographical economics (Krugman 1991a; 
Fujita et al. 1999; Brakman et al. 2001), political economy (Piore 
and Sabel 1984), public policy (Putnam 1993), and business 
strategy (Porter 1990, 1994, 1998). Due to their economic 
potential, clusters and their study have had a remarkable 
impact on industrial and regional policies designed to promote 
economic development and the competitiveness of firms, 
regions and countries (see for example, Cooke 2002). 
A multitude of approaches have been proposed apparently 
to explain different aspects of clusters. Those approaches are 
                                                          
∗ This essay is co-authored by Päivi Oinas. 
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concerned with what clusters are (Martin and Sunley 2003); 
how they emerge (Fujita et alii 1999; Cooke 2002; Saxenian 
1994); why they are beneficial for business firms (Porter 1990, 
1994, 1998; Storper 1997; Malmberg and Maskell 2002); and why 
they persist (Fujita et al. 1991; Malmberg and Maskell 2002; 
Saxenian 1994). Alas, the literature suffers from theoretical 
ambiguities (Martin and Sunley 2003), and it is far from clear 
how the various explanations relate to each other. As a result, 
theoretical disputes have emerged across disciplines (see 
Chapter 3). Given the amount of intellectual resources devoted 
to the study of spatial clustering, and the widespread adoption 
of cluster-based policies, it is high time to try to bring some 
clarity in this area of research. For this purpose, it is necessary 
to disentangle the elements of the various explanations and to 
identify their explanatory scope in precise terms. This is the 
task we take upon in this paper with the aid of simple tools 
drawn from the philosophy of science. 
As examples, we select the writings of a few core 
contributors (and some closely related follow-up literature) in 
four disciplines: geographical economics initiated by Paul 
Krugman, strategic management research represented by the 
work of Michael Porter, economic geography represented by 
Anders Malmberg and Peter Maskell’s outline of a knowledge-
based theory of clusters, and a cultural approach to clusters as 
advocated by the regional planner Annalee Saxenian. Even 
though these are all well-known approaches, even across 
disciplines, detailed analyses of how they relate to each other 
have not yet been carried out. 
We identify the explanatory structures of these approaches 
to clustering: what they explain (the explanandum) by what (the 
explanans or explanantia) in Section 4.2. Having provided our 
interpretive reconstructions of the basic elements of the 
explanations, in Section 4.3 we present theoretical tools that 
Rival or complementary? 
 88
assist us in determining how the explanations of different 
theories relate, in particular whether they exclude or 
complement each other. In Section 4.4, we take a close look at 
the explanations that seem to explain the same aspect of spatial 
clustering and offer a comparison by reformulating the 
explananda in contrastive terms. We suggest that this detailed 
analysis allows us to discuss the ways in which they relate more 
precisely than presented in the literature thus far. Section 4.5 
discusses and qualifies the results of the analysis, and finally, 
Section 4.6 concludes and points at further research questions. 
 
4.2 The four explanations of spatial clustering: what 
explains what 
 
All theories involve incomplete representations of complex 
reality. Theories narrow down complexity by focusing on 
selected aspects of phenomena. We can specify the explanatory 
scope of theories by asking: What is explained by what? Or, 
what is the explanandum and what is (are) the explanans 
(explanantia)? The fixing of explananda and explanantia 
involves theoretical isolations: theories isolate certain features 
of the phenomenon under study while explicitly or implicitly 
leaving out others (Mäki 1992b, 1994, 2004b). Isolations can be 
divided into horizontal and vertical isolations (ibid.). A 
horizontal isolation takes place at a given level of abstraction; it 
amounts to focusing on a limited set of items (for example, 
when a particular industry is isolated from all other industries). 
A vertical isolation occurs when a universal or quasi universal is 
isolated from the particularities and specificities of its 
manifestations (such as isolating the general characteristics that 
define what it is to be an industry from all other characteristics 
of specific industries at given times and places). Furthermore, 
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theoretical isolation is effected by means of omissions (leaving 
certain items unmentioned) and idealizations (explicitly 
assuming certain variable(s) to be zero or infinite, such as in 
assumptions of perfect information or homogenous space). 
Theories differ in terms of what they isolate as explananda 
and explanantia, and in the ways in which these isolations are 
effected. It often appears that the elements of the explanation 
and their relations are not clearly specified. Therefore, we have 
to offer interpretive reconstructions of the explanatory elements 
in the four approaches to spatial clusters we analise. (A detailed 
analysis of the isolations involved in them falls beyond our 
purposes here, yet examples of those are identified in Section 
4.5.)  
 
4.2.1 Porter’s strategic management explanation 
 
Michael Porter is a strategic management scholar, known 
beyond the boundaries of his discipline for his work on factors 
creating competitive advantage at the level of firms, nations 
and regions. Since 1990, his work has addressed the significance 
of clusters for enhancing competitiveness. Porter observes that 
“most past theories address aspects of clusters or clusters of a 
particular type” (Porter 1998: 208.). His theory seeks to address 
all types and aspects of clusters, and hence to provide a unified 
account (Porter 1998: 208) 
Porter understands clusters as “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers and service 
providers, firms in related industries, and associated 
institutions (for example, universities, standard agencies, and 
trade associations) in particular fields that compete but also 
cooperate” (Porter 2000: 253). The widespread presence of 
clusters, especially in advanced economies, suggests that 
“much of competitive advantage lies outside a given company 
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or even outside its industry, residing instead in the locations of 
its business units” (Porter 1998: 198). Porter believes that 
clusters may be formed at different spatial scales (Porter 2000: 
254), and that the same factors can be invoked in explaining 
them. 
Porter integrates his theory of clusters with his broader 
theory of competition and competitive advantage (1998: 198). 
He identifies four interrelated elements that affect 
competitiveness, constituting what he refers to as “diamond”: 
factor (input) conditions; demand conditions; firm strategy and 
rivalry; related and supporting industries (Porter 1990). These 
elements come together in clusters: “Clusters contain one facet 
of the diamond (related and supporting industries), but they 
are best seen as a manifestation of the interactions among all 
four facets” (Porter 2000: 258; cf. 1998: 213). 
Porter’s theory seeks to integrate explanations of 
competitiveness at the levels of firm (1985), nation and region 
(1990, 1994, 1998, 2000). More specifically, the competitiveness 
of firms adds up to the competitiveness of more aggregate 
levels of analysis (cf. Porter 2000: 257). At any scale, “[f]irms 
located within a cluster are more likely to attain competitive 
advantage” (ibid.: 257). As to the connecting mechanisms, 
“[l]ocation affects competitive advantage through this influence 
on firm productivity and especially on productivity growth“(ibid.: 
256). Our interpretation suggests that clusters per se are not the 
target of his explanation. His focus, instead, continuously lies 
on the competitive advantage of firms (cf. Porter, 1985), which 
translates into the competitiveness of higher levels of 
aggregation. We propose to formulate Porter’s explanandum as 
referring to competitiveness38: 
                                                          
38 We follow Mäki (2004b) in denoting M for explananduM (what is 
explained) and S for explananS (what explains). Throughout the paper M 
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[MP] The competitiveness of clustered firms 
 
His theory isolates as parts of his explanans those features of 
clusters that lead to increase productivity and productivity growth 
and hence explain why firm’s competitiveness is sustained by 
clustering. The explanans is made up of the following set [S1-4P] 
(Porter 2000: 259-265): 
 
[S1P] Features of clusters that increase (static) productivity. 
Proximity, face-to-face contacts, close and ongoing 
relationships and “insider” access to information 
enable superior or lower cost access to specialised 
inputs, information, institutions and public goods; 
facilitate complementarities between the activities of 
the cluster participants (in production, marketing, 
buying, alignment of activities), improve the 
incentives within firms and facilitate the 
measurement of performance of in-house activities. 
 [S2P] Features of clusters that enhance firms’ capacity to 
innovate and thus productivity growth. Both rivals and 
demanding customers located in its proximity 
prompt firms to innovate. Swiftness in innovation is 
facilitated by flexibility and the ability to combine 
different capabilities in clusters. 
[S3P] New business formation. Thanks to easier access to 
information about opportunities, together with 
lower barriers to entry and lower perceived risks of 
entry, clusters stimulate new business formation 
and attract firms from elsewhere. Increased rivalry 
strengthens surviving firms in clusters. 
                                                                                                                             
and S will at times denote phenomena and at others the theoretical 
representations. In each case the context should clarify the usage. 
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[S4P] Favourable social structure. Shared features of social 
relations a) facilitate interaction within clusters so 
that the potential in the other explanantia is 
realized, and b) by so doing exclude outsiders so as 
to increase the competitiveness of those included in 
the cluster (cf. 1990: 129). 
 
Note that “social structure” or “social glue”, that is, various 
features related to social relations (cf., Porter 2000: 264), has a 
distinctive explanatory role. As Porter explains, “[t]he mere 
presence of firms, suppliers and institutions in a location creates 
the potential for economic value, but it does not necessarily 
ensure the realization of this potential” (ibid.). He seems to 
suggest that cluster-specific social features are manifested in 
“relationships, networks, and a sense of common interest“ 
(Porter 2000: 264). He has pointed out earlier that cultural factors 
“work through the determinants [of competitive advantage], 
not in isolation from them” (Porter 1990: 129); “such influences 
are important ones to competitive advantage […] because they 
change slowly and are difficult for outsiders to tap or emulate” 
(ibid.). We conclude that features of social relations assist in 
competitiveness creation in clusters because they make 
interaction possible, and they serve to include (individuals and 
firms in a specific cluster) and exclude (competitors outside the 
cluster). Notice that “social structure” can only influence some 
of the other explanantia,  namely those that work through social 
relationships, but not those stemming for instance from the 
available pool of capital (Porter 2000: 226). Obviously, social 
structure can take on many forms and can also prevent the 
realisation of the potential in the other explananda. Thus, it 
should be favourable to contribute to enhanced competitiveness.  
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4.2.2 The explanation of geographical economics 
 
Geographical economics – initially labelled “new economic 
geography” (Krugman 1991a) – is a theoretical approach to 
spatial issues developed within economics since the early 1990s. 
It is firmly grounded in the economics tradition, applying the 
general equilibrium framework to analyse the location 
decisions of maximising agents. 
Geographical economics (GE) aims to explain agglomeration 
defined as “the clustering of economic activity, created and 
sustained by some sort of circular logic” (Fujita et al. 1999: 1). 
Agglomeration refers to very distinct real-world phenomena 
including industry clusters, core-periphery patterns, and cities 
(Fujita and Thisse 2000: 1). GE takes these diverse phenomena 
to be influenced by the same kind of economic mechanisms, 
viz. “economic mechanisms yielding agglomeration by relying 
on the trade-off between various forms of increasing returns 
and different type of mobility costs” (ibid.: 1). 
GE typically assumes homogenous and neutral space in 
order to isolate, from the influence of spatial differences, the 
effects of “purely economic mechanisms” on agglomeration. 
The optimizing agents in the GE models make their location 
decisions in the presence of increasing returns at the firm level, 
imperfect competition (typically employing the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) model of monopolistic competition) and transportation 
costs (modelled as iceberg transportation costs39). At the 
aggregate level, the interaction between transportation costs 
and increasing returns give rise to pecuniary externalities 
(typically market-size effects and labour market pooling). These 
are counteracted by forces pushing towards dispersion, namely 
                                                          
39 Iceberg transportation costs “imply that a fraction of the manufactured 
goods does not arrive at the destination when goods are shipped between 
regions” (Brakman et al. 2001: 80) 
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centrifugal forces, such as the presence of immobile factors, 
congestion and the like. 
As an example of the kind of mechanisms postulated by the 
models of GE consider the operation of market-size effects. In 
the presence of increasing returns and transportation costs, a 
firm’s location affects the local market by increasing local 
demand for upstream activities (market expansion) and local 
supply for downstream ones (market crowding) (Ottaviano 
2003: 667). The entry decision of a firm gives rise to pecuniary 
externalities as its decision is based on its own profit. This does 
not reflect modifications in the payoffs of upstream and 
downstream activities because of imperfect competition. 
Agglomeration arises when the former effect (market 
expansion) predominates over the latter (market crowding) 
(Ottaviano 2003: 667). 
The literature distinguishes pecuniary and technological 
externalities as the potential explanantia of agglomeration. 
Technological externalities – such as Marshall’s (1890) knowledge 
or information spillovers – impact on the individual firms’ 
production function: if the output of the industry increases, the 
technological relationship between input and output for the 
firm is altered. Pecuniary externalities resulting, for instance from 
labour market pooling and market-size effects (Marshall 1890) 
operate via the market by affecting prices at the level of the 
firm, possibly but not necessarily leading to an altered output 
level. GE mainly focuses on pecuniary externalities; this limits 
what GE can possibly explain about agglomeration. This choice 
is based on tractability requirements: technological externalities 
cannot be endogenously derived from a rational-choice cum 
equilibrium framework. Yet, the proponents admit that since 
these are likely to be more important than pecuniary 
externalities when the explanation concerns spatial clusters at 
smaller spatial scales (Krugman 1991b: 54), their account 
The many explanations of spatial clustering 
 
 95
appears more adequate for larger scales of spatial resolution. In 
addition, pecuniary externalities are taken to be causes of 
agglomeration at all times and places, whereas technological 
externalities are believed to be more important in contemporary 
advanced economies. This specifies the range of clusters the GE 
explanation is concerned with: clusters at all scales and at all 
times. 
GE seeks to explain agglomeration at different scales. To 
them, “all these concentrations form and survive because of 
some form of agglomeration economies, in which spatial 
concentration itself creates the favourable economic 
environment that supports further or continued concentration” 
(Fujita et al. 1999: 4). The main contribution of GE has been to 
open the black box of agglomeration economies and hence to 
derive them from more fundamental considerations (Ibid: 4). In 
particular, GE investigates two issues. First, the conditions 
under which “a spatial concentration of economic activity is 
sustainable”; when the advantages created from agglomeration 
are sufficient to keep it in place. Second, the conditions under 
which small differences among locations trigger a cumulative 
process whose result is the break down of the dispersed 
equilibrium; when an equilibrium without spatial 
agglomeration is unstable (Fujita et al. 1999: 9)40. Answering 
both questions amounts to showing how agglomerations can 
form and be maintained, and hence, to explaining their 
existence. We formulate the general form of the explanandum 
of GE as:  
 
[MGE] The existence of clusters at all scales and at all times 
                                                          
40 Although we talk of a “process”, the ad-hoc dynamics in the models 
falls short of genuinely describing the cumulative process leading from 
even dispersal to agglomeration. The models only assume that workers 
gradually migrate to locations where real wage rates are higher. 
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It can be decomposed into two parts. 
 
[M1GE] The formation of clusters at all scales and at all 
times 
 
[M2GE] The sustenance of clusters at all scales and at all 
times 
 
The general form of the explanans in each case is: 
 
[SGE] The agglomeration mechanisms of pecuniary 
externalities that is relatively stronger than 
centrifugal forces.  
 
This abstract explanatory framework is variously modified 
to generate more specific accounts for the occurrence of 
agglomerations at different spatial scales. 
 
4.2.3 Malmberg and Maskell’s “knowledge-based” 
explanation 
 
The economic geographers Malmberg and Maskell (2002) 
point out that despite the considerable attention paid to spatial 
clustering over the years, “its causes and effects remain elusive” 
(ibid.: 431); a satisfactory theory of spatial clustering is still 
missing. These authors observe that existing accounts, both the 
traditional ones concerned with costs reduction and the more 
recent ones concerned with knowledge spillovers, can be seen 
as relying on the reduction of costs of interaction generated by 
spatial proximity as determinants of spatial clustering (ibid.: 
432, 434). Yet empirical evidence does not confirm that the 
degree of interaction among firms in clusters is higher than 
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among firms outside, and hence, does not support the idea that 
clusters exist because they reduce the costs of interaction. To 
remedy this explanatory failure, they propose that a 
“satisfactory theory of spatial clustering”, first, “must include 
an explanation for the existence of the cluster”; second, it should 
“address the internal organization of the cluster”; and third, it 
should be “dynamic in the sense that it can encompass the 
possibility of and reasons for the decline of formerly successful 
clusters” (ibid.: 438). We discuss the first and the third of these 
explananda41 (see Maskell 2001 for the original formulation; 
and Bathelt et al. 2004, and Maskell and Lorenzen 2004 for 
extensions). We begin by discussing their explanation of the 
existence of spatial clusters. 
Like many authors (ibid.: 430, fn 1), they believe that 
“location close to similar or related firms contributes to the 
competitiveness of an individual firm” (ibid.: 430). In line with 
recent work – among which they include Porter’s and 
Saxenian’s contributions – they focus on knowledge creation 
and learning as the main advantages of clustering in a 
“knowledge-based” economy. These advantages operate most 
obviously at the local scale (p. 443). This specifies the kinds of 
cluster they attempt to explain: local clusters in the knowledge-
based economy. In contrast to recent accounts, which typically 
focus on processes of knowledge creation among vertically-
related firms, they identify the “horizontal dimension” of clusters, 
that is, horizontally related (rival) firms, as the most important 
                                                          
41 The second requirement regarding the internal organization of the 
cluster  “implies that it [the theory] should provide a framework for 
understanding the division of labour taking place between and among 
firms within the cluster” (ibid.: 438). We found it difficult to specify the 
elements of this explanation, and will not analyse it in detail. It seems that 
this explanandum concerns the division of labour between horizontally 
and vertically related firms in clusters, and the explanantia are in line 
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locus of knowledge creation (cf. Porter’s [S2P] above). They 
invoke variation, observation, comparison, selection and rivalry 
as the “knowledge-enhancing mechanisms” (ibid.: 442) that 
take place in clusters among horizontally related firms. These 
mechanisms permit “processes of parallel experimentation and 
testing of a variety of different approaches” (ibid. 439) to 
related problems in different firms, and lead to the growth of 
business-specific knowledge. 
Then, the existence of spatial clusters [M] is accounted for by 
“knowledge-enhancing mechanisms” along the “horizontal 
dimension of clusters” [S]. Yet, on a closer examination of what 
exactly explains what, the story becomes somewhat more 
complicated. Considerable effort is required to disentangle the 
various elements of their account. Our reconstruction suggests 
that two explanations are included. The first is a functional 
explanation of the existence of clusters. We refer to it as 
explanation [1M&M]: 
 
[M1M&M] The existence of local clusters in the knowledge-
based economy 
 
[S1M&M] The competitiveness of clustered firms 
 
According to [1 M&M], clusters exist because they perform a 
function: the creation or enhancement of firm competitiveness. 
For Malmberg and Maskell, “an explanation for the existence of 
the spatial cluster […] means that it must specify the process or 
processes that impel similar and related firms to cluster at one 
place and by doing so thrive” (ibid.: 438). Note, however, that 
they themselves do not specify such a process: they don’t 
explicitly describe “how the cluster emerged as a consequence of 
                                                                                                                             
with the explanation for the existence of the cluster discussed below, plus 
the growth of the number of horizontally and vertically related firms. 
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these benefits [of clustering]” (p. 434). Instead, their theory 
describes the processes that impel similar and related firms to 
thrive and that attract new firms to a cluster, once the cluster is 
already in place. The second explanation, [2M&M], instead, 
provides a causal explanation of the explanans of [1M&M]: 
 
[M2M&M] The competitiveness of clustered firms 
 
[S2aM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge creation among 
horizontally related clustered firms due to 
mechanisms of variation, observation, comparison, 
selection and rivalry 
 [S2bM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge creation among vertically 
related clustered firms due to mechanisms of 
specialization, interaction, exchange, coordination 
and collaboration 
 [S2cM&M] Cost reductions 
 [S2dM&M] Shared institutional environment 
 
This is a causal explanation describing the mechanisms that 
enable clustered firms to be competitive. The explanantia 
appear to have different degrees of importance in explaining 
competitiveness. In Malmberg and Maskell’s words (ibid.: 440), 
“[t]he cluster exists [...] primarily because of the benefits of 
enhanced knowledge creation that occur when many colocated 
firms undertake similar activities”, that is [S2aM&M]. 
They then move on to discuss “the important, but secondary, 
types of knowledge creation stemming from the vertical 
dimension of the cluster, once its existence has been secured” 
(ibid.: 440): efficiencies in knowledge creation among vertically 
related firms, [S2bM&M]. The advantages from knowledge 
creation along the vertical dimension begin to play a role only 
during later stages of cluster development, either because the 
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cluster attracts specialised suppliers and sophisticated 
customers or through task partitioning taking place among 
specialised firms in the cluster (ibid.: 440). 42 
Furthermore, that “a theory of spatial clustering should play 
down the role of cost efficiencies” (ibid.: 444), that is [S2cM&M], is 
here taken to mean that cost efficiencies are not decisive, but 
they should still be included among the explanantia of 
[M2M&M]. [S2cM&M] includes the kinds of items discussed in 
traditional theories of clusters: costs-savings due to (a) 
collective resources; (b) well-functioning markets for 
specialized skills and (c) co-location with partners (ibid.: 432-
433). Largely in line with Porter’s analysis, the main thrust in 
Malmberg and Maskell’s theorising lies in the explanation of 
why clustering makes firms competitive. 
Malmberg and Maskell claim that ‘institutional fit’, that is, 
the emergence of local institutions meeting the needs of the 
types of firms constituting the cluster, is not in itself part of an 
explanation of the existence of the cluster (Ibid.: 442). However, 
their discussion in fact seems to suggest that institutional 
factors contribute to an explanation of the competitiveness of 
clustered firms (and thereby to an explanation of the existence 
of clustering). In discussing “the internal organization of the 
cluster”, they suggest that bridging cognitive distances in 
transferring knowledge is “less difficult when the transfer takes 
place within a community that shares the same language, 
beliefs, judgements and values” (p. 440). This additional 
explanans comes very close to Porter’s fourth explanans (social 
                                                          
42 Although is not fully clear whether in the later stages the advantages of 
knowledge-creation along the vertical dimension still remain secondary 
vis-à-vis those along the horizontal dimension, we reconstruct them as 
such.  The discussion of early and later stages seems to belong to what 
Malmberg and Maskell themselves see as their explanation of the internal 
organisation of the cluster (see footnote 39 above). We fail to reconstruct 
this explanation as separate from the other explanations. 
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structure, [S4P]): institutional factors influence the way in which 
the other factors operate by moulding the institutional (socio-
cultural) bases and patterns of interaction and thereby 
differentiating clusters from each other. Similarly as in Porter’s 
[S4P], insiders are favoured vis-à-vis outsiders who do not share 
the same institutional environment. This makes specialized 
suppliers and sophisticated customers (p. 440) and 
entrepreneurs (p. 441) attracted to clusters. We therefore 
formulate a shared institutional environment as an additional 
explanans to Malmberg and Maskell’s explanation of 
competitiveness, [2M&M].  
Their third explanation concerns “the reasons for the decline 
of formerly successful clusters” (ibid.: 438). A cluster’s 
persistence over time involves the development of an 
institutional fit. The institutional fit is said to contribute to the 
“explanation of the successful path-dependent development 
trajectories of clusters – and to the lock-in situations in which 
clusters sometimes end up” (ibid.: 442). The locality-specificity 
of institutions contributes to how learning takes place in a 
cluster and thus distinguishes learning processes in one locality 
from those in other localities. The effect is that it shortens 
cognitive distances among agents in a cluster, and makes 
presence in a cluster attractive for actors pursuing success in an 
innovative business (ibid.: 441).  
This third explanation has a temporal dimension to it: A rigid 
“institutional fit”, (preventing firms from renewing) leads to 
reduced competitiveness through time, which accounts for the 
decline of clusters. We take it that the opposite also applies: a 
flexible “institutional fit” sustains firm competitiveness in time, 
and hence, accounts for the continued success of clusters. For 
later comparison, we formulate [3M&M] as an explanation given 
at the firm level rather than at the level of the cluster and as an 
explanation of the success of clusters instead of their decline. 
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This is because continued competitiveness of firms in clusters 
seems to add up to the successful continuation of clusters in 
Malmberg and Maskell’s theorising. Hence, we get the 
following explanation: 
 
[M3M&M] Continued competitiveness of firms in clusters 
 
[S3M&M] Flexible institutional fit  
 
In order to distinguish it from the previous explanation, we 
add “continued” as an attribute meant to capture the temporal 
dimension characterising this explanation. 
 
4.2.4 Saxenian’s cultural explanation 
 
Saxenian’s (1994) well-known study compares two leading 
high-tech regions of the United States (up till the early 1990s): 
the surroundings of Route 128 on the East coast and Silicon 
Valley on the West coast. Some have regarded Saxenian’s book 
as “path-breaking” in regional science (Waldorf 2004: 62), and 
there is a continuous flow of references to her study across 
disciplines. It seems that her powerful narrative has convinced 
broad audiences about the fact that it is something about 
regional culture that made Silicon Valley firms succeed and that 
made Route 128 firms do less well. 
The two regions stood out as symbols of economic and 
technological success in the U.S. (Florida and Kenney 1990: 98). 
By the 1970s, they were also regarded internationally as the 
world’s leading centres of innovation in electronics (Saxenian 
1994: 1). In the 1980s, these regions went through severe 
downturns. By the early 1990s, Silicon Valley was able to regain 
its former vitality, and Route 128 was still in trouble. “Why?” is 
the question the book seems to set out to answer. In Saxenian’s 
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analysis, firms are embedded in regional environments that 
provide the basis for their success, or lack of it, in competition. 
Much of the answer lies in characterizations of Route 128 firms 
as “autarkic” and Silicon Valley firms as members of a 
“community”. 
Saxenian’s book may be effectively characterised as an 
ethnographic narrative, a thick description of the production 
and innovation environments in the two regions. The beginning 
of the book provides a light conceptual apparatus that loosely 
guides the detailed narrative of the key moments and industrial 
practices that gave rise to considerable differences in regional 
economic success. While Saxenian discussed those practices 
only in terms of “regional culture”, her narrative incorporates 
aspects of regional, organisational and industrial cultures 
(Oinas 1995, 1998). Saxenian shows how the characteristics of 
the regional cultures that had evolved in the two regions in the 
course of history (strong puritanist culture in the East Coast vs. 
the “Wild West”) had given rise to very different organisational 
cultures (closedness, rigidity and hierarchy in Route 128 vs. 
openness, flexibility and informality in Silicon Valley) and 
regional industrial cultures (co-located autarkic corporations in 
Route 128 vs. collectively learning community in Silicon 
Valley). Details in Saxenian’s conceptualisation and narrative 
suggest that there were feedback loops among the various 
cultural features: they seemed to co-evolve. Silicon Valley’s 
cultural features induced adaptability which went hand-in-
hand with entrepreneurship and innovativeness, and resulted 
in continued competitive success of an increasing number of 
Silicon Valley firms. The “localized accumulation of technical 
knowledge enhanced the viability of Silicon Valley start-ups 
and reinforced a shared technical culture” (Saxenian 1994: 37). 
The fate of Route 128 was to suffer from rigidity and lack of 
innovation, and decreasing competitiveness among its large 
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autarkic firms. From this reconstruction we extract Saxenian’s 
explananda, which we formulate at the firm level rather than at 
the cluster level. 
 
[MSVSax] The continued competitiveness of firms in Silicon 
Valley  
 
[MR128Sax] The declining competitiveness of firms in Route 128  
 
These in turn are explained (albeit via a more complex chain 
of causal relations than the one sketched below) by: 
 
[SSVSax] Cultural features of Silicon Valley (openness, 
flexibility and informality; collectively learning 
community)  
 
[SR128Sax] Cultural features of Route 128 (puritanism, 
closedness, rigidity, hierarchy) 
 
From these specific explanations of concrete cases, we can 
extract a more general one that can be presented schematically 
as a causal chain: (regional, regional industrial and 
organisational) cultural features are reflected in adaptability 
which leads to innovativeness which leads to competitiveness. 
From our reconstruction of Saxenian’s concrete explanation we 
can derive a generalized explanation (the successful case), 
where the explanatory elements are:  
 
[MGSax] The continued competitiveness of firms in certain 
clusters 
 
[SGSax] Those cultural features that facilitate adaptability 
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We can see that Saxenian’s explanation closely resembles 
Malmberg and Maskell’s third explanation as formulated 
above. 
 
4.3 Inter-theoretic relations 
 
4.3.1 Rival and complementary explanations 
 
Identifying the isolations involved in specific theories and 
the resulting configuration of explananda and explanantia 
provides us with the basic elements to carry out inter-theoretic 
comparisons. Such comparisons seek to answer the question of 
whether different theoretical explanations of a phenomenon are 
complementary or rival to each other. Two explanations are 
rival when their claim about either the explanantia or the 
explananda are incompatible, that is, they cannot be true at the 
same time (cf. Day 2004). For instance, if one were to propose 
that the only reason for firms to cluster is the attainment of cost 
reductions, then any explanation citing some other advantage 
as exclusively responsible for firm clustering would be rival in 
relation to the first explanation because their explanantia are 
incompatible. When explanations are rival, at least one of them 
is mistaken. Partial rivalry is also possible, for example, when 
two explanations take the same factors as explanantia but 
ascribe different explanatory relevance to them. 
 
  [Table 4.1 around here] 
 
 Table 4.1 schematically identifies the possible ways in which 
theories differ in terms of what they isolate as explanantia and 
explananda (the first and second columns) and lists potential 
sources of rivalry and complementarity (the literature on 
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explanatory exclusion has given inspiration here; Day 2004; 
Kim 1988, 1989). It will turn out that our comparisons concern 
two of the cases 
In Case I, the same explanandum is accounted for by 
different explanantia, S1 and S2. In this case the two 
explanations are rival if S1 and S2 explanantia are incompatible. 
If they are not, S1 and S2 can either be both necessary causes, be 
causally related, operate under different conditions, or be 
related otherwise. In Case II, different explananda of two 
explanations, M1 and M2, are explained by the same explanans, 
S. Here rivalry arises from the incompatibility of M1 and M2. 
The explanations can complement in the following cases: S 
explains both M1 and M2; S operates under different conditions 
to bring about either M1 or M2; M1 and M2 are causally or 
otherwise related. Finally, in Case III, both the explanantia and 
explananda of two explanations differ. This latter case is 
relevant only when the M’s and S’s differ but relate to the same 
phenomenon. Here, the explanations are rival in case of 
incompatibility either between the S of one and M of the other, 
between the S’s or between M’s. They are complementary when 
the S’s and the M’s are somehow related to each other. 
 
4.3.2 Explanation and contrastives 
 
In order to determine whether explanations are rival or 
complementary, we employ what philosophers of science call 
the “contrastive approach to explanation” (Barnes 1994; Day 
2004; Garfinkel 1981; Lipton 1990, 1991; Morton 1990; 
Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2001). The crux of the contrastive 
approach is that explanations do not explain plain phenomena, 
but those phenomena in contrast to alternatives. This insight 
makes it possible to formulate the explananda in precise terms – 
in terms that enable us to see why different explanations invoke 
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the explanantia that they do. A fictional example illustrates the 
power of the contrastive approach. A detective investigating a 
murder case asks a witness: “Why did the victim die?” The 
witness replies: “We all have to die sometime”. Obviously this 
is not the answer the detective expected to receive. While the 
detective had asked, why the victim died rather than lived on as 
expected, the witness answered the question why he died rather 
than lived forever? The detective and the suspect had contrasted 
the victim’s death with different alternatives (cf. Garfinkel 1981: 
22) and this explains the miscommunication between them.  
Explanation-seeking questions are taken to have a 
contrastive form, whether explicit or not, and whether they 
concern singular events (as typically discussed in the 
philosophical literature), like the victim’s death, or theoretical 
explanations. The contrastive explanandum is usually 
expressed as a why-question of the form: “Why X rather than 
Y?” Our notation below is of the form: “[CMAuthor] X [Y]” (cf. 
Ylikoski, 2001). For example, “[CMGE] The existence of spatial 
agglomeration [spatial dispersion]” means that the GE explains 
why spatial agglomeration rather than spatial dispersion 
occurs. Given that phenomena or aspects thereof are ultimately 
brought about by a vast number of causally relevant factors, the 
effect of the contrastive formulation is that it allows for picking 
out the explanatorily relevant factors among them. The contrast 
narrows down the number of explanantia compared to the 
number of explanantia for a non-contrastive explanandum. As 
illustrated by the fictional example above, a different contrast 
usually requires a different explanans. Notice that the 
contrastive approach to explanation is neither about what the 
person who asked for an explanation had in mind nor what the 
one who is giving the explanation means. It is instead about 
what a given explanation can actually explain (cf. Ylikoski 2001: 
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19), that is, what the explanantia of a given explanation can 
actually account for about a given phenomenon.  
The contrastive approach to explanation is a useful tool in 
comparing apparently competing explanations of the same 
phenomenon. It allows realising whether the explanations are 
really explaining the same thing and if not, to spell out the way 
in which they differ (cf. Garfinkel 1981; Ylikoski 2001; Day 
2004). In the following section, we employ the contrastive 
approach to compare explanations that our previous analysis 
revealed to deal with the same phenomenon, that is, the 
competitiveness of clustered firms and the existence of spatial 
clusters. It appears that once we formulate the explanations in 
contrastive terms, their relations correspond to Cases I and III 
of Table 4.1 (cf. Table 4.2 in Section 4.5). 
 
4.4 The four explanations of spatial clustering: how they 
relate  
 
4.4.1 Explanations of competitiveness 
 
We reconstructed Malmberg and Maskell’s and Porter’s 
accounts as explanations of the enhanced competitiveness of 
clustered firms, and we reconstructed Malmberg and Maskell’s 
and Saxenian’s accounts as explanations of the continued 
competitiveness of firms in clusters. Let us first discuss the 
relations of the former two by employing the insights of the 
contrastive approach. 
To begin with, the two accounts differ in terms of the scale of 
clusters which they deal with. Whereas Malmberg and 
Maskell’s explanation is geared to the local scale, Porter’s 
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explanation supposedly concerns all spatial scales43. Both 
explanations, therefore, explain the local scale.  
When we try to formulate Malmberg and Maskell’s 
explanandum in contrastive terms, it is not self-evident what 
“competitiveness of clustered firms” is contrasted with. A 
closer look at Malmberg and Maskell’s different explanantia 
identified in Section 4.2.3, suggests us how to formulate their 
contrastive explananda.  
As we have seen, Malmberg and Maskell take 
competitiveness to be primarily explained by the advantages 
that arise from horizontal relations among rivals. These are 
advantages that accrue to many related firms “when co-located 
but which are not available to a hypothetical single firm 
carrying out precisely the same activities, even at the same 
location, using the same suppliers, customers and workforce” 
(ibid.: 438)44. That is to say, when advantages of clustering are 
contrasted to the potential advantages of a single uni-locational 
firm, the explanans is [S2aM&M] (and, we presume, [S2dM&M]). 
This gives us the following contrastive explanandum: 
                                                          
43 The benefits Porter identifies as explanantia mainly arise from spatial 
proximity even though his explanation is concerned with clusters at all 
scales. We can think of two ways of remedying this inconsistency. One 
option is to suggest that a) clusters at all scales are accounted for by 
factors that draw on his “static productivity” explanantia (especially cost 
reductions in clusters), and b) lower scale clusters are accounted for by 
“dynamic efficiency” explanantia. The second option is that the 
explanantia Porter identifies for clustering at any scale work most 
efficiently at the local scale but many aspects of them, even if not all, can 
be seen as operating at higher scales as well (for example, frequent face-
to-face interaction is less likely over long distances, yet this can be 
compensated by telephone and e-mail interactions). 
44 Note a small slip in the argument. If the point is precisely that more 
activities can be carried out and more knowledge can be created in 
multiple firms in clusters through mechanisms of variation, observation, 
comparison, selection and rivalry than in single firms, “carrying out 
precisely the same activities” in clustered firms and single unilocational 
firms would not be possible. 
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[CM2AM&M] The competitiveness of clustered firms [of single uni-
locational firms] 
 
[S2aM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge creation among 
horizontally related firms 
 [S2dM&M] Shared institutional environment 
 
Moreover, Malmberg and Maskell identify dispersal – or 
isolated locations – as the contrast in “[t]he more theoretically 
oriented part of the literature of agglomeration [… that] aims at 
explaining the existence of spatial clustering by identifying and 
analyzing those permanent advantages that may accrue to firms 
located close to other similar and related firms, rather than 
being located in isolation” (ibid.:  432). The explanantia include 
cost efficiencies as covered in the earlier theoretical literature 
(ibid.: 432), efficiencies in knowledge creation among vertically 
related firms, and the facilitating effect of the shared 
institutional environment. Since existence is explained by 
competitiveness, and this is explained by the advantages from 
clustering, we formulate the contrastive explanandum as 
follows. 
 
[CM2BM&M] The competitiveness of clustered firms [of dispersed 
firms] 
 
[S2bM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge creation among vertically 
related firms  
 [S2c M&M] Cost reductions 
 [S2dM&M] Shared institutional environment 
 
Similarly, Porter asks, what is it in clustering that confers 
competitiveness to firms, but is not available to firms otherwise 
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organized? Porter recognises clustering as an alternative to a 
range of other arrangements including vertical integration, 
formal alliances with outside entities, sourcing inputs from 
distant locations, outsourcing, dispersal, isolated firms or 
locations (Porter 1998: 214-225, cf. Porter 2000). We formulate 
his contrastive explanandum as: 
 
[CMP] The competitiveness of clustered firms [firms 
otherwise organized] 
 
[S1P] Features of clusters that lead to increase (static) 
productivity 
[S2P] Features of clusters that enhance firms’ capacity to 
innovate and thus lead to productivity growth  
[S3P] New business formation 
[S4P] Favourable social structure 
 
Malmberg and Maskell’s and Porter’s explanations are very 
similar in substantive terms. In both, the explanantia include a 
range of advantages that account for the superiority of clusters 
vis-à-vis other forms of spatial organization. Even the 
equivalent of Porter’s [S3P] can be found in Malmberg and 
Maskell’s description of the later stages of cluster development 
when firms are attracted to join the cluster from elsewhere and 
the cluster processes create opportunities for the emergence of 
new firms (Malmberg and Maskell 2002: 440). The main 
difference lies in Malmberg and Maskell’s emphasis on 
knowledge creation among horizontally related firms. Porter 
does not ascribe explicit priority to the advantages giving rise to 
dynamic productivity over those giving rise to static 
productivity and, within the former, to those stemming from 
the horizontal dimension. Thus, the two explanations differ in 
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the claims made about the explanatory relevance of the various 
explanantia. This makes them partially rival. 
Summing up, we conclude that Malmberg and Maskell’s and 
Porter’s explanations of competitiveness are related as follows:  
 
(i) Both can be applied to explaining firm competitiveness 
in local clusters in the knowledge-based economy.  
(ii) They explain similar contrastive explananda with very 
similar explanantia, which makes them closely related. 
(iii) However, they seem to be partially rival: in Porter we 
could not distinguish different explanantia specifically 
explaining different contrastive explananda. By contrast, 
Malmberg and Maskell explicitly regard the knowledge 
creation advantages along the horizontal dimension (or 
advantages from rivalry) as explanatorily primary. 
 
Consider now the explanations of the continued 
competitiveness of firms in clusters. The contrast of Saxenian’s 
explanation is easy to identify as it can be derived from her 
narrative on the continued competitiveness of Silicon Valley’s 
firms vis-à-vis the declining competitiveness of Route 128’s firms. 
The contrastive formulation of Malmberg and Maskell’s third 
explanation [3M&M] is virtually the same. 
 
[CMGSax] = [CM3M&M] Continued [declining] competitiveness of 
firms in certain clusters  
 
The explanantia are respectively: 
 
[SGSax] Cultural features facilitating change  
[S3M&M] Flexible institutional fit 
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Saxenian’s narrative depicts the cultural features of clusters 
that support adaptability and innovativeness and that lead to 
competitiveness ([SGSax]). Similarly, Malmberg and Maskell 
seem to suggest that cluster-specific institutions “such as social 
capital” (p. 441) have to remain adaptive to support processes 
of continued learning and innovation. Thus, their explanantia 
are also closely related. Both explanations refer to institutions, 
but Saxenian’s narrative especially highlights the broader 
cultural foundations of the institutionalised business practices 
(and Malmberg and Maskell, 2002: 440, also point at them in 
passing). While for Saxenian culture facilitates adaptability and 
collaboration (even among competitors, although her narrative 
concerns the earlier stages of Silicon Valley development), 
Malmberg and Maskell’s emphasis is on adaptability and 
rivalry. 
We draw the following conclusions, suggesting that the two 
explanations are complementary. 
 
(i) The two explanations seem to agree that what 
discriminates between successful and unsuccessful (declining) 
clusters in time is the presence of suitable (flexible) institutions 
that enable processes of adaptation and innovation and hence 
account for the continued competitiveness of firms. 
(ii) Saxenian puts considerably more emphasis than 
Malmberg and Maskell on the cultural foundations of the 
cluster-specific institutions. 
 
4.4.2 Explanations of existence 
 
Geographical economists and Malmberg and Maskell seek to 
explain the existence of clusters. GE explains the existence of all 
kinds of clusters at all times, whereas Malmberg and Maskell 
focus on local clusters in a “knowledge-based economy”. The 
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latter is a subset of the former and hence both explanations 
apply to local clusters in a knowledge-based economy which is 
where they can be compared more easily. The formulation of 
their explananda in contrastive terms reveals a significant 
difference, however. 
The geographical economists’ models show that economic 
activity becomes either (fully or partially) agglomerated or 
dispersed, depending on the relative strength of the forces 
pushing towards agglomeration (for example, market 
expansion effect) vis-à-vis those pushing towards dispersion 
(for example, market crowding effect). From this, we derive 
their contrastive explanandum: 
 
[CMGE] The existence of clusters [of spatial dispersion] at all 
scales and at all times  
 
[SGE] The agglomerating mechanism of pecuniary 
externalities that is relatively stronger than 
centrifugal forces 
 
Malmberg and Maskell explain the existence of clusters 
functionally by invoking their role in creating competitiveness. 
It is not evident what existence is contrasted with, but, from 
Section 4.4.1 above, we can infer that the alternatives included 
in the contrast can be at least organisation of economic activities as 
a single uni-locational firm and dispersal of (horizontally or vertically 
related) firms in several locations. Thus, we take the contrast to be 
the non-existence of clusters, that is, all other states of affairs in 
which economic activities are organised in space in some other 
way. The contrastive formulation is: 
 
[CM1M&M] The existence of local clusters [of other forms of spatial 
organisation] in the knowledge-based economy 
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[S1AM&M] The competitiveness of clustered firms 
 
The contrast reveals a key difference between the two 
explanations. The rationale of Malmberg and Maskell’s 
explanation is that the benefits of clustering vis-à-vis all other 
forms of spatial organisation explain why clusters exist. Those 
benefits are given in explanations of [CM2AM&M] and [CM2BM&M] 
regarding how firm competitiveness is created in clusters (vis-
à-vis single uni-locational firms and dispersal), and in 
[CM3M&M] regarding how firm competitiveness continues to be 
sustained (vis-à-vis declining) in institutionally flexible clusters. 
These seem to be the reasons why firms keep clustering, and 
hence why clusters keep existing. The argument is, essentially, 
that no other form creates firm competitiveness quite like 
clustering, and that is why clusters exist rather than not exist at 
all. 
GE only compares two possible scenarios: agglomeration 
and dispersion. Under certain ranges of parameters, benefits of 
co-location offset benefits of dispersion. This explains how 
clusters may come about and be sustained. When GE models 
compare clustering to the dispersal of firms and workers over two 
or more locations, ‘existence’ refers only to the formation and 
sustenance of clusters under the specific conditions specified in 
the models. Thus, they explain why clustering rather than 
dispersion takes place and not why clusters exist rather than 
not existing at all – this is because clustering and dispersal are 
not the only two organizational options available to firms. 
Summing up, the explanations relate as follows 
 
(i) The contrastive formulation reveals that the theories 
provide two different explanations and are complementary. 
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(ii) The contrastive formulation unravels two different 
meanings of ‘the existence of clusters’. 
 
4.5 The intricate web of explanatory relations 
 
We have seen that explanations differ in what they isolate as 
explananda and explanantia, and in how they isolate them (cf. 
Section 4.2 above). For instance, to explain merely the ever-
present phenomenon of clustering – not, for example, the 
regional agglomeration of innovation (cf. Caniels and Romijn 
2003) – GE abstracts (isolates vertically) clusters from place-
specific and scale-related particularities. To isolate the “purely 
economic mechanisms” supposed to always explain a tendency 
of certain types of economic activity to cluster, it employs a host 
of horizontal isolations (for example, the neglect of 
technological spillovers) as well as vertical isolations (e.g., 
abstract agents), effected through strong idealizations (e.g., 
maximizing agents) and various omissions. Their explanation 
can be seen as complementary to those of other scholars who 
have set out to explain different aspects of clusters or specific 
types of clusters. In Porter’s explanation, the degree of 
horizontal isolation regarding the explanantia is lower than in 
GE as Porter includes a wider range of factors. Porter focuses 
on what makes clustered firms competitive. With the same aim, 
Malmberg and Maskell include similar factors as Porter. By 
focusing on local clusters they horizontally isolate them from 
clusters at other scales. Two of the explanations agree that 
various socio-cultural and institutional features account for the 
capability of clusters to remain successful in time through their 
firms’ continued competitiveness. Saxenian’s rich historical 
narrative requires fewer isolations and idealisations. When we 
reconstructed it as a more generic explanation to compare it 
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with Malmberg and Maskell’s explanation, we vertically 
isolated the cultural characteristics from the specific features 
they take on in concrete clusters.  
The implicit isolations determine those aspects of the 
clustering phenomenon that are being explained and how 
broad a variety of explanatory features are drawn upon. 
Whether some of these isolations are more adequate than others 
cannot be decided a priori. The correctness of a given 
explanation, and hence of its isolations should be ultimately 
settled by empirical investigation. Difficulties in identifying the 
explanatory strategies in the theories we have analysed suggest 
that some explanations do this more clearly than others. It may 
be more customary in some traditions to be fuzzy as to the 
precise explanatory scope (cf. Markusen 1999). Our analysis 
suggests that clarifications regarding one’s explanatory goals 
will be helpful in assessing and comparing explanations 
presented in the literature. 
The explananda in the four approaches we analysed seemed 
to fall into three categories: a) the existence of clusters and b) 
the competitiveness of clustered firms, and c) their continued 
competitiveness. In Table 4.2 we summarise the results of our 
comparisons. The classification corresponds to the cases of 
Table 4.1 that are of relevance here, that is, Cases I and III. The 
contrastive formulation of the explananda revealed that even if 
the explanations explain the same aspect of the clustering 
phenomenon, the precise explananda were different. Thus, 
most of the comparisons ended up representing Case III in 
Table 1. Comparisons of the reconstructed explanations suggest 
that they are complementary (except for Porter’s and Malmberg 
and Maskell’s case of partial rivalry). 
 
[Table 4.2 around here]  
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The three explananda represent different aspects of clustering 
and are obviously related. Although the contrastive analysis 
has been of assistance in unearthing the aspects of clustering 
that each account can possibly explain, it does not provide the 
means to understand how those different aspects relate to each 
other. Identifying their intricate explanatory relations remains a 
challenge for theorists. We propose that our analysis prompts 
the following considerations, however. 
Both the existence of clusters and the competitiveness of 
clustered firms are explained by invoking the benefits accrued 
to firms by clustering, although the types of benefits differ. For 
geographical economists, the benefits come in the guise of 
pecuniary externalities, and those are sufficient to bring about 
clusters and keep them in place vis-à-vis dispersal. For Porter, 
and for Malmberg and Maskell, the benefits from clustering do 
include something akin to pecuniary externalities (cost savings), 
but the focal benefits, in their view, relate to features of clusters 
that increase innovativeness, and thus enhance the 
competitiveness of clustered firms. 
The comparison of Porter’s and Malmberg and Maskell’s 
theorising shows that formulating a precise contrastive 
explanandum helps in disentangling the role of various 
explanatory elements in the theory. They invoke very similar 
explanantia for the competitiveness of clustered firms. But 
while Porter’s theory seems to offer only a generally formulated 
explanandum with a list of undifferentiated explanantia, 
Malmberg and Maskell’s theory could be dissected into more 
detailed explanations concerning the competitiveness of firms 
in cluster vis-à-vis their activities being organised as a uni-locational 
single firm and vis-à-vis being dispersed. Additionally, Malmberg 
and Maskell are explicit about how the explanations of firm 
competitiveness and of existence of clusters relate: 
competitiveness and its sustenance functionally explain 
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clusters’ existence. Yet, it remains unclear whether firms 
knowingly cluster in view of obtaining those benefits and hence 
competitiveness, or whether it is the market mechanism that 
ensures that clustered firms survive in competition – or both. 
Furthermore, the benefits from clustering can only arise 
when a certain number of firms are already co-located. The 
realisation of these advantages then attracts more firms in the 
locality and thereby further reinforces these advantages. This 
brings us to definitional issues about the very concept of 
cluster: at what point does a spatial concentration of firms turn 
into a cluster? 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
Many real-world phenomena are multifaceted and complex, 
and theories and models, by nature, can only provide partial 
representations of them. Hence theories typically isolate some 
aspects of the phenomenon they study, while neglecting others. 
Vagueness about what is being explained and by what leads to 
misguided judgements of the explanatory value of theories. In 
practice, very often theories and the explanations they provide 
are expected to explain more than what they actually can (cf. 
Ylikoski 2001), and critics often take this failure to imply that 
the theories in question are false. In some cases vagueness of 
what is being explained leads to considering alternative 
theories as rivals when in fact they are potentially 
complementary. (Misunderstandings of this sort seem to have 
afflicted the dispute between economic geography and GE, cf. 
Chapter 3 and 5). The contrastive approach helps in making 
sense of the different theoretical isolations which we find in 
explanations that may, at first, appear to be rival. Ours is then a 
call for clarity and precision on what is being explained by what 
and on its relations to alternative approaches. Clarity about 
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explanatory strategies allows avoiding misguided judgements 
of rivalry between explanations, eases cross-fertilization and 
communication, and enhances the possibility of attaining 
explanatory progress. 
Recognition of these features should also ground attempts at 
comprehending the plurality of theories of spatial clustering. 
Spatial clustering is a complex phenomenon and a variety of 
explanation-seeking questions can be asked about it. The 
selection of theories and explanations examined here appear to 
focus on closely related aspects of clusters, namely the existence 
of clusters due to various benefits they bestow and the 
competitiveness of firms as an outcome of clustering. 
The different theories in spatial clustering research are built 
according to disciplinary conventions and for specific purposes. 
This influences what aspects of the phenomenon each theory 
isolates as in need of explanation and as doing the explaining. 
The theories analysed here come from different disciplinary 
traditions and, accordingly, offer different types of explanation, 
construe those according to different methodologies and with 
different purposes in view. We have largely neglected these 
differences. Abstracting from these features means neglecting 
other forms of rivalry. Yet this abstraction serves the purpose of 
showing that despite differences in style, methodologies and 
foci, the theoretical approaches are not explanatorily rival. 
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5 Geographical economics models: contrastive 
explanation in action 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Disputes over the unrealisticness of models and their 
assumptions abound in economics. They typically centre on the 
question of whether a given model is realistic enough so as to 
explain the real-world phenomena it is used to investigate. 
These disputes are often carried out without paying enough 
attention to the various roles that the different unrealistic 
elements of the model play. In the methodological literature, 
three main categories of assumptions have been identified: 
negligibility, applicability and tractability assumptions 
(Musgrave 1981; Mäki 2000; Hindriks forth). Here, I spell out a 
distinct role for unrealistic elements of theoretical models 
which cannot be reduced to any of the above categories. Their 
role is derived from the application of the contrastive approach 
to explanation (Garfinkel 1981; Lipton 1990; 1991; Woodward 
2003; Ylikoski 2001).  
The contrastive approach takes an explanation to be, either 
explicitly or implicitly, an answer to a composite question of the 
following form: why f rather than c? Here f is the aspect of the 
phenomenon to be explained (for instance, leaves turn yellow 
in autumn) and c is an alternative to it (for instance, leaves turn 
blue in autumn or turn yellow in spring).  
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Formulating an explanation-seeking question in contrastive 
terms allows us to make sense of a given selection of factors 
among the many that lie behind the occurrence of a 
phenomenon: the explanatory factors to be selected are those 
which discriminate between f and c. This implies that those 
causal elements common to the causal nexuses of f and of c will 
not be part of an explanation of why f rather than c. These 
common elements constitute the shared causal background. I 
suggest that at least some of the unrealistic elements of 
economic models serve the function of fixing the causal 
background. These unrealistic elements have an ontological 
justification and, when correctly selected, do not endanger the 
truth of the explanation of why f rather than c.  
I will show that looking at the explanations offered by 
economics models in contrastive terms helps to be precise about 
the explanatory potential of those models, and hence, to assess 
the adequacy of their unrealistic elements. It is by this means 
that contrastive analysis enhances more sophisticated disputes 
over the unrealisticness issue. 
I will use the geographical economics (GE henceforth) 
models as an illustration. GE is a recent approach aimed at 
introducing the long-neglected role of space into (conventional) 
economics (for example, Baldwin et al. 2003; Brakman et al. 
2001; Fujita and Thisse 2002; Fujita et al. 1999; Krugman 
1991a,b). It employs a general equilibrium framework in which 
optimizing agents take their location decisions in presence of 
increasing returns, imperfect competition and transportation 
costs. Criticisms from neighbouring fields, in particular from 
economic geography, have been mainly directed at the 
unrealisticness of the assumptions of the GE models. Economic 
geographers who have traditionally been interested in 
agglomeration and spatial phenomena have adopted a 
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particularly critical attitude towards GE. The ongoing and 
intense dispute between geographical economists and economic 
geographers over the worth of these models provides a fertile 
terrain to illustrate the usefulness of the contrastive approach. 
A contrastive analysis of the explanandum of GE shows that 
many of the unrealistic elements of the models serve to fix the 
causal background, and by so doing, that most of the charges of 
unrealisticness are misguided. The analysis also makes the 
explanatory ambitions of the GE models more explicit and 
suggests that, as it stands, GE can at most explain a fairly 
narrow aspect of real-world spatial phenomena.  
The paper is comprised of three sections. Section 5.2 presents 
the contrastive approach and what I take to be its contribution 
to the unrealisticness issue. Section 5.3 applies the contrastive 
approach to the case of GE. It discusses a few theoretical 
isolations of the GE models and the critiques directed at them. 
The contrastive approach is shown to clarify the explanatory 
potential of the GE models, and accordingly, in what ways the 
criticisms of unrealisticness are misguided. Section 5.4 
concludes the paper. 
5.2 Contrastivity and unrealisticness 
 
The common way to illustrate the idea behind contrastive 
explanation is by telling the story of Willie Sutton, the bank 
robber. When asked by the priest of the prison why he robbed a 
bank, Willie candidly replies: “Because the bank is where the 
money is”. Obviously this is not the answer the priest expected 
to receive. While the priest was asking why Willie had robbed a 
bank, rather than living honestly, Willy answered the question, 
why did you rob bank rather than robbing any other place? The 
miscommunication between Willie and the priest occurred 
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because their implicit contrasts were different. The main tenet 
of the contrastive approach to explanation is that explanation-
seeking questions, scientific or not, have a contrastive form, 
whether explicit or not (Garfinkel 1981). Notice that the 
contrastive approach to explanation is neither about what the 
explainee has in mind when asking for an explanation nor 
about what the explainer means when giving the explanation, 
but instead it is about what a given explanation can actually 
explain (cf. Ylikoski 2001: 19). 
In general, to articulate the explanandum in the contrastive 
form allows picking out the appropriate explanatory factors 
from the causal history of the phenomenon45 for which we 
search an explanation. The point is that the causal history or 
causal nexus of a phenomenon is typically incredibly complex 
and not all factors which make up this history are explanatorily 
relevant.  
Following the notation employed by Ylikoski (2001), let us 
formulate a contrastive explanandum as: f [c], where f is the fact 
to be explained and c is the foil, an alternative to it46, where c 
                                                          
45 f and c can refer both to regularities (every autumn leaves turning their 
colours), and to singular occurrences (Willie Sutton robbed a bank). 
Proponents of the contrastive approach are usually concerned with 
analysing explanations of singular events (singular explanations). Though 
this makes their terminology and concepts better fit for singular 
explanations, no major problem arises when applying the framework to 
explanations of patterns, regularities, laws and the like (theoretical 
explanations). Since I am here concerned with both singular explanations 
and theoretical explanations, modifications are sometimes needed. One 
such modification concerns replacing  the notion of causal history, 
typically used by proponents of the contrastive approach, with that of 
causal nexus. Talking of the causal history leading to, say, a regularity is 
somewhat incorrect and this motivates my usage of the broader concept 
of causal nexus.  
46 Supporters of the contrastive approach disagree on whether the foil has 
or does not have to be a incompatible occurrence (cf. Lipton, 1990; 
Ylikoski, 2001) 
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can be either a single alternative or a list or class of alternatives; 
in the latter case, we talk about a contrast class. Employing this 
notation allows us to indicate contrasts in a way which is 
independent of linguistic vagaries.  
But what makes an explanation of a contrast adequate? In 
order to answer this question we need a way to mark off 
sensible from non-sensible contrasts. Proponents of the 
contrastive approach admit that not all contrasts are sensible, 
but the criteria for sorting them out vary among them. Think of 
a question such as why spatial agglomeration occurs rather 
than an increase in the sales of IPod, and compare it with one 
asking for an explanation of why agglomeration of economic 
activity occurs rather than spatial dispersion. It is intuitively 
clear that although the latter is a sensible question, the former is 
not. We therefore need a way to individuate what makes 
certain contrasts sensible and others not. Lipton (1990) suggests 
that in order to construe sensible contrasts, f and c should have 
largely similar causal histories. Lipton's difference condition 
provides the central criterion for individuating relevant causal 
factors. This says that "to explain why P rather than Q, we must 
cite a causal difference between P and Q, consisting of the cause 
of P and the absence of a corresponding event in the history of 
not-Q" where “a corresponding event is something that would 
bear the same relation to Q as the cause of P bears to P” (Lipton 
1990: 257)47. In other words, to construe sensible contrasts we 
compare phenomena which have similar causal nexuses, and 
                                                          
47 Lipton’s difference condition is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s Method of 
Difference (Mill 1843) according to which a cause must lie among the 
antecedent differences between a case where the effect occurs and a 
similar case where it does not (Lipton 1991: 43; cf. Garfinkel 1981:40) 
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conclude that the difference between them is the relevant 
explanatory factor48.  
It has been noticed that the contrastive approach to 
explanation makes sense of scientific experiments as means to 
acquire causal knowledge (Ylikoski 2001: 22): Scientific 
experiments work in a contrastive setting and employ 
manipulation in order to learn how changes in the explanatory 
factors change the outcome. Theoretical models work quite like 
scientific experiments in that, by way of theoretical, rather than 
material, manipulations (cf. Mäki 1992b, 2005; Morgan 2002, 
2003) they are used to inquire into how changes in the 
explanatory factors change the outcome. To do so, quite like 
scientific experiments, they require isolating away a host of 
elements for the purposes of focusing on a few causal relations, 
processes or mechanisms. This makes them unrealistic in the 
sense of being partial (Mäki 1992a,b). Unlike scientific 
experiments where this is done by means of material isolations, 
in theoretical models those isolations are effected by means of 
                                                          
48 Two qualifications are to be made. First, in case of incompatible 
contrasts the causal history/nexus of f and not-c (when we explain why f 
rather than c, it is implied that c is not the case, hence not-c) will be the 
same. This does not represent a problem for Lipton’s difference condition. 
This does not require the same event to be present in the history of f and 
absent in the history of not-c, but only that the cited cause of f finds no 
corresponding event, as defined above, in the history of not-c (cf. Lipton 
1991: 44). Second, there might be a number of differences between the two 
causal nexuses, but not all of them are explanatory. Ylikoski (2001: 41) 
proposes to add a mechanism requirement which asks that for a to be a 
cause of f[c], there has to be a mechanism ensuring that f occurs instead of 
c because of a. Note that the contrastive approach to explanation does not 
commit us to any particular account of causation. But in applying it, we 
need to have a way to identify differences which are both causal and 
explanatory. Not all differences in the causal history are causal, not all 
causal differences are explanatory, and not all explanations are adequate 
explanations. Woodward’s manipulability theory seems to be quite 
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omissions and idealizations. The presence of idealizations 
makes theoretical models unrealistic in a sense that is different 
from simply being partial since they include elements which are 
flatly false when interpreted as referring to the real world (Mäki 
1992 a,b).  
The philosophical conundrum about unrealistic models is 
how they can succeed in explaining real-world phenomena. 
Despite the obvious significance of this issue, providing a 
solution to it is far beyond the scope of this paper. 
Independently of whether, and how, inferences from the model 
world to the real world should be made, it is a matter of fact 
that those inferences are actually made and that many disputes 
over unrealistic models concern whether a given theoretical 
model is sufficiently realistic for these inferences to be made.  
What contrastivity has to do with the issue of unrealisticness 
is that the degree to which a model is unrealistic is to be judged 
by paying attention to the contrast class which the phenomenon 
to be explained is compared to. If we take explanatory 
questions to be contrastive, then unrealistic elements such as 
omissions and idealisations are (at least partly) dependent on 
the contrasts. Omissions and idealisations will sometimes refer 
to factors which belong to the shared causal background 
between the fact and the foil. These unrealistic elements have 
an ontological justification and, when correctly selected, do not 
endanger the truth of an explanation of why f rather than c. Let 
us identify the function of these assumptions as that of fixing the 
causal background49.  
                                                                                                                             
suitable to accompany the contrastive approach (cf. Ylikoski 2001; 
Woodward 2000; 2003). 
49 Notice that in some cases the assumptions might refer to factors which 
in the real world constitute explanatory differences between the fact and 
the foil. In such cases, some of the assumptions have the effect of turning 
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Since models typically isolate one or a few causal factors, 
processes or mechanisms, they might be thought to be at most 
able to offer a partial or incomplete explanation for the 
phenomenon. Yet, to provide the complete explanation of a fact, 
that is, an explanation of the fact itself compared to all its 
possible alternatives is in most cases impossible. Moreover, the 
few causal factors, processes or mechanisms isolated in a model 
might be both necessary and sufficient to account for a given 
contrastive explanandum. When this is so, then the explanation 
provided by the model in question is complete. The difference 
between explanations offered by theoretical models and 
explanations given by other means is therefore not a matter of 
kind, but of degree. Let me elaborate. 
The focus on one or a few causal mechanisms often depicted 
at a highly abstract level, usually (though not necessarily!) 
means that the number of contrastive explananda a model can 
account for is very limited: the contrast class, c with respect to a 
given f will typically include only one or a few elements. The 
explanatory potential, assessed in terms of the variety of 
contrastive questions about a given phenomenon a theory or 
                                                                                                                             
those differences into background conditions. In so doing, the theorist 
creates a set up where the only explanatorily relevant difference between 
the fact and the foil is the one she sets out to investigate. Interestingly, the 
explanatory factor so isolated is taken to retain its explanatory power 
outside the model. The explanation of why f[c] in terms of this isolated 
causal difference might still be true. Yet, it would be incomplete since in 
the real world there are further explanatory causes of why f[c]. The 
locution ‘fixing the causal background’ is drawn from Ylikoski (2001). 
Ylikoski employs it to refer to the role of contrasts in discriminating 
between explanatory and non-explanatory causes. My usage is slightly 
different as it refers to assumptions which fix the causal background: Some 
of the elements of the assumed causal background are shared by the fact 
and the foil in the real world (in the real world these are not explanatory 
differences) while some others are assumed to be shared by the fact and 
the foil by the theorist, even though in the real world they might be 
explanatory differences. 
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model is potentially capable of answering, is therefore quite 
restricted. Let us call this dimension of explanatory potential 
explanatory variety. Explanatory variety should be distinguished 
from explanatory depth, assessed in terms of the number and 
variety of detailed underlying causal connections, and from 
explanatory scope, assessed in terms of number of kinds of 
phenomena a theory or model explain (cf. Mäki 2004b for a 
similar distinction). 
It has already been argued that contrastive analyses are of 
help in the solution of disputes between apparently competing 
explanations (cf. Garfinkel 1981; Ylikoski 2001; Day 2002). The 
point that contrastive focus sheds light on the explanatory 
potential of models and that these have usually restricted 
contrastive force is made by Morton (1990, 1993). Here, I 
combine both lines of arguments so as to promote contrastivity 
as an aid to the solution of debates over unrealistic models. If 
theoretical models explain by way of showing why f[c], then we 
should not expect either our own models or rival ones to 
explain a plain phenomenon. 
5.3 The case of geographical economics 
 
In this section I will examine a few of the unrealistic 
elements of the GE models which have been contested by 
economic geographers. Before proceeding, a word of caution is 
needed on the methodology that I will employ. Although the 
authors’ writings might reveal clues about the intended 
contrast, the focus of my reconstruction is not meant to sort out 
the intentions of the authors but rather what a given 
explanation as it stands can be plausibly supposed to be able to 
explain. Furthermore, nothing is suggested on the adequacy of 
the GE explanation. The explanation should thus be intended as 
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a potential explanation, that is, an explanation about which we 
do not yet know whether it is correct. 
Finally, I discuss a simplified version of the GE approach, 
which corresponds to the closest extensions and refinements of 
the core model of GE, namely Krugman (1991a). This 
simplification does not have any implication for the 
effectiveness of my arguments. This is, first, because most of the 
commentaries of economic geographers that I consider here do 
refer to this core model and its modifications and, second, 
because my objective, that is, to illustrate the usefulness of the 
contrastive approach, goes beyond the specifics of this case.  
Some of the assumptions that I discuss have been 
subsequently relaxed and in some cases this might have 
resulted into an extension of the explanatory potential of the GE 
models. Though I do not discuss this issue here, the contrastive 
approach serves well also in a dynamic context: it helps to 
assess whether and how the explanatory potential of a given 
theoretical approach changes over time, and hence, to make 
judgments regarding explanatory progress.  
 
5.3.1 The geographical economics framework and its critics 
 
GE seeks to explain the uneven distribution of economic 
activity in space, and more precisely, the phenomenon of 
spatial agglomeration taking place at different spatial scales. 
The concept of agglomeration refers to seemingly very distinct 
empirical phenomena such as the existence of industry clusters, 
the emergence of core-periphery patterns, the existence of cities 
and systems of cities, the pattern of international trade and 
specialization, the causes of economic growth and 
development.  
The uneven distribution of economic activity repeats itself at 
different levels of spatial aggregation. To geographical 
Geographical economics models 
 
 131
economists this suggests that these apparently distinct 
phenomena might be (at least partly) brought about by the 
same kind of economic mechanisms, viz. ‘economic mechanisms 
yielding agglomeration by relying on the trade-off between 
various forms of increasing returns and different types of 
mobility costs’ (Fujita and Thisse 2002: 1). Instead of 
investigating each of those phenomena separately, using a 
different theory for each, GE proposes a unified approach. (For 
a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2). 
The framework of GE has two building blocks: the presence 
of increasing returns at the firm level and transportation/trade 
costs50. Increasing returns at the firm level requires dropping 
the assumption of perfect competition and replacing it with that 
of imperfect competition, modelled according to the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition model51. At the aggregate 
level, increasing returns at the firm level and transportation 
costs give rise to pecuniary externalities. Pecuniary externalities 
are transmitted through the market via price effects and, simply 
                                                          
50 Increasing returns to scale are defined as a decrease in the average costs 
per unit of output for the individual firm as the level of output increases. 
Transportation costs are generally assumed to be of the “iceberg form” 
meaning that part of the good “melts” in transit and hence only a fraction 
of it arrives at destination. Externalities are defined as a decrease in 
average costs as a result of an increase at the level of output of the whole 
industry. Pecuniary externalities are externalities that are transmitted 
through the market via price effects for each firm, which, as a 
consequence, may decide to change its output decisions. 
51 The Dixit-Stiglitz model provides a way to model imperfect 
competition. The Dixit-Stiglitz is a general equilibrium model where there 
is a large number of firms producing differentiated products under 
increasing returns to scale. Firms take the price-setting behavior of other 
firms as given and do not take into account the effects of changing their 
own price onto the price index. The products are symmetric, which means 
that consumers do not prefer one variety to another. However, they prefer 
variety for its own sake which means that they always prefer to consume 
a unit of a new variety than an additional unit of a product they have 
already consumed.  
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put, their presence implies that the more firms and workers 
there are in a locality, the more the locality becomes attractive 
as a location for further firms and workers. This creates a 
cumulative process whose end result might be that all economic 
activity turns out to be concentrated in one locality. 
While pecuniary externalities are forces that push towards 
the concentration of economic activity (agglomerating or 
centripetal forces), the presence of immobile factors, of 
congestion and the like push towards dispersion (dispersing or 
centrifugal forces). The models are characterized by the 
presence of multiple equilibria: whether or not, and where, 
agglomeration arises depends on the relative strength of those 
forces and on initial conditions, that is, on previous locational 
decisions. The cumulative nature of the process of 
agglomeration is such that a small advantage of one location 
due to locational chance events in the past can have snowball 
effects which turn that location into the centre of economic 
activity, even though this outcome might not be the optimal 
one. 
Economic geographers who are also concerned with spatial 
issues have been extremely critical of the GE approach. 
Criticisms range from blaming GE for its imperialistic 
tendencies (Johnston, 1992) and for inspiring the feeling of déja 
vu (Berry 1999; Hoare 1992; Martin 1999) to charges directed at 
the employment of formal mathematical models based on neo-
classical economics that do not allow for capturing the 
complexity of real-world phenomena (Clark 1998; Dymski 1992; 
Martin 1999). In particular, economic geographers have 
identified a series of issues that are poorly treated or even 
omitted altogether in the GE models. For instance, GE is held to 
downplay the key role of technological and knowledge 
spillovers in explaining agglomeration (cf. Olsen 2002) and for 
paying too little attention to the issue of “spatial contingency” 
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which results in the failure of acknowledging “spatial 
interdependence” (Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002). Finally, 
economic geographers noted that GE overlooks the possibility 
that different mechanisms may be at work at different spatial 
scales (Martin 1999; Sjöberg and Sjöholm 2002).  
In what follows I will focus only on a few of the criticisms of 
unrealisticness made by economic geographers (for a broader 
discussion of the dispute, see Chapter 3). The following analysis 
will prove the usefulness of the contrastive approach by 
showing (i) how some of the unrealistic elements of the GE 
models can be interpreted as serving the function of fixing the 
causal background, (ii) how formulating the GE explanandum 
in contrastive terms helps to delimit precisely its models’ 
explanatory potential which turns out to be very limited, and 
(iii) that the criticisms of economic geographers here discussed 
end up being misguided. 
 
5.3.2  Contrastive foci on spatial agglomeration 
 
Take the following (non contrastive) generic explanation-
seeking question [Q] about spatial agglomeration.  
 
[Q] Why is economic activity agglomerated in 
cities, clusters, countries and groups of countries? 
 
Formulating [Q] in contrastive terms gives us at least the 
following three contrastive questions. 
 
[Q-i] Why is economic activity [other activities, e.g. 
political] agglomerated in cities, clusters, countries and 
groups of countries? 
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[Q-ii] Why is economic activity agglomerated 
[alternatively arranged in space, e.g. dispersed] in cities, 
clusters, countries and groups of countries? 
 
[Q-iii] Why is economic activity agglomerated in 
(certain) regions countries and groups of countries [other 
regions, countries and groups of countries] 52? 
 
It is easy to see how adding a contrast to [Q] gives rise to 
three different explanation-seeking questions whose answers 
are likely to require three distinct sets of explanatory factors. 
Questions [Q-i]-[Q-iii] and modifications thereof should be kept 
in mind for they will guide us in identifying the explanatory 
potential of the GE models. To do so, I proceed as follows. First, 
I discuss the GE’s selection of explanatory factors and in this 
way derive a proposal for what might be plausibly taken to be 
their contrastive explanandum. Second, I consider a selection of 
the criticisms by economic geographers. These serve to spell out 
the limitations of the explanatory power of the GE models, even 
though I show that the criticisms end up failing to hit the target. 
 
5.3.3 Spatial agglomeration at all scales and at all times 
[dispersion] 
 
As a first step towards identifying the explanatory potential 
of the GE models, it is useful to begin with what geographical 
economists name the "the folk theorem of spatial economics" 
(cf. Ottaviano 2003) which helps singling out the main elements 
of the GE explanation. The folk theorem states that a firm's 
location decision turns into a non-trivial economic problem 
when there are [1] transportation costs and [2] increasing 
                                                          
52 Notice that in this formulation reference to cities and clusters has been 
dropped as cities and clusters are agglomerations. 
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returns to scale. Under these conditions, the firm faces a trade-
off between market proximity and concentration of production 
(Ottaviano 2003: 666), that is, between reducing transportation 
costs and reaping advantages from larger scales. However, the 
presence of both [1] and [2] is incompatible with a perfectly 
competitive market. As shown by "the spatial impossibility 
theorem" (Starrett 1978; see Fujita and Thisse 2002 and 
Ottaviano 2003), if space is neutral, then "total transport costs in 
the economy must be zero at any spatial competitive 
equilibrium, and thus regional specialization, cities and trade 
cannot be equilibrium outcomes" (Fujita and Thisse 2002: 26). 
As a consequence, the only equilibrium compatible with a 
competitive market and a neutral space is a situation of local 
autarkies where each person produces for her own 
consumption, a situation referred to as "backyard capitalism". 
Within a competitive framework agglomeration can only arise 
by virtue of so-called "first-nature factors", that is, differences 
between locations such as those due to climatic conditions, 
proximity to means of transportation and to natural resources. 
First-nature factors, however, cannot be the whole explanation 
of agglomeration because they cannot account for observed 
differences in degrees of agglomeration between locations 
which are fairly similar in terms of these first-nature 
characteristics (Ottaviano 2003).  
To investigate an alternative explanation for the observed 
uneven spatial distribution of economic activity, GE assumes 
locations to be identical in all respects, and agglomeration to 
arise solely as the result of the presence of increasing returns, 
imperfect competition and externalities. By assuming identical 
locations, the GE models neutralise the effects of first-nature 
factors and “isolates second nature as the component of the 
spatial variation that cannot be explained in term of first 
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nature” (Ottaviano and Thisse 2004: 3). As geographical 
economists put it: 
 
One of the attractive features of the core model of 
geographical economics is the neutrality of space. Since, 
by construction, no location is preferred initially over 
other locations, agglomeration (a center-periphery 
structure) is not imposed but follows endogenously from 
the model (Brakman et al. 2001: 167) 
 
Focusing on this key isolation allows us to specify the GE 
explanandum more precisely. In contrastive terms, 
agglomeration is compared to backyard capitalism. The 
explanandum is therefore something like: what makes 
agglomeration occur rather than backyard capitalism? Recall 
that backyard capitalism is the outcome of a situation 
characterised by [1] neutral space; [2] transportation costs; [3] 
constant or decreasing returns to scale and [4] competitive 
markets. As depicted in Figure 5.1, the only relevant difference 
in the causal nexuses of the two outcomes (that is, 
agglomeration and backyard capitalism) is the presence of 
increasing returns and imperfectly competitive markets, which 
together with transportation costs can, under certain conditions, 
produce externalities, strong enough to make agglomeration a 
stable equilibrium. 
 
[Figure 5.1 about here] 
 
This formulation helps unearthing the rationale of the GE 
models: in order to explain the actual degree of agglomeration 
in the real world, increasing returns to scale are necessary. As 
geographical economists put it, the assumption of increasing 
returns is essential: “if there is no loss to splitting up production 
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there is really no location choice to be made” (Baldwin et al., 
2003: 60). Backyard capitalism, however, only arises when there 
are no increasing returns, and hence, it is not a possible 
outcome in the GE models. The more general explanatory 
question is thus to be formulated in terms of a contrast between 
spatial agglomeration and spatial dispersion (where backyard 
capitalism is to be seen as an extreme case of dispersion where 
increasing returns are absent), that is, a sub-question to [Q-ii]: 
 
[Q-ii(a)] Why is economic activity agglomerated 
[dispersed] in cities, clusters, countries and groups of 
countries? 
 
The assumption of identical locations can be seen as fixing 
the causal background shared by both agglomeration and 
dispersion. In such a set up the only difference between the 
causal nexuses is the realisation of pecuniary externalities, 
arising from the interaction between increasing returns and 
transportation costs, which are strong enough to offset the 
effects of the centripetal forces.  
Though pecuniary externalities are in principle sufficient to 
discriminate between agglomeration and dispersion, there are 
other determinants of why economic activity is agglomerated 
rather than dispersed. These are the presence of first-nature 
factors and technological externalities. Technological 
externalities can arise in perfectly competitive markets 
(Scitovski 1954) as they are transmitted through non-market 
interactions and they directly affect either the utility function of 
workers or the production function of firms. This type of 
externalities is given pride of place as explanantia of 
agglomeration by economic geographers. GE models, by 
contrast, virtually ignore their explanatory role, though 
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geographical economists admit that in the real world 
technological externalities are relevant (cf. Fujita and Thisse 
2002). 
Two main reasons for the GE’s almost exclusive reliance on 
pecuniary externalities can be identified. First, GE aims at 
analysing those mechanisms that can be taken to operate across 
instances of agglomeration at different spatial scales. 
Technological externalities, instead, require a high degree of 
spatial proximity to operate. Thus, they are likely not to be very 
effective at the international or global scale (Ottaviano and 
Puga 1998: 708). A similar justification is given by Krugman 
who argues that technological externalities are not the typical 
reason for agglomeration, both across different industries and 
through time (Krugman 1991b: 54). Both statements suggest 
that GE seeks to explain the phenomenon of agglomeration vis-
à-vis spatial dispersion as they occur at various spatial scales. To 
do so, it isolates causal mechanisms that can be thought to 
operate scale-independently. This focus on scale-independent 
mechanisms, to which we will return below, points to the 
unifying thrust of the GE explanation. Explanatory unification 
means explaining much by little, that is explaining a great 
number of classes of phenomena by relying on a few basic 
principles and/or mechanisms. It involves what I termed 
explanatory scope. GE employs the trade-off between increasing 
returns and transportation costs to explain a host of phenomena 
at different spatial scales, which were previously attended to by 
other theories. The pursuit of unification in GE requires the 
explanantia to be selected among those mechanisms which are 
thought to be in operation at all levels of aggregation and in 
various instances of agglomeration (Chapter 2 of this thesis 
analyses in detail explanatory unification in GE).  
The second reason is that technological externalities are 
difficult to derive from micro-economic considerations. GE sets 
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out to get inside the black box of agglomeration economies and 
"derive the self-reinforcing character of spatial concentration 
from more fundamental considerations” (Fujita et al. 1999:4). As 
Ottaviano (2003: 666) puts it, the "comparative advantage [of 
pecuniary externalities] lies in the possibility of relating their 
emergence to a set of well-defined economic parameters", 
namely transportation costs, increasing returns to scale and 
imperfect competition (cf. also Fujita and Thisse 2002: 9). The 
underlying argument is that since technological externalities 
cannot be derived from well-defined microeconomic 
parameters, an explanation citing them is at best a shallow 
explanation. It would be very much like claiming that 
agglomerations form because of agglomeration economies, as 
Fujita et al. (1999: 4) report a physicist to have sarcastically 
noted.  
Before the GE’s advent, also pecuniary externalities were 
largely treated as black boxes. The problem, so the GE 
argument goes, was that economists lacked the analytical tools 
to deal with increasing returns and imperfect markets, which as 
we have seen, are deemed to be necessary for the realization of 
pecuniary externalities. GE seeks to increase the explanatory 
depth of an explanation of spatial agglomeration relying on 
pecuniary externalities by showing how these, and hence 
agglomeration, can be derived from more fundamental 
economic parameters. This makes sense of the geographical 
economists’ claim that opening up the black box of 
agglomeration economies, that is producing general 
equilibrium models in which pecuniary externalities are shown 
to arise endogenously, is their prime theoretical contribution 
(cf. Fujita et al. 1999; Brakman et al. 2001). 
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5.3.4 Agglomeration takes place in certain places [other 
places] 
 
After having identified the contrastive explanandum which can 
be plausibly ascribed to GE, I now consider a few of the 
criticisms raised by economic geographers over the 
unrealisticness of the GE models in order to identify precisely 
the models’ explanatory potential. 
We have seen that the assumption of identical locations 
serves the role of fixing the causal background. Pecuniary 
externalities arising from the interaction of increasing returns 
and transportation costs are the sole determinants of 
agglomeration. Obviously, in the real world locations are not 
identical. These first-nature characteristics do make a 
difference53, and so do many other specific features of locations. 
Economic geographers have not failed to notice this highly 
unrealistic element of the GE models. In particular, they have 
not so much complained about the absence of first-nature 
characteristics from the GE models, as about the lack of social, 
cultural and institutional features of those locations54.  
                                                          
53 First-nature factors can explain why and where agglomeration occurs. 
As we have seen, the GE argument is that they cannot provide the whole 
explanation of agglomeration because even locations similar in terms of 
first-nature factors have different degrees of agglomeration. The kind of 
mechanisms identified by GE is taken to be at work also when locations 
differ in terms of first-nature factors. 
54 GE explicitly assumes that locations are identical in terms of first-nature 
factors. Cultural, social and institutional factors instead are omitted 
without any mention. Assuming that locations are identical in all respects 
implies that locations do not have the aforementioned characteristics at 
all. Notice, however, that first-nature factors are present before any 
agglomeration takes place. In contrast, cultural, social and institutional 
factors develop together with agglomerations and can be interpreted as 
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They complain that “the ‘messy’ social, cultural and 
institutional factors […] are assumed of secondary importance” 
in GE (Martin 1999: 75; see also Amin and Thrift 2000, for a 
similar point regarding economics more generally) and yet “it is 
precisely the social, institutional and political embeddedness 
that can play a key role in determining the possibilities for or 
constraints in development, and thus why spatial agglomeration of 
economic activity occurs in particular places and not others” (Martin 
1999: 75, emphasis added). The question the GE models are, 
according to economic geographers, unable to answer is here 
already formulated contrastively, namely [Q-iii]. Arguably, [Q-
iii] is a question whose answer is likely to require a different set 
of explanantia than the one employed by GE, even though the 
former set is likely to encompass the latter. But this does not 
imply that the GE models are worthless from an explanatory 
viewpoint. Though GE might well be unable to tell us why 
agglomeration occurs in particular places and not others [Q-iii], 
this does not imply that it is also unable to explain why spatial 
agglomeration rather than spatial dispersion occurs [Q-ii(a)]. 
This qualification has two important implications, which will 
recur throughout the discussion: on the one hand, it shows that 
this criticism is not fatal and, on the other, that GE might lack 
the resources to provide an answer to [Q-iii]. 
Another problem which economic geographers take to beset 
the GE models is that locations can either represent cities, 
regions, or groups of countries depending on the issue under 
                                                                                                                             
contributing or counteracting mechanisms. The economic mechanisms of 
the GE models do sustain, when they do, agglomerations, but they can 
either be counteracted by the absence of appropriate institutional, cultural 
or social conditions or reinforced by their presence. Economic 
geographers, who typically place a strong emphasis on these conditions, 
variously refer to them with labels such as “untraded interdependencies”, 
“institutional thickness”, “social capital”. 
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investigation. Here is one telling exposition from the same 
critic. 
 
So cavalier is the treatment of space and place that the 
same model is often used to explain spatial 
agglomeration […] at vastly different scales, from the 
international level, to broad core-periphery patterns 
within nations, to local urban industrial concentrations, 
and even intra-urban neighborhoods. Processes are thus 
assumed to be largely scale-independent […] It seems 
likely that different externalities operate at different 
geographical scales […] The spatial agglomeration 
models may well predict, that, under specific 
assumptions, industrial localisation and specialisation 
will occur, but they are unable to tell us where it actually 
occurs, or why in particular places and not in others. 
(Martin 1999: 78, emphasis in the original) 
 
Again, it is claimed here that GE cannot provide an answer to 
[Q-iii], which, as noted above, is likely to require a set of 
explanatory factors different from those of GE. Geographical 
economists justify the conflation between spatial scales by 
suggesting that the same or similar mechanisms might be at 
work at different spatial scales, referring once more to the 
unifying character of their explanation. It seems plausible to 
think that both scale-dependent and scale-independent 
mechanisms affect the emergence and persistence of spatial 
agglomeration—and economic geographers do not seem to 
deny this. It might well be, as Martin suggests, that scale-
dependent mechanisms or processes are necessary explanantia 
for [Q-iii]. This, however, does not conflict with the possibility 
that the same or similar mechanisms, responsible for the 
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occurrence and sustenance of agglomeration vis-à-vis spatial 
dispersion, are at work at different spatial scales. 
In sum, both sets of criticisms discussed here are per se 
insufficient to undermine the potential of GE to explain [Q-
ii(a)]55. They do however indicate its limitations in providing an 
explanation of [Q-iii]. 
 
5.3.5 Spatial clusters exist [single unilocational firms]? 
 
In a recent article, economic geographers Malmberg and 
Maskell (2002) notice that explanations of the existence of 
spatial clustering, that is, the spatial concentration of related 
firms taking place at a local scale, typically proceed “by 
identifying and analyzing those permanent advantages that 
may accrue to firms located close to other similar and related 
firms, rather than being in isolation" (Ibid.: 432) and argue that 
thus far these accounts have been unsatisfactory.  
They propose what a satisfactory theory of spatial clustering 
should include:  
 
[…] the theory must provide an explanation for the 
advantages that many related firms might accrue when 
colocated but which are not available to a hypothetical 
                                                          
55 This argument involves a simplification. First, GE models cannot 
provide the complete explanation for why agglomeration rather than 
dispersion takes place because the models do not include all the 
explanatorily relevant factors. As seen, first-nature factors and 
technological externalities are in some cases explanatorily relevant for 
real-world agglomeration [dispersion]. Second, the GE models could also 
provide a very partial explanation to the question as to why 
agglomeration occurs in some places and not others. However, it seems 
clear that their explanatory potential is much higher if judged against the 
former question than the latter.  
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single firm carrying out precisely the same activities, 
even at the same location, using the same suppliers, 
customers and workforce (Ibid.: 438).  
 
For Malmberg and Maskell, previous accounts relying on cost 
reductions cannot explain the existence of clusters because “a 
superior way to reduce such costs would presumably consist of 
joining the different activities and placing them under one 
common ownership, thus eliminating most costs of interaction” 
(Ibid.: 438). Though geographical economists themselves admit 
that at the local scale pecuniary advantages are likely to be less 
important vis-à-vis other kinds of externalities (Ottaviano and 
Puga, 1998), this does not amount to saying that they do not 
play any role at all. The underlying conception seems to be that 
the GE explanatory factors are always in operation; what varies 
is their strength relative to other forces. If this is so, then the 
critical argument of Malmberg and Maskell applies to the GE 
models as well: if cost reductions arising from the realisation of 
pecuniary externalities are the kinds of advantages which are 
sought for when firms locate close to each other, then a single 
firm carrying out the same activities, at the same location, using 
the same suppliers, customers and workforce would be a more 
superior arrangement to reduce those costs due to distance. The 
GE models appear not to have the internal resources to provide 
a response to this puzzle. 
Reformulating the claim in contrastive terms, it says that the 
GE explanantia cannot explain the contrast between spatial 
clustering and a hypothetical single firm and hence the 
existence of spatial clustering (for a more thorough comparison, 
see Chapter 4).  
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Independently of its accuracy, Malmberg and Maskell’s 
argument serves us here to identify a further foil to 
agglomeration56, which gives us the following explanandum:  
 
[Q-ii(b)] Why is economic activity agglomerated in 
clusters [unilocational single firm]? 
 
If the GE explanatory factors cannot account for the contrast 
between spatial agglomeration and unilocational single firm, 
then this would further narrow down the GE explanandum, or 
better reduce its contrastive force. (Analogous reasoning can be 
provided for other spatial arrangements included in the 
contrast class to spatial agglomeration when viewed qua form 
of spatial organization). The set of contrasts GE has the 
resources to account for appears to be limited to just one 
alternative to agglomeration, namely dispersion. It therefore 
follows that the GE contrastive explanation seeking question 
can be reformulated as: 
 
[Q-ii(a)] Why is economic activity agglomerated 
[disperse d] in cities, clusters and groups of countries?  
                                                          
56 It can be argued that [dispersion] includes [unilocational single firm]: if in 
place of a number of spatially clustered firms, there was a single firm, 
then the final configuration of the space economy would be one of 
spreading. Such a conclusion, however, runs counter to the very rationale 
of the contrastive approach. In order to see why, suppose there are n 
firms in an industry and two localities, 1 and 2. While GE compares an 
outcome in which the n firms agglomerate in either 1 or 2 (as seen, in the 
GE models it does not generally matter which location will host 
agglomeration) to one in which firms spread between 1 and 2, Malmberg 
and Maskell compare a situation in which there are n firms located either 
in 1 (2) to one in which there is a larger single firm in 1 (2). The two 
questions are indeed different, and it might be the case that that they 
require different answers. 
Contrastive explanation in action 
 
 
146
 
This analysis shows that the range of contrastive questions 
the GE models seem to be capable of answering is limited, and 
hence that the degree of explanatory variety is minimal (as 
mentioned earlier, refinements and extensions of the basic 
approach are likely to lead to an increase of explanatory 
variety). Recall that explanatory variety has been distinguished 
from both explanatory scope and explanatory depth, and that 
the GE models were said to lack neither (potential) explanatory 
scope nor (potential) explanatory depth. The GE case seems to 
suggest that a minimal degree of explanatory variety is 
compatible with a higher degree of explanatory scope and 
depth. The GE case shows that the various dimensions on 
which explanatory potential can be assessed are not related in a 
straightforward manner. Distinguishing among them, thus, 
makes judgments of explanatory potential much harder and yet 
more accurate.  
 
5.3.6 A distinct role for unrealistic elements 
 
Obviously not all assumptions fix the causal background. 
Some assumptions do play other, in some cases connected roles. 
Some assumptions are to be interpreted as negligibility 
assumptions, others as applicability assumptions and still 
others as tractability assumptions (Musgrave 1981; Mäki 2000; 
Hindriks forth). Sometimes, distinguishing these roles might 
not be so easy in practice, and in other cases, the same 
assumption may play different roles at the same time (for 
example, the omission of technological externalities might be 
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interpreted as a tractability assumption, and yet we have seen 
that it also has an ontological justification57). 
To be clear about the contribution of the contrastive 
approach in the context of the ongoing discussion over 
unrealistic models in economics, it is important to see how 
unrealistic assumptions fixing the causal background cannot be 
reduced to any of the roles identified by the threefold typology 
mentioned above. I begin with negligibility assumptions. A 
negligibility assumption takes a given factor F to have a 
negligible effect on the phenomenon under investigation given 
the purposes of the investigation (Mäki 2000: 320). To assert 
that the factors which are kept fixed belong to the causal 
background (or are made to belong to it) is not the same as 
asserting that the factors which are kept fixed have negligible 
effects on the phenomenon. In GE, differences in underlying 
characteristics among locations are not taken to have negligible 
effects on the occurrence of agglomeration. Notice that the 
definition of a negligibility assumption includes “the purpose 
of the investigation”. Contrastive analysis could be employed to 
specify the notion of purpose, and hence, that of negligibility 
given a purpose. The purpose determines the contrast and the 
contrast identifies what factors are negligible: some factors 
might be negligible for some contrasts but not for others58.  
This nonetheless fails to capture the function of fixing the 
causal background. For instance, we could reformulate the 
assumption of identical locations as a negligibility assumption 
                                                          
57 The roles of unrealistic assumptions discussed here are not meant to be 
exhaustive. For example, Mäki (2000) identifies a further kind, that is, 
early-step assumptions. Furthermore, the omission of technological 
externalities implies that the GE models have a better fit when applied to 
spatial agglomeration vis-à-vis dispersion at larger scales than the local 
ones. This identifies yet another role for unrealistic elements. Thanks to 
Uskali Mäki for having suggested this to me. 
58 I owe this observation to Petri Ylikoski 
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asserting that differences in underlying characteristics have 
negligible effects given that the purpose of the investigation is 
to identify what makes agglomeration rather than dispersion 
occur. But this is not what is claimed in the GE models. 
Differences in underlying characteristics are not thought to be 
negligible. They are thought not to be explanatory; the 
assumption of identical locations fixes them as part of the 
causal background. 
Consider then applicability assumptions. An applicability 
assumption claims that the model applies only in the domain 
where the assumption holds true, or where its falsehood is 
negligible (Mäki 2000: 323-325). Yet, it does not seem to do 
justice to the GE rationale to take the assumption of identical 
locations to determine the domain of applicability of the 
models. If it were so interpreted, the models would be held to 
be applicable only in those circumstances where locations are 
identical or very similar indeed. However, as suggested above, 
the kinds of mechanism identified by GE are supposed to 
operate independently of whether locations are similar or not. 
In a tractability assumption, the effects of a set of factors are 
neutralised in order to make a problem (more) tractable 
(Hindriks, forth). Take the assumption of identical locations. 
This is not made solely for convenience, but it appears to play a 
role in the search for causal knowledge concerning the 
contrastive explanandum. Compare this with the assumption 
that firms take the price indexes to be constant as they solve 
their profit maximisation problem. Together with the 
assumption of constant-elasticity demand functions, it implies 
that all market-size effects work through changes in variety; 
thereby totally ignoring the procompetitive effects which 
would work in the same direction (an increase in market size 
would reduce the price-cost margins and average costs). As 
geographical economists themselves concede, “[this] is a 
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dramatic simplification, allowing us to model issues that might 
otherwise seem quite intractable” (Fujita, et al. 1999: 52), 
thereby explicitly qualifying it as a tractability assumption. 
It follows that contrastivity identifies a distinct role for 
unrealistic assumptions of theoretical models, that is, fixing the 
causal background, which cannot be reduced to any of the 
aforementioned roles.  
5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The dispute over the unrealisticness of economics models 
has a long history. Many of the criticisms over theoretical 
models both from within and outside the economics discipline 
centre on the question of those models’ degree of realisticness 
and justifiability. 
Contrastivity pinpoints a distinctive role for some of the 
unrealistic elements in theoretical models, that is, fixing the 
causal background shared by the fact and the foil. Unrealistic 
elements of models serving this purpose do not endanger the 
(possible) adequacy and veracity of the explanation thereby 
offered. We have seen how some of the unrealistic elements of 
the GE models can be so interpreted. 
The contrastive approach to explanation proves to be a 
useful aid in the solution of disputes over some unrealistic 
elements. An analysis of theoretical models in contrastive terms 
facilitates the precise delimitation of the explanatory potential 
of a given model and an assessment of the adequacy of its 
isolations. If theoretical models explain contrasts, then we 
should not expect either our own models or rival ones to 
explain a plain phenomenon. I have shown that once the GE 
explanandum has been precisely delimited, some of the 
criticisms of unrealisticness against them raised by economic 
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geographers turn out to be misguided. This said, it still remains 
an open question whether the GE models are realistic enough 
for the purposes of making correct inferences from the model 
world to the real world. 
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Appendix 
 
The core model of GE and an extension 
 
We first present the core-periphery model of GE from which 
the conditions for the existence and sustainability of a core-
periphery structure in the economy are derived (Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables, 1999). Second, we report one of the 
extensions of the core model (Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 
1999). 
 
The core-periphery model 
 
There are two regions, 1 and 2, which are symmetric in all 
respects. The demand side is modelled as follows.  
(2.1)    µµ −= 1U AM  
(2.2)    ( ) ρρ
1
0
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∫n diimM  
(2.1) represents a Cobb-Douglas utility function over 
agricultural and manufactured goods for the typical individual, 
where A is consumption of the agricultural good and M is a 
composite index of the consumption of manufactured good, 
and µ is the expenditure share of manufactured goods. As it is 
characteristic of the Dixit-Stiglitz model, (2.2) defines M as a 
CES function (constant elasticity of substitution), where ρ 
represents the intensity of the preference for variety in 
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manufactured goods and 0<ρ<1; m(i) is the consumption of 
each available variety; n is the range of varieties produced. 
The range of manufactures offered is endogenous. This 
implies that increasing the range of varieties reduce prices and 
therefore the cost of attaining a given level of utility (love-of-
variety effect). 
The supply side is modelled as follows. There are two 
sectors in the economy, agriculture and manufacturing, and 
two factors of production, each assumed to be specific to one 
sector. The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and 
produces a homogenous good under constant returns to scale. 
In this model, agricultural workers are immobile. 
The manufacturing sector is a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
sector, characterized by increasing returns to scale. The 
technology function, which expresses internal economies of 
scale, for a manufacturing good i is given by  
(2.3)    MMM qcFl +=  
where l is the cost of producing a given amount, q, of good i. 
F is a fixed cost and cMqM is the marginal labour input 
requirement. 
There is a large number of firms, each producing a single 
variety. For all varieties produced at location r, the pricing rule 
is as follows: 
(2.4)    ρ/MrMMr wcp =  
where wrM is the wage rate. The zero-profit condition implies 
that the equilibrium output for an individual firm is: 
(2.5)    McFq /)1(* −≡ σ  
where σ=1/(1-ρ).  
It is assumed that transporting agricultural goods is costless. 
Transport costs for manufactured goods are assumed to be of 
the “iceberg form” meaning that only a fraction 1/TrM of the 
good arrives at destination, where T represents the amount of 
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the good dispatched per unit received. That is, when there are 
no transportation costs T = 1. 
Workers are assumed to move in response to real wage 
differentials, that is, they move towards the regions that offer 
higher real wages. Define the average real wage as ∑=
r
rrωλω . 
The ad hoc dynamics is then given by 
(2.6)    rr λωωγλ )( −=
⋅
 
The equilibrium of the model for a two-regions case is given 
by the following system of equations. 
(2.7)    [ ] σσσ λλ −−− −+= 1/112111 ))(1( TwwG  
(2.8)    [ ] σσσ λλ −−− −+= 1/112112 )1()( wTwG  
(2.9)    [ ] σσσσ /111221111 −−− += TGYGYw  
(2.10)    [ ] σσσσ /112211112 −−− += GYTGYw  
(2.11)    
2
1
11
µµλ −+= wY  
(2.12)    
2
1)1( 22
µλµ −+−= wY  
(2.13)    µω −= 111 Gw  
(2.14)    µω −= 222 Gw  
 
(2.7) and (2.8) give the normalized price index equations, 
where λ is the share of manufacturing in each region. (2.9) and 
(2.10) are the normalized wage equations. (2.11) and (2.12) give 
income in the two regions and finally, (2.13) and (2.14) are the 
real wage equations. Aided by numerical examples, these eight 
non-linear equations, which are not very tractable, yield 
analytical results. 
Suppose that all manufacturing is concentrated in one 
region, λ = 1. To determine whether this constitutes an 
equilibrium, we ask whether real wage in region 1 is higher 
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than in region 2. If it is, then the core-periphery pattern is 
sustainable.  
The wage is guessed as being equal to 1 and it turns out to be 
the case that this is indeed an equilibrium value. In such 
equilibrium, the expression for the sustain point is:  
(2.15)   
σ
σσµ µµω
/1
11
2 2
1
2
1
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++= −−− TTT  
When there are no transportation costs, then 12 =ω  and 
hence location is irrelevant. If transportation costs increase by a 
small amount, then agglomeration becomes sustainable 
( 12 1 ωω =< ). For very high transportation costs, agglomeration 
is not sustainable. In (2.15) T-µ represents the forward linkage: 
location 2 is relatively expensive and therefore unattractive for 
manufacturing workers because manufacturing goods have to 
be imported. The second term of (2.15) represents the nominal 
wage at which a firm that were to locate in 2 would make zero 
profits. It says that such a firm would do well in supplying the 
smaller market (location 2) but badly in supplying the larger 
one (location 1) and that there is a backward linkage working 
through demand. 
To find the break point, we assume a situation of symmetric 
equilibrium. In order to obtain it, the equilibrium is totally 
differentiated with respect to λ. Then we check the equilibrium 
response to ( ) λωω dd /21 −  to obtain the change in real wages in 
response to a movement of workers: 
(2.16)   ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−
+−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= − 2
2
11
112
ZZ
ZZG
d
d
ρρµ
ρµρµ
ρ
ρ
λ
ω µ  
where Z (0 ≤ Z ≤ 1) represents an index of trade cost. If trade 
has no cost, then Z = 0; if trade is not possible, then Z = 1. If dω 
/dλ < 0, then the symmetric equilibrium is stable, if  dω /dλ  > 0, 
then the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. For low 
transportation costs, (Z close to 0), the symmetric equilibrium is 
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unstable, and it is stable for sufficiently high levels of transport 
costs. 
 
Extension: International Specialization 
 
An extension of the core model derives patterns of 
international specialization by introducing intermediates for 
production. In this model locations are intended as countries. 
Labour is assumed to be immobile between locations, but 
mobile between sectors. The backward and forward linkages 
now arise from the use of intermediates. The input for 
production is assumed to be a composite of labour and 
intermediates. Assume that the price of intermediates in 
location r is Gr and that the input composite is a Cobb-Douglas 
function of labor and intermediates with the share of 
intermediate equal to α. 
The price of the input is defined by αα rr Gw −1  and the pricing 
rule by αα rrr Gwp −= 1 . The intermediate is assumed to be a CES 
function of the available varieties. The price indices for each 
country in this model become, 
(2.17)   σασασασασσ λλ −−−−−−−− += 12)1(1221)1(11111 TGwGwG  
(2.18)   ασασσασασσ λλ −−−−−−−− += 2)1(12211)1(11112 GwTGwG  
And the wage equations become, 
(2.19)   σσσ
σαα
α
−−−
−
+=−
11
22
1
11
1
1
1
1
)( TGEGEGw  
(2.20)   1
22
11
11
2
1
2
1
)( −−−− +=−
σσσ
σαα
α GETGE
Gw  
The sustain condition is identical to the one reported for the 
core-periphery model except for µ is replaced by α. 
(2.21)   
σ
σσαα αα /1111
2 2
1
2
1
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++= −−−− TTTw  
Similarly, the break point is given by the following 
expression: 
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Tables and figures 
Table 4.1 . Ways in which explanations relate 
 
What is the same 
 
What differs 
 
Explanatory rivalry 
Explanatory complementarity 
CASE I 
M 
 
S (e.g., S1 and S2) 
 
-S1 and S2 are incompatible 
-S1 and S2 jointly cause M  
-S1 and S2 are causally related (S1 
causes S2 and S2 causes M) 
-S1 causes M under conditions C1, 
and S2 causes M under conditions 
C2 
-S1 and S2 are otherwise related  
CASE II 
S 
 
 
M (e.g., M 1 and M2) 
 
-M1 and M2 are incompatible 
-S explains M1 and M2 
-S causes M1 under conditions C1, 
and S causes M2 under conditions 
C2 
-M1 and M2 are causally related 
-M1 and M2 are otherwise related 
 
CASE III 
- 
 
S and M (e.g., S1, S2 , M 1, M2) 
 
-M1 is incompatible with S2 
-M2 is incompatible with S1 
-S1 and S2 are incompatible 
-M1 and M2 are incompatible 
-M1 and M2 are causally related 
-M1 and M2 are otherwise related 
-S1 and S2 are causally related 
-S1 and S2 are otherwise related 
-Both of the above 
-S1 and S2 jointly cause M1,2 
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Table 4.2. Relations of the various cluster explanations 
 
CASE I 
Explanations of competitiveness 
SAME M DIFFERENT S 
[CMGSax] = [CM3M&M] Continued 
[declining] competitiveness of firms 
in clusters 
[SGSax] Those cultural features 
facilitating adaptability 
[S3M&M] Flexible institutional fit 
RIVALRY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
Very similar S (Apparent causal relation: [SGSax] Æ [S3M&M]) 
CASE III 
Explanations of competitiveness 
DIFFERENT M DIFFERENT S 
[CM2AM&M] The competitiveness of 
clustered firms [single uni-locational 
firms] 
[CM2BM&M] The competitiveness of 
clustered firms [dispersed firms] 
 [S2aM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge 
creation among horizontally related 
firms 
[S2dM&M] Shared institutional 
environment 
------------------------------ 
[S2bM&M] Efficiencies in knowledge 
creation among vertically related 
firms  
[S2c M&M] Cost reductions 
[S2dM&M]Shared institutional 
environment 
[CMP] The competitiveness of 
clustered firms [firms otherwise 
organized] 
[S1P] Features of clusters that 
increase (static) productivity 
[S2P] Features of clusters that 
enhance firms’ capacity to innovate 
and thus productivity growth 
[S3P] New business formation 
[S4P] Favourable social structure 
  
 173
Table 4.2 (continues from previous page) 
 
RIVALRY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
(i) [CM2AM&M] + [CM2BM&M] ~ [CMP] 
(ii) [S2AM&M] + [S2BM&M] ~[S1P] + [S2P] 
(iii) [S2dM&M] ~ [S4P] 
(iv) M&M yield reconstructions of more precise CM’a and their related S’a 
(v) Partial incompatibility due to the explanatory primacy M&M ascribes to 
[CM2AM&M]  
 
CASE III 
DIFFERENT M DIFFERENT S 
Explanations of existence 
[CMGE] Existence of clusters [spatial 
dispersion] at all times and at all 
scales 
[SGE] The agglomerating mechanism 
of pecuniary externalities 
[CM1M&M] Existence of local clusters 
[other forms of spatial organisation] 
in the knowledge-based economy 
[S1M&M] The competitiveness of 
clustered firms due to [S2aM&M], 
[S2bM&M], [S2c M&M], [S2dM&M] 
RIVALRY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
Complementarity: different meanings of ‘existence’ 
 
  
 174
Figure 5.1 Spatial agglomeration versus backyard capitalism 
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Samenvatting 
 
Geografische economie is een nieuwe benadering binnen de 
economie die erop gericht is om een geunificeerd raamwerk te 
ontwikkelen voor de bestudering van de ruimtelijke 
concentratie van economische activiteiten. Dit streven naar 
eenheid of unificatie staat in scherp contrast met de huidige 
verscheidenheid van benaderingen die erop gericht zijn 
ruimtelijke agglomeratie te verklaren. De verschillende 
benaderingen zijn voorgesteld in of op het grensvlak tussen 
disciplines zoals economie, economische geografie en business 
strategy. Voorstanders van de verschillende theorieën hebben 
hun kritiek vooral gericht op geografische economie. Dit 
proefschrift onderzoekt de verscheidenheid aan theorieën en 
richt zich daarbij met name op de rol van geografische 
economie. Het bevat vier onafhankelijke essays die eenheid, 
verscheidenheid en verklaring in relatie tot geografische 
economie en haar buren betreffen. Deze worden voorafgegaan 
door een vijfde essay dat de gemeenschappelijke filosofische 
premissen expliciet maakt, het overkoepelende filosofische 
raamwerk schetst en de belangrijkste conclusies presenteert. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk introduceert een pluralisme binnen een 
raamwerk van realisme en laat zien hoe een dergelijke 
benadering inzicht kan geven in het feit dat theorieën slechts 
deelaspecten belichten en dat ook slechts bij benadering en 
verheldert de samenhang met een contrastieve benadering van 
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verklaring. Verder bespreekt dit essay de belangrijkste 
conclusies van dit proefschrift zowel voor geografische 
economie (GE) en haar buren als voor de filosofie van de sociale 
wetenschappen in het algemeen en de filosofie van de economie 
in het bijzonder. 
Het tweede hoofdstuk laat zien dat het streven naar eenheid 
of unificatie een belangrijke factor heeft gespeeld in de 
ontwikkeling van GE. GE claimt te hebben laten zien dat 
ruimtelijke agglomeratie-effecten op verschillende ruimtelijke 
niveaus voortkomen uit dezelfde basale economische 
mechanismen. Hiermee zou ze een geunificeerde benadering 
van deze fenomenen hebben ontwikkeld. De gedetailleerde 
analyse die hier wordt gepresenteerd verheldert zowel de rol 
die unificatie recentelijk heeft gespeeld binnen GE als de 
belangrijkste filosofische benaderingen van unificatie. Ze laat 
met name zien dat geen van die filosofische benaderingen 
volledig recht kan doen aan de rol die unificatie binnen GE 
heeft gespeeld. 
Het derde hoofdstuk betreft het meest verhitte theoretische 
debat in het vakgebied, te weten dat tussen economische 
geografen en geografische economen. Door mogelijke 
misverstanden op te helderen maakt dit essay duidelijk waar 
het debat echt over gaat. Daarmee laat het zien dat de twee 
benaderingen zowel op methodologische als inhoudelijke 
gronden complementair zouden kunnen zijn. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk analyseert intertheoretische relaties 
tussen verklaringen van ruimtelijke clustering (dat wil zeggen, 
de geografische concentratie van bedrijven die met elkaar 
samenwerken of concurreren). Met dit doel worden de 
explananda in contrastieve termen geherformuleerd en wordt 
beargumenteerd dat de verklaringen niet als concurrenten 
beschouwd hoeven te worden: ze richten zich op het 
beantwoorden van verschillende vragen over en benadrukken 
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uiteenlopende aspecten van het fenomeen van ruimtelijke 
clustering. 
Het vijfde hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat de contrastieve 
benadering goed te gebruiken is om geschillen over 
onrealistische modellen in de economische wetenschap op te 
lossen. Het laat met name zien dat de contrastieve benadering 
van verklaren het nut van bepaalde onrealistische 
veronderstellingen van theoretische modellen kan verhelderen. 
Ter illustratie worden de kritieken op GE dat ze onrealistisch 
zou zijn besproken wat resulteert in een gekwalificeerde 
verdediging van een aantal van de onrealistische elementen van 
de relevante modellen. De contrastieve benadering wordt met 
name gebruikt om de vraag die GE probeert te beantwoorden 
en daarmee de verklaring die ze nastreeft te specificeren om zo 
de abstracties of, beter gezegd, de isoleringen die ze maakt te 
evalueren.  
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